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# Daily Report

# East Europe

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# Daily Report
East Europe

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### Zhelev, DPS Head Discuss Situation in Kurdzhali

*AU3011112795 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelyu Zhelev will meet Prime Minister Zhan Videnov and pose the issue of Kurdzhali, especially the fact that the elected mayor Rasim Musa has not assumed his post yet.

This became clear after the one-hour meeting President Zhelev had today with Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] leader Ahmed Dogan, the elected mayor of Kurdzhali, Rasim Musa, and DPS deputies.

President Zhelev will ask Prime Minister Videnov to punish Angel Naydenov, administrator of Khaskovo Oblast, who still has not convened the Kurdzhali Municipal Council, something which contradicts the law.

Dogan told reporters that the law requires that the Kurdzhali Municipal Council be convened, but the issue is being delayed in a biased manner. This is a violation of the law, he added.

### Russian Participation in Belene Plant Confirmed

*AU2911163395 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 25 Nov 95 p 7*

[Report by Vesela Vaneva: "Russia's Participation in Completing Construction of Belene Nuclear Power Plant Has Been Confirmed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The construction of the Belene nuclear power plant cannot continue without the participation of the main Russian constructor and designer, Konstantin Rusinov, chairman of the Committee on Power Supply, stated on 24 November at a news conference with Russian nuclear experts at the end of the two-day seminar titled "Modernization and Reconstruction of Plants with WWER-440 and WWER-1,000 Reactors, and Increasing Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Through New and Modern Reactors."

At the forum it became clear that there are four options regarding the first reactor of the Belene nuclear power plant. By utilizing the equipment that has already been installed to a maximum degree and modernizing the original project to a minimum degree, the reactor could be licensed for operation at a capacity of 600 megawatts [MW]—60 percent of its planned capacity.

The second option involves replacing part of the original equipment and introducing the "Nuclear Power Plant-91" Petersburg Project for big reactors with a capacity of 1,000 MW.

The third option has been proposed by "Atomenergoproekt" in St. Petersburg, and it involves a reactor of the new generation with a capacity of 640 MW. The fourth option involves the installation of a reactor with a capacity 500 MW or even less, in accordance with the scope of our power supply system.

"We demonstrated the new projects which are being developed now in Russia, in order to help the Bulgarian experts make their choice," Viktor Sidorenko, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, said.

### 'New Type' of Reactors Offered

*AU2911163595 Sofia NOVINI PLYUS in Bulgarian No. 34, 25 Nov-1 Dec 95 p 6*

[Interview with Atomenergoeksport Director General Viktor Kozlov and Zarubezhatomenergostroy Director Eduard Akopyan by Lidiya Kotseva and Vladislav Vorobyev "especially for NOVINI PLYUS"; place and date not given: "The Nuclear 'Topenergy' Company Is Called 'Triada'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A story has appeared that Western forces tried to take metal samples from the No. 1 Reactor at Kozloduy to discover the composition of the metal used to build the hulls of Russian nuclear submarines. The chiefs of two of the largest Russian nuclear firms, Atomenergoeksport Director General Viktor Kozlov and Zarubezhatomenergostroy Director Eduard Akopyan, dismissed this allegation in an interview granted especially to NOVINI PLYUS.

The composition of the metal used to construct the shells of the Kozloduy nuclear reactors has been known for at least 20 years. There are no secrets about this, Kozlov said. The Russian nuclear submarines use similar, but less powerful reactors. It is true that the reactors are made of the same metal, which is of excellent quality and has a service life of over 50 years at high temperatures and pressures, but there is nothing secret about it. According to Kozlov, the reasons for taking the samples is much simpler: Certain countries again want to reassure themselves of the safety of our reactors.

We met the two Russian nuclear specialists at the airport and learned that the seminar on "remodeling" the Russian reactors was not the only purpose of their visit. They admitted that they were also discussing the current state of the Bulgarian-Russian "Triada" Company, which supplies and repairs nuclear equipment for the nuclear power stations in Bulgaria. The company was formed last March and not many people know about it. Its director is Konstantin Rusinov, chairman of the Committee on Power Supply. People who know about it have already dubbed it the nuclear "Topenergy," so our first question to Kozlov and Akopyan was this:

[NOVINI PLYUS] It is rumored that "Triada" is connected with the Russian nuclear mafia and that it was devised and registered in an irregular manner.

[Answer] This is quite untrue. The Russian share in "Triada" is 45 percent, of which Atomenergoeksport and Zarubezhenergoeksport each hold 20 percent and the remaining 5 percent is held by our partners at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. These organizations have existed for more than 20 years and have great experience in the world market for nuclear technologies. They also built the nuclear plant in Kozloduy. So far, the mafia has failed to penetrate them.

[NOVINI PLYUS] How is the Bulgarian side's share allocated?

[Answer] The National Electricity Company, Energoproekt, Energoremont, and the Bulgarian-Russian Investment Bank all hold shares. All these bodies are state structures. We are convinced that they do not contain even a single crack for the mafia to creep through.

[NOVINI PLYUS] What ambitions do you have?

[Answer] We combined our efforts to be able to complete the repair work at the Kozloduy nuclear power station as soon as possible. We believe that the thermoelectric power stations also need reconstructing, so we will be working on them, too. After the Bulgarian Government reached a decision to resume construction of the Belene plant, "Triada" decided also to invest money in completing the construction of the new nuclear plant. We intend to deal with all matters relating to the repair, protection, construction, and equipment of power stations. "Triada" will be trying to create a good basis for the future of the Bulgarian energy industry.

[NOVINI PLYUS] It has become known that reactors of a new generation, of a completely new type, will be installed at Belene. What are they like?

[Answer] I can assure you that if the nuclear plant is built with Russian reactors, these will conform to European standards. They will be the same type of water-cooled water-moderated reactors, [WWER] but more up-to-date. In Belene it is planned to use 320-1,000-megawatt [MW] WWER reactors. In the CIS countries about 20 nuclear plants of such type have been in service since the start of the 1980's and they are continuously being improved. Russia does not offer nuclear reactors abroad before they have been tried and tested inside our country. Almost every time a unit is shut down for maintenance, improvements are made to the control system, taking into account the international standards. If the requirements are made more stringent in the future, we will fit new components. The problem is that there is a limit to the extent to which systems already in existence can be updated. Accordingly, we are working on a design for a new type of WWER 320-1,000 MW reactor. We will be installing the first ones in the No. 6 and No. 7 generating units of the Novovoronezhka nuclear power station. These will be 21st century reactors and will start operating after the year 2000. As soon as we get them licensed, we will give them the right to go forth and multiply and will offer them to China, India, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and other countries. In about 20-30 years, we will devise an even newer generation of reactors.

[NOVINI PLYUS] How much will the new reactors for Belene cost?

[Answer] I cannot tell you at the moment. The design projects are not ready, yet you are asking me now much they cost! First, we have to send our project engineers to Bulgaria to investigate the possibilities for constructing the plant and what equipment is required, after which we will draw up the projects and calculate the costs.

[NOVINI PLYUS] Are you joining the trilateral consortium that is developing new 640-MW reactors with Siemens of Germany?

[Answer] We are not working with Siemens on this project, but we do have another one under way with them on improving automatic control systems for the existing 1,000-MW reactors, including those installed in Kozloduy's No. 5 and No. 6 units. We have decided to collaborate with Siemens on these systems so that we do not reinvent the wheel that they have already made. As regards the WWER 640-MW reactor, one of this type is already being built at Sosnovyy Bor near St. Petersburg and it will enter service around the year 2001. After this, three similar reactor units are planned for the Kola nuclear power station. When we have thoroughly tried these out as well, we may offer them for sale abroad. These reactors embody the latest technological improvements. There is a real possibility that they will be offered on the international market before the year 2000.

[NOVINI PLYUS] What will happen with the 1,000-MW reactor that we have already bought from the Czech Republic for Belene?

[Answer] Much of this unit's equipment has already been purchased and installed. It also incorporates the new control system. If the Bulgarian authorities reach a decision, we can quickly finish the work. The site is in a very good state and much of the work has been completed. With a little additional money and tight deadlines, the unit can be put into service in three or three and a half years. The Bulgarian builders had done an excellent job before your parliament suspended construction. Had this political situation not developed in Bulgaria, there could have been two reactors working at Belene by now.

[NOVINI PLYUS] Are there any grounds for the suggestion raised by the West that if powerful reactors are used to generate more electricity, Bulgaria will be flooded with surplus electricity and it will be impossible to link our country to the European energy grid?

[Answer] Bulgaria is located at almost the center of Europe. It is linked to the energy systems of its neighbors and will have no difficulty selling its surplus electricity. You are not an isolated island that cannot be connected to the transmission systems of other European countries. Apart from this, the new reactors do not have to operate at full capacity, so there are no grounds for these suggestions.

[NOVINI PLYUS] Our interview made it clear that, in their search for sensations, certain sources have been throwing and continue to throw mud at the Bulgarian energy industry. Undoubtedly, this is not to the benefit of either Bulgaria or Russia, which remains our most advantageous partner at the moment. To prevent the same thing happening that occurred with Topenergy and to forestall the next scandal, our newspaper has permitted itself to publish information about the activities of a company that will be active in Bulgaria from now on.

### Russian Minister Views Reactors

*AU2911161595 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 25 Nov 95 p 6*

[Interview with Viktor Sidorenko, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, by Veselka Marinova; place and date not given: "The New Type of Nuclear Power Units Will Be Built First in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marinova] Mr. Sidorenko, what is your impression of our nuclear power plant?

[Sidorenko] The Kozloduy Plant is in very good condition, and my impressions are excellent. Together with the Bulgarian specialists, we worked out a program to improve the safety of the nuclear reactors. The old WWER-440 [400-megawatt water-moderated water-cooled] reactors will need more money spent on them, but the 1,000-megawatt [MW] reactors are of a modern type.

[Marinova] Does this mean that the four less powerful reactors will remain in operation until the end of their design life?

[Sidorenko] If the measures we have recommended are taken and the program that we have just drafted with the Bulgarian specialists is carried out, and provided that the analyses of the condition of the reactor shell are completed and the reactor is restored to a serviceable state, it will be possible to continue operating the No. 1 reactor until the end of its design life. The situation with the No. 2 unit is even more advantageous.

[Marinova] At the Sofia seminar the Russian side announced a new generation of reactors. Can these reactors be installed at Belene when the construction of the plant is completed?

[Sidorenko] At this seminar we will clarify three issues. The first concerns the modernization of the reactors now in service, and the second concerns how the construction of the Belene nuclear plant will be completed. We have to discuss what design or what type of reactor will be accepted for it. In addition, we are making preparations for the future, and propose that we should take a longer-term view. However, I do not think that this has any relation to the completion of the Belene plant. The construction of this plant should be completed according to the principle of modernizing these reactors, which are considered to be sufficiently modern by present-day standards.

[Marinova] How do you intend to develop Russia's nuclear power industry?

[Sidorenko] In developing our strategy we have mapped out three stages. We are now at the end of the first stage, which consists of modernizing the units now in service so that we can use them to the end of their design lives. It is not excluded that some of them may remain in service for a longer period. As well as doing this, it was very important for us to develop reactors of a new type with improved safety characteristics. This work is now nearing completion. Our aim is for the first units of this type to start operating at the end of the century. Russia also has to decommission some nuclear generating capacities, and this has to be synchronized with the entry into service of the new power plants. We cannot get by without our nuclear power industry.

[Marinova] Will the reactors of the new type first be built inside or outside Russia?

[Sidorenko] Design projects already exist, and a decision has been adopted in principle to use a number of sites in Russia. The first such plant will be built in Leningrad Oblast, and we will also build plants on the Kola Peninsula and near Novovoronezh.

[Marinova] What does the Bulgarian-Russia "Triada" Company represent?

[Sidorenko] "Triada" is a company that we have formed for joint economic and commercial activities. It is our aim for the Russian and Bulgarian organizations to be based on certain structures that are operating effectively in this field.

### Klaus on Approval for Bosnian Peacekeeping Unit

*LD2911124395 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus commented on the government meeting today that discussed the issue of sending a Czech peacekeeping unit to Bosnia:

[Begin Klaus recording]] After a three-hour-long deliberation and consideration of dozens of circumstances, the government has unanimously arrived at the conclusion to offer our participation in the international effort to reinstate peace in Bosnia. That is the main conclusion.

The government is aware of the enormous seriousness of this decision. Some ministers said it was the most difficult decision they have had to make while in office. We discussed, clarified a whole host of issues, and, compared with the submitted material, we switched it around. I think the main thing is that the material was unanimously approved. [end recording]

### CSSD Official Discusses Referendum on NATO

*AU3011112595 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 24 Nov 95 p 13*

[Commentary by CSSD Deputy Chairman Petra Buzkova: "To Join NATO, Preferably Without a Referendum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The rather broad consensus on our political scene for the necessity of working toward joining NATO is not surprising. A single glance eastward is sufficient. Squalor prevails on the territory of the former Soviet Union, with new people offering us the old formulas: The big words about national pride at least temporarily drown the rumbling in the stomach. People listen to generals because they know, even without reading the famous English philosopher, that "war takes care of everyone, it brings victory to some, death to others." The squalor of peace is so hopeless that the worries of war seem to them a preferable alternative.

The interest of the Czech Republic and the interest of the NATO countries is, I believe, identical: To prevent the export of this Russian squalor through Russian arms and nuclear intimidation and to constrain the space into which the Russian (Ukrainian, etc.) armed squalor could be exported without any difficulty. Our experience of 1968 and the recent Yugoslav experience show that we should not ignore the advice that appeared in an influential U.S. daily approximately six months ago precisely in the context of the possible admission of the postcommunist countries to NATO: "Son, never go to global nuclear war because of a country you cannot find on the map."

Despite the widely acknowledged Czech interest, a dissonance exists in our country on the NATO issue: the referendum controversy. Why is this issue so burning, if we agree on the core of the matter all the way across an unusually broad section of the spectrum, namely, from the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] to the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD]?

I do not see the call for a referendum as a concealed rejection of NATO entry, but, rather, I think there are two other incongruent, yet connected, reasons to support the call for a referendum.

The first is the fear of the cost involved in the Army's reaching the standard required of a NATO member country. At the same time, we are facing a very simple consideration: Neutrality would be cheaper, but it is feasible only with guarantees from the superpowers, and we do not have them. To be able to maintain our defense capability on our own certainly would be more expensive than maintaining it within the framework of a strong military structure. Of course, the arithmetic has been successfully muddled up by our military top brass, who detected a chance to cut for themselves an even greater piece of the budget pie in the name of achieving compatibility between our Army and NATO.

The other reason is more complex. After the ODS-HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] government coalition decided in 1992 on the partition of Czechoslovakia in a way that is unique in the context of European culture—I am trying not to say audacious—i.e., without a referendum, many people, myself included, became more sensitive to the arrogant decision-making of the present government parties on matters that concern the sovereignty of the state. To some people, a referendum on whether to opt for NATO membership may seem to be a satisfaction for 1992.

If they were to be given such satisfaction—and I do not feel that way—this is not the time to ask for it. A fact-finding referendum would most likely confirm that the general will of the citizens supports the endeavors to join NATO. We do not have a law, however, according to which such a fact-finding (or any other) referendum would be conducted. I do not intend to comment on the irresponsibility of the coalition now, which has led to this situation. Thanks to the absence of such a law, the demand for a referendum on joining NATO, which, however unusual, remains neutral in its intent, acquires the unintended character of delaying a decision and tends toward rejection of entry. In view of this and the possibility that otherwise the scale of the political consensus on our willingness to join NATO could be made questionable abroad, the CSSD has decided to express its support for these efforts without the condition of a referendum.

It is not clear to me, however, why the government coalition is not just as interested in the incontestable nature of the broad political consensus. Together with the CSSD Deputies' Club, it certainly has more than the constitutional majority in the parliament regarding the NATO issue. So, why has not there been a discussion on this topic in parliament? Is there, as long as the referendum is not realistic, any possibility for a more representative expression of the political will? I know that our government quickly got used to seeing parliament just as a voting machine through which the enlightened laws that it drafts must be passed. Moreover, deputies often spoil the wise government bills with audacious comments. Therefore, the less presented to them, the better. Everyone has the right to his own biases, and why should I deny them to our government officials? Nevertheless, it would not hurt if they remembered that, in the countries to which the Republic is turning in its efforts to join NATO the idea is mostly well rooted that parliament plays a key role in democracy, and if they acted accordingly.

### Minister Volunteers To Complete Army Concept

*AU2911204495 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 24 Nov 95 p 2*

[Report by "fp": "Holan: The Concept Only Needs To Be Complemented"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Defense Minister Vilem Holan will present the upgraded Army concept to the government by the specified deadline—that is, by Christmas of this year. According to the minister's statement for DENNI TELEGRAF yesterday, it will be no problem because the Army concept "is actually ready and only needs to be complemented into an understandable form." The actual concept is, according to him, "very voluminous." According to the minister, the main tasks for the years 1993 to 1996, like the partition of the federal Army, reorganization, and reduction of the strength of the Army from 100,000 to 65,000 men, have been fulfilled. Holan says that he actually volunteered at the Ministerial Council to complete the concept for the coming years.

### Communist Party Claims Largest Membership

*AU2911145195 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 Nov p 3*

[Article by Marketa Matouskova: "The Ranks of the KSCM Allegedly Most Populous"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to the individual political parties' own data, the KSCM [Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia] has the largest membership. It is followed by the KDU-CSL [Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party], the SPR-RSC [Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia], the HDZJ [Movement of Retired People for Social Security], the ODS [Civic Democratic Party], and the CSSD [Czech Social Democratic Party].

**Party-Reported Membership Data**

| | |
|---|---|
| KSCM | 200,000 |
| KDU-CSL | 80,000 |
| SPR-RSC | 55,000 |
| HDZJ | 40,000 |
| ODS | 21,803 |
| CSSD | 12,500 |
| LSNS | 7,000 |
| SDL | 6,000 |
| ODA | 2,500 |
| KDS | 2,200 |
| SD | 1,200 |
| KAN | 600 before the congress, 200 now |

According to information from Press Spokesman Vera Zezulkova, the KSCM has 200,000 members, representing approximately 2 percent of all qualified voters. The second-largest party is the KDU-CSL, whose ranks currently comprise some 80,000 citizens (i.e., 0.9 percent of the voters). Third place in terms of membership size is claimed by the SPR-RSC. Employees of the Secretariat of this party have told LIDOVE NOVINY that they have 55,000 members (0.6 percent of the voters' total).

HDZJ representatives report that they have some 40,000 members, but there is absolutely no evidence for this figure. The ODS registers in its 1,391 local centers a total of 21,803 members (0.2 percent). The CSSD follows with 12,500 organized social democrats, representing 0.15 percent of voters. The sixth-largest party is supposedly the LSNS [Liberal National Social Party], with 7,000 members. The SDL [Party of the Democratic Left], according to Secretary Stanislava Zajicova, has 6,000 members. It is followed by the Left Bloc [LB], with approximately 3,000 members. The Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], according to Press Spokesman David Rozanek, has 2,500 members. According to KDS [Christian Democratic Party] Press Spokesman Ondrej Turek, on 15 November, his party had 2,200 members. Since spring, when the opponents of integration with the ODS launched their antagonistic campaign within the party, the KDS has lost, according to Turek, only 20 members, who were immediately replaced by new membership candidates. The Free Democrats [SD] currently have approximately 1,200 members, according to Presidum Member Michal Hron. KAN [Club of Nonaligned Activists], after its recent congress, has the smallest membership of all of the listed parties. According to a secretariat employee who wishes to remain anonymous, it is expected that, following the rejection of the merger with the KDS, half the original 600 members will transfer to the KDS, some to the KDU and the Democratic Union, and only some 150 to 200 will remain in the club. [passage omitted]

### EP's Boesch Rejects Slovak Officials' Criticism

*AU3011080595*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Slovak newspapers on 25 November publish statements by Herbert Boesch, head of the European Parliament [EP] delegation at the first meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EU and the Slovak Republic, held in Bratislava from 22 to 24 November, in which he responds to Slovak officials' criticism that the Slovak Government had not been given the chance to express its opinion on the EP resolution of 16 November, which appealed to the Slovak Government to respect democratic principles and human rights, and that the resolution was drafted on the basis of "one-sided information."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 25 November on pages 1 and 3 carries a 1,200-word interview with Herbert Boesch by Juraj Alner entitled "We Came Not To Investigate but To Prepare the Future." The interview was conducted in Bratislava in the course of the Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting.

Asked to respond to Slovak representatives' "reproaches" that the resolution was one-sided and should have been coordinated with them, Boesch says: "Even before the adoption of the resolution in Strasbourg, our collaborators delivered its draft to your ambassador to the EU. The next day, State Secretary Sestak was in Strasbourg. They both participated in a session of the European delegation with the joint parliamentary committee of Socialists and Liberals." Boesch also rejects "some Slovak representatives'" assertion that the EU resolution represents an act of interference in internal Slovak affairs: "I have already directly replied to this to your prime minister: We have a common agreement. On the plane to Bratislava, I read once again the 'Memorandum' that forms part of the Slovak application to join the EU, in which the Slovak Republic critically comments on the 'deficit of democracy' in the EU. I told the prime minister: This is your right. But it works both ways. The prime minister did not reply to that." Asked to comment on the "comparisons between the EP resolution and 'diktats' from the past that have come from official mouths," Boesch then says: "I did not want to discuss this week what absurd and even stupid comparisons with the dictators of previous decades have suddenly emerged. We must think of the future. We have a common project and must move closer to it. I believe we have succeeded in this."

Boesch is also asked whether the EU parliament members received "satisfactory" answers to the "very specific reservations" expressed in their resolution. He replies that the EP delegation "did not come to Slovakia in the capacity of the 'European police' to investigate the details of individual affairs" and that its mission was political rather than investigative. "The important thing is that we told our Slovak friends: 'We have problems with you in various areas.' We came with our cards on the table. I think matters are now moving in the right direction."

In another reply, the EP delegation head expresses bewilderment at the conflict between Prime Minister Meciar and President Kovac. He says: "No one in Europe understands the evident conflict between them. We spoke with both of them very frankly. In connection with integration into the EU, they both expressed the same ideas. That, at least, was the impression we gained. Where is the problem, then? Why do they not go for a beer and settle these matters together? Sometimes it is good to have friends who look at things with detachment and see that the problem is solvable. Why do you not solve it?"

On the same day, on page 2, NARODNA OBRODA carries a 700-word report by "suj, isa" on a news conference given by Herbert Boesch and Augustin Marian Huska, the Slovak delegation head, in Bratislava on 24 November, after the conclusion of the Joint Parliamentary Committee meeting. According to the report, Boesch rejected as "unwarranted" Slovak officials' objections that the EP resolution was based on "one-sided information." He reportedly said that "individual member states and the EU have excellent representatives in Bratislava, who maintain good relations with the government, the coalition, and the opposition. 'We came here to forestall the creation of such legends,' he added. Asked by NARODNA OBRODA whether he believes that an earlier meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee could have prevented the resolution from coming into being, he replied that the resolution contains concerns and worries about certain areas and that the resolution had been preceded by demarches. He said that, occasionally, the EU delegation was confronted with the argument that the EP, by dispatching such resolutions, greatly complicates the situation for the Slovak leadership because it is then difficult to convince the citizens of the Slovak Republic that entry into the EU is a good thing. He drew attention to the fact that the same argument is valid also for the other side because it, too, must convince the citizens of EU countries that the EU's enlargement by new member states will bring them more advantages than disadvantages. Herbert Boesch emphasized the importance of an early ratification of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty as a key step toward dedramatizing [oddramatizovani] the issue of minorities."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 25 November on pages 1 and 4 carries a 1,000-word interview with Herbert Boesch by Zuzana Kohutkova entitled "Start With the Endeavor Not To Deflect." In the interview, Boesch reiterates that EU diplomats in Bratislava maintain contacts with all sides of the domestic political conflict and that the EU "takes very seriously the task of obtaining an objective picture about the Slovak Republic." He therefore "cannot accept" the argument that "the EU holds discussions only with the opposition and not with the government" and that "in its statements regarding the situation in the Slovak Republic, the EU sides with the opposition." Boesch also mentions that "not all questions raised in the basic debate on the political situation in the Slovak Republic have been answered as the EP would perhaps imagine" during the Bratislava talks, and cites the example of "important parliamentary committees" from which the opposition is still excluded.

### Meciar Suggests DU To Blame for EU Demarche

*AU3011113495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 25 Nov 95 p 2*

[Article by Eva Laukova: "The Prime Minister Considers the Time Frame for the Slovak Republic's Entry Into the EU To Be a Delphic Oracle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prievidza—"The predictions for the time frame seem like a Delphic oracle to me," said Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in reply to a question from PRAVDA on what he thinks about the personal opinion expressed by Herbert Boesch, the head of the European Parliament delegation, who declared on Slovak Television that the Slovak Republic may become a member of the EU in 10-15 years.

The prime minister added that any particulars on who will enter the EU and when are inappropriate because no one knows the time scale for future events. "The EU itself is changing qualitatively; after all, it started with six states and now there are 15 of them. At the same time, the exacting nature of interlinking two systems is also changing. We have to embark on basic systemic changes to an extent the other side is not always aware of. This also requires a certain method for generating assets on the part of the EU, but also a means of generating our own assets so that this process moves forward in a manner that, in the event of competition, does not lead to the collapse of the enterprises."

At yesterday's meeting with state administration representatives in Prievidza, the prime minister also said that the Slovak Republic's strategic objective is to continue in its endeavors for incorporation into the North Atlantic structures, but the strategic efforts of the Slovak Government have been interpreted incorrectly by the opposition and President Michal Kovac in the EU countries and the United States. This has led to the unfair reactions by the EU countries and the European Parliament.

According to the prime minister, bitterness and acrimony still prevail on the political scene. Bellicose attitudes have manifested themselves recently, and militancy is becoming discernible, especially among the Christian democrats. "They announced in the Federal Assembly in 1992 that they would put us away for breaking up Czechoslovakia; now they are yelling on the squares that they will lock us up," he said to illustrate the situation. He suggested that the political activities of the Democratic Union [DU] abroad are associated with the recent EU demarche: "Its political leadership is using the fact that it has three foreign ministers; it has staked everything abroad and is 'promoting' its own state and parliament there."

Following a question from PRAVDA, the prime minister explained what he had meant by his comment concerning the Michal Kovac Jr. affair. At yesterday's meeting with state administration representatives, he said that there had been friction between the Interior Ministry and the Slovak Information Service [SIS]. "We have never made a secret of the fact that there was a real danger of friction between these institutions. Someone managed to arrange things cunningly so that SIS and the Interior Ministry suspected one another for a time instead of searching for the culprits. This inappropriate situation was dealt with by the Defense Council. The time that was lost by this made it possible, if there was a crime, for the culprits to cover their tracks. Therefore, the work is now very hard, although relations between these two institutions are normal and legal."

### MKDH Member: Kovac Broke Promise by Signing Law

*LD2911163395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1500 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Language Law signed by President Kovac is not only bad but also unconstitutional, Gyula Bardos of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH] told a news conference today. He said the president had thus broken his promise not to put his signature to laws that are at variance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Gyula Bardos said the MKDH is ready to join those opposition deputies intending to take the matter of whether the Language Law conforms with the Constitution to the Constitutional Court.

## President on Disagreement With Prime Minister

*BR3011162095 Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 24 Nov 95 p 6*

[Interview with Slovak President Kovac by Christine Dupre in Bratislava; date not given: "Michal Kovac Does Not Rule Out Resignation on Referendum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *It was a very diplomatic Slovak president who LA LIBRE BELGIQUE met at a rather empty Primatial Palace in Bratislava: The budget cuts imposed on the head of state's services by his avowed enemy Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar are beginning to hurt.*

*One month after the joint move by the European Union and the United States, a European Parliament resolution condemning in the same terms the government's antidemocratic practices has been described by the governing Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) as "reminiscent of the times of the Nazis and of Brezhnev, when warnings preceded the invasions." Also, Slovak television conducted a long interview with an ex-convict who accused President Kovac's son of involvement in fraud.*

[Dupre] Far from blowing over, isn't the Slovak political crisis deepening?

[Kovac] You must first take certain things into account. Slovakia is a country with a free press, where democratic institutions are continuing to operate, and where economic change is continuing. At the political level, though, there is a split between the parliamentary majority and the government on the one hand, and the president, the opposition, and the European Union on the other, regarding the significance of democracy. The former believe that any law they pass is just, the latter think differently. Myself, I look upon the "moves" as a friendly way of saying to Slovakia that it should not abandon the idea of integrating into European structures. The tragedy would be if the government persisted in its present view (from which the HZDS executive bodies are now distancing themselves, ed.) which would jeopardize the future prosperity of our citizens. As regards Slovak television, the very fact that it broadcasts an interview with a criminal who admits having stolen $400,000 from a company in the country, when there has not been a single picture of my trip to the eastern regions, shows that the television stations are solely serving the narrow interests of a group of politicians.

[Dupre] Do you still believe it will be possible to come to a working arrangement with Prime Minister Meciar?

[Kovac] Yes, because we are obliged to do so by the Constitution and the results of the democratic elections! On the other hand, I still believe Meciar is intent on pushing me into resignation. Because I refuse to go, he is now thinking of holding a referendum on the matter, which, in the opinion of the experts, would be contrary to the Constitution, which lays down very strict conditions for the dismissal of a president. Nevertheless, if there is a referendum and if it did go against me, I would not exclude the possibility of resignation. The judgment of the people in this case would be less constitutional than moral and political.

[Dupre] Has the nature of your conflict with the prime minister not gone beyond the personal level, having an effect on the balance of power in Slovakia? Whatever happens, your successor has lost the right to appoint the head of the secret services and to draw up the text of a motion for a referendum.

[Kovac] This is true, but that need not necessarily pose a threat to the democratic process; the German Government has much wider powers than the Slovak Government. The difference is that in Slovakia the opposition is excluded from parliamentary bodies that exercise control over the executive. But even the present parliamentary majority can change and take into account the moves by the West. The problem for the moment is that many MP's are unaware that what they are doing is not right.

[Dupre] So what stance should the European Union take? Pack its bags if things get any worse in Bratislava or opt for "constructive commitment" with Meciar?

[Kovac] Slovakia must not be allowed to fall into isolation. We must pursue dialogue, also with the present government. But—and I would not put the question in the same terms as you—I believe that only a democratic country and government will be able to join the European Union. And by helping Slovakia you are also helping it to integrate into democratic structures.

[Dupre] As regards relations between Slovakia and NATO, should we take Meciar seriously when he says that if his government does not find the approval it is seeking in the West it will turn to the East?

[Kovac] I believe it is preferable to look at what the government does than at the statements. Our problem is that the two small coalition parties, the National Party (far right) and the Workers Association (far left) are opposed to Slovakia's joining NATO. But, despite everything, they approved the government's program statement, which includes such integration. In terms of our international credibility, I am well aware that this is not an ideal situation, but even Meciar knows that this participation in Western structures will be impossible for a country that is neither democratic nor stable.

[Dupre] The present government's sole move toward these structures remains the signing of the Slovak-Hungarian treaty. And even that has not been ratified in Bratislava, while the law confirming Slovak as the "official language" is rekindling tensions with the Hungarian minority. Are they not in the process of destroying what has been achieved to date?

[Kovac] I am studying this law. I know that it does not prevent the 570,000 Magyars from being educated in their mother tongue and that in any country the use of the official language conforms to regulations: If a Slovak mayor is elected in a district with 80 percent Magyars, he will not be obliged to officially speak in Hungarian, and the same applies to a Slovak university professor. I am personally opposed to restrictions on the freedom of minorities to use their own language. We must now look at the content of the "supplementary law," which will determine this use and which must be approved by the Slovak parliament. I would like to see the majority and the opposition quickly enter into negotiations on this subject, and also on the treaty, which could still be ratified by the end of the year.

### Meciar, Belgian Foreign Minister on Meeting

*LD3011[illegible]33595 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgian Foreign Minister Erik Derycke arrived yesterday evening for an official visit to Slovakia. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar received him at the government office. Among the journalists present was Jozef Rebo for Slovak Radio:

[Rebo] Erik Derycke is the first Belgian foreign minister to visit Bratislava since the division of Czechoslovakia and the emergence of the independent Slovak Republic. Yesterday evening, he said, among other things, the following:

[Begin Derycke recording in French, fading into Slovak translation] It is an exceptional honor for me to be in your country. As you know very well, in terms of geographical area, Belgium does not rank among the largest states, but it has played an important role in the construction of Europe right from the beginning.

I think there exists a wealth of good feeling between our two countries, especially between our prime ministers. So, as far as I am concerned, I have to say that this visit is extremely important and necessary because a great many things are under preparation, and this concerns not merely the expansion of the European Union, but equally the expansion of NATO, and I believe that two countries with so much in common can help each other. I am here, therefore, to listen and perhaps also to give some advice in friendly discussions. [end recording]

[Rebo] Asked by Slovak Radio for his expectations of the visit, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar replied:

[Begin Meciar recording] I very highly appreciate the visit by the foreign minister of the Kingdom of Belgium as a significant impulse to the development of bilateral relations and to the assessment of issues of multilateral cooperation in the framework of the European Union and NATO, and in connection with the overall situation in Europe. Belgium is currently chairing the Schengen Agreement [on elimination of border controls between certain EU countries], and this too increases the importance of the visit. We have many friends in Belgium, we have a sincere interest in the development of cooperation in all spheres, and therefore I hope that this visit will in this sense be a further motivating factor, which will open the door to new initiatives. [end recording]

[Rebo] Belgian Foreign Minister Erik Derycke will hold talks today with his ministerial counterpart, Juraj Schenk, and he will also be received by Ivan Gasparovic, speaker of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [parliament].

### Official Urges Dialogue With U.S.

*LD3011140795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovakia considers constructive dialogue with the government in Washington as exceptionally important and badly needed. This was stated by Emil Kuchar, director general of the Political Section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in an interview for Voice of America after his talks with some employees of the Clinton administration of the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon.

He added that the two countries need each other because they have a large number of views and projects in common. These include a new system of export control of arms and other sensitive items. Slovakia was one of the founding members of this system.

In connection with the possible invitation of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar for a visit to the United States, Emil Kuchar noted that, if Washington has a sincere interest in an equal dialogue, talks between Meciar and Clinton should form its logical part.

### Opposition Rejects Call for Referendum on Meciar

*AU2911130795 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 28 Nov 95 p 2*

[CTK Report: "Vulgarities Among the Signatures"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Bratislava private entrepreneur Robert Krajnak has already collected over

10,000 signatures for a petition calling for a referendum with the question: "Do you agree with the dismissal of Vladimir Meciar as Slovak prime minister?" According to Krajnak, the signatures also include many forgeries. For example, signatures of the leaders of various political parties—Jan Carnogursky, Milan Knazko, Vojtech Bugar—have "miraculously" appeared on the same sheet. Some sheets contain vulgarities, including threats of hanging. According to Krajnak, official opposition circles have rejected the initiative.

### HZDS Board Condemns Opposition Rally

*AU2811220095 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 Nov 95 pp 1-2*

[Report by "(zl)": "The HZDS Republican Board Has Condemned the Vocabulary Used by the Opposition at Its Rally"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prievidza—"We do not have time for political vacations," said V. Meciar, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman and Slovak prime minister, at a meeting of HZDS Republican Board members in Prievidza on 25 November. He made this comment in connection with an analysis of developments on the domestic political scene, in particular the statements made by the opposition at its rally in Bratislava on 16 November. The HZDS Republican Board members adopted a statement on the domestic and foreign political situation in which they appraise favorably the activity of the coalition government, especially the positive economic results.

The statement also says that "the Republican Board expressed its alarm at the continuing attempts by certain opposition parties and movements and also by the president of the Republic to destroy the political system in Slovakia. These attempts, as is known, have also been reflected in the approach adopted by a number of foreign entities, including European Union bodies. In this context, it considers the EU and Slovak Joint Parliamentary Committee session to be very significant. It creates certain scope for ensuring that the Slovak Republic's legitimate bodies are at last given an opportunity to air their views on various phenomena and facts."

In the discussion on the report on the political situation, all of the participants condemned the opposition's vocabulary at its rally in Bratislava on 16 November. All those present expressed their indignation at the remarks made by a representative of the Christian Democratic Movement's young generation, who at the meeting described the ruling coalition as criminals and bandits and claimed that they must, and will, persevere against this. Therefore, it is necessary to activate the clubs, said V. Meciar, and to stabilize the membership base before the HZDS district assemblies, which will be held from 6 to 27 January next year.

One of the most important points on the agenda was a report on the territorial organization of local and state administration. This also provoked a comprehensive debate, and, at its conclusion, a proposal was approved that Slovakia be divided into eight territorial units.

A report on the activity of the Movement of Youth for a Democratic Slovakia was delivered by its chairman, P. Lutter. It is becoming apparent that it is necessary to guarantee supervision of the funds spent on supporting youth activity because it is often the case that the civic associations working with young people are financing activities directed against the government from state budget resources.

The journalists at the news conference were especially interested in the law on the protection of the Republic. A.M. Huska, HZDS and National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] deputy chairman, said in this connection that it is being drafted by the usual legislative means. In reply to a question on whether it is not being drafted as a consequence of the 16 November rally, he said that it had nothing to do with this. In reply to a question on whether the HZDS will take part in a commission to consider the language law, the chairman of the HZDS Deputies Club in the NR SR, T. Cabaj, said that the deputies had already expressed themselves on the law in the NR SR, so there is nothing to discuss. A.M. Huska pointed out that the approval of the language law has not created a dividing line in opinions between the opposition and the coalition.

### Official Criticizes Opposition Contacts With FRG

*AU2911084995 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 24 Nov 95 p 4*

[Report by TASR: "Launching Pad for Another Attack on Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The coming trip by a delegation of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] made up of Jan Carnogursky, Jan Figel, Milan Gala (all from the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]), and Bela Bugar (Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH]) to the FRG is not included in the program of the NRSR's foreign parliamentary contacts. The delegation also includes Peter Osusky from the Democratic Party [DS]. As Roman Hofbauer, chairman of the NRSR Committee for Economy, Privatization, and Enterprise, goes on to say in a statement he made available to TASR yesterday, the trip is being made and financed on the basis of an invitation from a German nonstate foundation.

The delegation's agenda includes meetings with the federal minister charged with coordinating the German state intelligence services, the state secretary of the Federal Ministry of Economics for liaison with parliament, and the Federation of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce.

According to Roman Hofbauer, it is more than unusual that "this group of opposition representatives of Slovak political entities that did not want Slovak statehood and whose method is destruction are being received by the German side at the highest level by central federal bodies, for whom members of the delegation are not matching partners." As the statement goes on to say, the planned talks of the KDH, MKDH, and DS representatives with high-ranking German partners from the Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union could become the launching pad for another attack on Slovakia from clericalist-Christian European political parties. The above facts introduce completely new elements into interstate diplomacy and European relations, which must be perceived with the utmost attention because they fundamentally change the established forms of these relations, Roman Hofbauer says in his statement.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 25 November on page 2 carries a 200-word report by "ao" on a Slovak National Party briefing, which specifies that the Slovak opposition politicians are to meet with "Schmidbauer, an official from the FRG Chancellor's Office responsible for the coordination of intelligence services in Germany."]

### British Deny 'Recalling' Privatization Adviser

*AU2911122195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Nov 95 p 4*

[Report by CTK: "Kerlik: No Adviser Has Been Officially Recalled From the Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"No British adviser operating in Slovakia with the support of the Know-How Fund (KHF), which is financed by the British Government, has been recalled through official government channels," Peter Kerlik, spokesman for the British Embassy in Bratislava, told CTK yesterday, rejecting a report in the 24 November issue of the British daily THE TIMES that Britain has recalled its privatization adviser in protest against the political manipulation of privatization in Slovakia.

Two such advisers used to work at the National Property Fund, but they concluded their work last summer as a result of the "normal termination of their contract." There are a number of people from the KHF in Slovakia at present, and they are all working normally, he added.

### ZRS Calls For Unity, Condemns 'Denunciation'

*AU2911112495 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 27 Nov 95 p 2*

[TASR report: "The Association of Workers of Slovakia Is Calling For Solidarity and Unity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—The members of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] Central Council discussed the domestic political situation and the outcome of the session of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the European Union and the Slovak Republic at a meeting in Banska Bystrica on 25 November.

"The predictions of those who had anticipated the collapse of our party after a year were false. The party is growing and becoming consolidated. Its position on the Slovak political scene is also getting stronger, and our coalition partners respect the Association of Workers of Slovakia. It is an equal partner, not a flunkey of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia." This statement was made by ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak at a press briefing held after the Central Council meeting.

ZRS Deputy Chairman Stefan Gavornik said that the Central Council members adopted the slogan "Solidarity, unity, and fortitude" and are also calling on the opposition parties to apply it. They favor a coalition that, according to them, is viable and should last until the end of the electoral period. They support it and the current government. They intend to remain in the coalition as long as their partners are as earnest as they have been until now. The ZRS Central Council members will endeavor to ensure that, in the interest of making privatization transparent, the Supreme Inspection Office has legal and guaranteed access to the National Property Fund [FNM]. They are demanding that what has happened in the FNM since its establishment be examined retrospectively.

"The ZRS Central Council is monitoring with alarm the increased polarization on the political scene in our republic. We consider the constant attacks by opposition politicians on our party's stance toward Slovakia's integrative orientation to be groundless. The view that it is unusual for the ruling party to have a different opinion from the one expressed in the Slovak Government's policy statement is wrong. This is a normal phenomenon in other European countries." This view, among others, is expressed in the statement issued by the ZRS Central Council on the domestic political and international situation. "The ZRS will continue to be a functioning element of the coalition grouping. It strongly condemns the threats against and the denunciation of the coalition grouping's functionaries and members made through the rallies organized by the opposition," it says at the conclusion of its statement.

### 'Revival' Platform Within SDSS Becomes Faction

*AU2811211495 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 27 Nov 95 p 2*

[TASR report: "B. Zala at the Head of the Faction Within the SDSS"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—A nationwide meeting of the signatories and supporters of the Revival [Obroda] of Social Democracy platform within the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] was held yesterday in Uhrovec. It decided unanimously to turn the platform into a faction and elected a leadership: L. Kohut, I. Laluha, J. Krajcik, V. Krajci, and S. Petery. B. Zala was elected chairman of its political program group.

### KDH: New Price Law Shifts Reforms Into Reverse

*AU3011101195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 28 Nov 95 p 3*

[Article by Mikulas Dzurinda, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement: "Low Prices—Through Orders or Through Competition?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] recently approved a new price law. The law is distinguished by four characteristics:

1. State bodies' dirigisme is being expanded.

2. Circumstances under which it is possible to regulate prices are being expanded, while these circumstances are formulated vaguely, in a way that cannot be measured (for example, the law makes it possible to regulate prices "in the public interest"....).

3. Bureaucracy is being expanded. For example, the law assigns the duty to keep the calculation of costs and profits for three years after the realization of the sale. Until now, it was necessary to keep only price records for three years, and price calculations had to be stored only in the case of prices subject to regulation in category or time [vecne alebo casove usmernovanie cien].

4. Sanctions are being tightened, as though we had a supercompetitive environment. And all of this is happening at the close of the first phase of economic reform.

The government is praising the results of the economy in 1994 and 1995. It claims that not only have we rebounded from the bottom, but also the results are surprisingly excellent. At the same time, it is undermining one of the three pillars on which the reform, and, hence, also the economic results, are based—the liberalization of consumer prices.

It is appropriate to ask: Why?

I believe that the reply is to be found in the explanatory report on the bill, page 7, where Article 12 is commented on as follows: "...the above provisions ensue from the need to guarantee the fulfillment of tasks from the Slovak Government Policy Statement, concerning the establishment of conditions for keeping the annual rate of inflation under 10 percent and gradually reducing it."

That is the crux of the matter. Once again, those ruling us have become convinced that it is possible to manage Slovakia by means of orders, commands, and directives. And how else could it be managed than by the strong and only arm of state bureaucrats? The evidence is provided, in particular, by Article 12, which defines the term inadequate price for sellers and buyers. The definitions are remarkable. These are agreed prices where the economically warranted costs, or adequate profit, are markedly exceeded or, in the second instance, prices that fall markedly short of the economically warranted costs. It goes without saying that adequacy, warrantableness, and markedness will be checked by state bureaucrats, without objective yardsticks, in a discretionary way.

It is evident that this not only prepares fertile soil for new corruption but, above all, that the government has committed a fundamental error. Instead of supporting the development of economic competition and establishing a competitive environment, the government is returning to the administrative methods of state dirigisme of 1948-89 that brought the Slovak economy to the brink of the abyss.

Instead of continuing the transformation process, the government is returning to approaches that will generate problems that have already been overcome. Let us recall what the liberalization of prices as of 1 January 1991 did to the Slovak economy. As a result of the abrupt liberalization of a substantial part (about 70 percent) of consumer prices at the beginning of 1991, in January 1991 retail prices jumped 25.9 percent and in the first half of 1991, as a whole, 51.6 percent. In the second half of 1991, however, retail prices rose only 6.7 percent. This decline was achieved through decline in the level of aggregate demand and by means of short-term regulatory measures. I will mention only the setting of maximum prices for staple foods and feed grain, maximum profit margins, and the like. These regulatory measures were eliminated by the end of 1991. In spite of this, in the first half of 1992 consumer prices rose merely by an unbelievable 1.4 percent, without changing existing legislation, through the attainment of macroeconomic balance and competent fiscal and monetary policy.

Now that we have overcome the aforementioned difficulties, we are again setting out on the way back. The government may be seeing this, but it lacks the strength and the expertise to continue reforms and is therefore putting in the reverse gear. That is why, after laws with which it hamstrung the capital market (law on securities, law on investment companies) and abolished privatization, laws that scared foreign investors to such a degree that the first and second quarters of 1995 saw the lowest influx of direct foreign investment to Slovakia since 1 January 1993, it has now come up with another law that is returning Slovakia to the hopeless situation from which it was already extricating itself.

Prices can be based either on orders from bureaucrats or on competition. We have already tested the command economy, which led to misery. [passage omitted] Instead of administrative interference by the state, the government should consistently support faster growth of economic competition and not just on the consumer goods market. The better and the greater competition there is, the slower prices will rise, and the more satisfied the citizen will be.

## Editorial on Dilemma of Sending Troops to Bosnia

*AU2911143395 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Nov 95 p 7*

[Editorial by Janos T. Barabas: "To Go or Not To Go"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every rose has its thorn. In other words, if we want to get something, we must also give something. NATO wants not only to set up a base in Hungary for its Bosnian peacekeepers; Washington requested the assistance of a Hungarian engineering unit in fulfilling their tasks.

So far, Hungary has firmly refrained from sending armed units to the neighbors, justifiably fearing the revival of certain historical concerns. However, the question is not only what the Serbs would say if a Hungarian military unit drove back the attack of some bellicose free unit against a bridge on the Sava River; it is also what a Hungarian mother would say whose son is in mortal danger, even if he volunteered for this mission. It is impossible to exclude the risk that building peace in Bosnia might demand not only the lives of ethnic Hungarians in Yugoslavia but also the life of Hungarians from the mother country.

We successfully avoided getting involved in this war, but it seems that we cannot avoid peace. If we are serious in our desire to become NATO members, unfortunately, we must acknowledge the fact that this has a price that cannot be expressed in money. Many people misunderstood or misinterpreted the conditions in NATO's cooperation document, and in order to make the doubters feel better about all this, they presented this document as if it did not stipulate the deployment of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Hungarian territory. The document did stipulate this, in case of need. And now it is such a case of need. Fortunately, the military base and the participation of Hungarian soldiers are needed for peace, and not for war.

This is a challenge that cannot be refused.

The Germans succeeded in solving a similar dilemma positively, although their historical burden is much heavier than ours and, hopefully, despite opposition from the Republicans, the United States will make a decision that is no longer determined by the shadow of the Vietnam War.

## NATO Ambassador Views Integration Issues

*AU2911200695 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Nov 95 p 10*

[Interview with Ambassador to NATO Andras Simonyi by Tamas Gordon in Brussels; date not given: "Our Catching Up With Europe Is at Stake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungary's membership in NATO is a goal and a means at the same time. Our goal is to catch up with Europe, also accepting our defense obligations. Preparation for NATO membership is also a means because the army becomes more modern with it and this is part of the country's modernization. We interviewed Ambassador Andras Simonyi, head of the Atlantic Liaison Office and ambassador to NATO, on this process.

[Simonyi] A continuity has existed in the Hungarian integration policy for five years, which means that our relations with NATO and the EU enjoy priority. The parliamentary parties have a consensus on this and the majority of nonparliamentary parties also agree. Euro-atlantic integration has two pillars, namely, the EU and NATO, and they are linked by the West European Union [WEU] as a bridge. The integration documents make it clear that, rather than choosing between the two pillars, they have to be handled in conjunction with each other. Naturally, my task here in Brussels is to promote our NATO membership, but I always keep an eye on EU integration; in debates on these I am also directly affected as WEU ambassador. We have come a long way since we established official contact, and my predecessor, Gyorgy Granasztoi, played a very valuable role in this. The process of NATO expansion has become irreversible, we now have joint military exercises, and we participate in planning. The peace partnership program is one of the most effective tools of Hungary's defense and security transformation. Let us not forget that our defense's reform is part of Hungarian modernization. If we get closer to NATO's structures and attitude, then the Hungarian army will again fit into Hungarian society from which it has for many years been an outcast. In a constitutional state, the issue of the army cannot be dealt with separately, either, and the political leadership recognized this when it decided to modernize our defense with NATO's help.

[Gordon] Opponents of NATO membership say that we have had enough of many decades of being at someone else's mercy, we are at last sovereign, why is the neutral status not good for us?

[Simonyi] Due to its economic and geopolitical situation, Hungary is incapable of satisfactorily defending itself independently. The approach which takes Sweden as an example is nonviable for Hungary, because we would not be able to cover the costs of autonomous defense. I would also emphasize a political aspect: Talking about Euro-atlantic integration, let us not forget about the importance of transatlantic links—and political and military cooperation with NATO is the most important institution of this. It has to be realized that the United States is a European power, it has interests in Europe, and it has been proved that its isolation reduces, rather than helps, Europe's stability.

[Gordon] Those EU members that are not members of NATO, can rest assured that they are almost automatically under NATO's protective umbrella, they need not worry about their security.

[Simonyi] Austrian, Finnish, and Swedish neutrality has a historical background, however, even in these states, a debate has started on whether neutrality is the adequate form in the new situation. It is a very attractive thought for Hungary to hoist the flag of neutrality, and this would automatically exclude Hungary from all kinds of conflicts. However, this logic does not take into consideration that the expansion of the EU is unthinkable without the new countries also joining the defense dimension.

[Gordon] Does this mean that we are in a constrained situation?

[Simonyi] I think so. We have to realize that the EU is also working with increasing intensity on establishing its own defense pillar, and whatever solution it finds, this will definitely be linked to NATO. Therefore, the notion of neutrality is starting to be changed radically. We are not joining NATO because Hungary is threatened, the logic of expansion is different. The West would like to defend itself against risks following the Cold War, and our military integration in NATO is a token of this, while NATO's East European expansion strengthens the stability of the region's countries. One cannot often hear about this key issue, although I am convinced that NATO's eastern expansion is also in Russia's interest. Stability means the establishment of conditions for an economic upturn. This is why there is a strong connection between NATO and EU membership. NATO's expansion is undoubtedly a joint process with the EU opening its doors. However, both institutions emphasize that they first have to implement internal reforms, and this argument is partly used to cool off the impatience of those waiting at the doors. However, the opening is a mutual interest. In the past three years, we have realized that we are not begging for membership. Closer cooperation is a mutual interest, and this will lead to membership in the case of certain countries. Therefore, this cooperation is interest-oriented. Hungary has been accepted as a partner, and we have proved a number of times that we are an important political and military partner to the alliance.

[Gordon] NATO recently published its study on expansion, but this did not make any commitments as regards countries or dates. How did Budapest react to the conditions of membership?

[Simonyi] Hungarian foreign policy had laid down the four basic criteria before the alliance did so. This is important because we came to the same conclusion. The first one is democratic institutional system and domestic political stability; second is progress in the economic reform process; third is civilian control and military reform; and fourth is the settlement of relations with neighboring countries. I would especially emphasize civilian control because it is through this that the army can find its way back to Hungarian society. Today it is impossible for politics not to have the final word in politically charged issues. It is possible for a politician to make a professionally bad decision and the chief of staff to be right.

From the viewpoint of the Hungarian democracy, it is vital that this should not appear as if the chief of staff failed to carry out the order; instead, the society and the political life should take people to account for the wrong decision. This is the civilian control. It is the logical consequence of our interest-oriented cooperation with NATO that this process ends in membership. The ongoing debate on the timing of this membership is secondary; the Hungarian position accepts that NATO will not expand immediately. We can wait if cooperation develops and if we receive guarantees that we will join the organization in the foreseeable future. I am convinced that this will happen before the year 2000. The political decision, negotiations, and finally the ratification procedures are time-consuming for NATO; however, our preparation also takes some time.

[Gordon] The opponents of NATO membership also admit that the Hungarian army needs development, but NATO membership means a more comprehensive and rapid reform and, consequently, a more expensive one. Can we delay this army modernization?

[Simonyi] This does not mean that we should replace our entire arsenal and guarantee markets for the arms factories. We must clearly reject this. Of course, we must fulfill certain conditions, like creating spiritual compatibility, reshaping the soldiers' thinking, creating the ability to communicate, and guaranteeing language instruction. Army supplies need modernization, and this is an urgent task irrespective of NATO. Modernizing our Air Force and the organizational and technical modernization of our communication system enjoy priority.

The argument that we must only spend money on this because NATO demands it is artificial. Here, the Hungarian interest is identical with NATO requirements. I read Tamas Csapody's article with interest. A considerable part of the things he finds missing has already been included in the Hungarian thinking in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, like the issue of purchasing military equipment. Hungary must arm itself not to become a victim of military industry sharks; Hungary should purchase what it needs, and not what they offer. Hungary is not obliged to purchase things that someone can get hold of through indirect ways; instead, Hungary is a free buyer on the international market of weapons systems from every point of view. It is the task of experts to tell what we should purchase; however, I fully agree that a weapons purchase style has not yet developed in Hungary. Therefore, we need a debate in society, but not about the purchase itself; Hungary cannot have 10 million defense ministers. We have one defense minister, and he has the political responsibility, but we need strict parliamentary control, and this is what NATO means with its demand for transparence. Major investments should be preceded by professional and political debates. NATO helps us in purchasing weapons that serve our integration interests, but we never experienced the smallest pressure on the part of NATO as to the type of weapons to choose. Corruption can only be avoided through the widest possible openness that is still acceptable from the viewpoint of security. The defense minister and the Defense Committee of the Hungarian Parliament are striving for maximum transparency. It is a clumsy argument to claim that Hungary might get entangled in an arms race, because we also committed ourselves to the treaty stipulating the reduction of conventional weapons. Hungary is below the limits stipulated by the treaty, and no one wants to exceed these limits. I agree that we need spiritual conversion, but I interpret this as a means for NATO integration.

[Gordon] Joining the EU and NATO will be preceded by a referendum, and the condition for this is to inform the public.

[Simonyi] Many articles discussing real problems appear in the press and the question is whether Hungarian policies convey the integration issue to the public firmly and clearly enough. I do not think so. I think there are shortcomings in this area, and we lack the background institutions that could provide a basis for debates that, in turn, would clarify our defense policy. However, we must notice the demagogue questions that serve totally different aims, questions that blame the integration policy for the rather natural problems inherent in reorganization. It would be desirable if the debate refrained from getting a timely political character.

### Army Commander Reports Staff Morale 'Critical'

*LD3011144495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Szilard Nemeth reports on the parliament's Defense Committee session.

[Nemeth] The committee members decided before the agenda that the hearing of a briefing by Political State Secretary Istvan Fodor of the Defense Ministry on NATO expectations regarding the accommodation of U.S. soldiers in Hungary should be held behind closed doors.

Following this, the commander of the Hungarian army [Colonel General Janos Deak] reported on army staff morale. Col. Gen. Deak said that the Hungarian army's prestige in NATO circles has never been as high as it is now. Contrary to this, the atmosphere among professional staff is particularly critical. The officers' salary is not in proportion with the responsibility they have to bear. The army does not have money for technical development, or even for gasoline sometimes. Despite all this, the army is able to function, the commander announced.

Lieutenant Gen. Balazs Novaky, national commander of the Border Guard, added that the Border Guard has to overcome many more—and more difficult—tasks since 1989 and far less money is available for all this. I cannot report that the atmosphere at the Border Guard is good, the lieutenant general said. The financial position of officers in leading positions is also deteriorating. Fifty percent of the new conscripts are unemployed, and 70 percent of those discharged will again become unemployed, the commander added.

### SZDSZ Head on Fodor Resignation, Budget Debate

*AU3011083995 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 28 Nov 95 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto by Attila Zsoldos in Budapest on 27 November: "According to Peto, the Budget Cannot Be Accepted"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], the versions of the budget and personal taxation draft bills which were received on 27 November are unacceptable, SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto told our correspondent after the National Assembly's 27 November session.

[Zsoldos] Do you see the resignation of Minister for Culture and Education Gabor Fodor as a personal failure or as the SZDSZ's failure?

[Peto] It naturally cannot be seen as success when a minister has to resign. The SZDSZ and obviously also Fodor were aware when he accepted the post that representing the government program in this area would involve many conflicts. However, it could not be predicted that, for this difficult task, he would not always receive the support that could be expected.

[Zsoldos] Did he not get support from the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] only or from the SZDSZ, either?

[Peto] I feel that the SZDSZ has given the support that is necessary in the case of a minister who acts with great sovereignty. However, the government coalition's commitment to the minister's cultural and education policy has not always been unequivocal. As an example, it is enough to mention a demonstration directed by a government party deputy, or that various government party groups have publicly distanced themselves from the minister's activities. This made Fodor's work more difficult than could have been expected. Perhaps the minister and others, too, did not assesses realistically enough to what extent many intellectuals who call themselves liberal would identify with the government policy which implements the liberal principle of the state's reduction and rationalization in the areas of culture and public and higher education. To sum it up, Fodor's work cannot at all be seen as a failure. Because of the government policy he represents, similarly to the finance ministers, the head of the Cultural Ministry also gets used up much faster than other government members.

[Zsoldos] Do you not think that it is very risky to expose Balint Magyar, one of the SZDSZ's most important politicians, to the danger of being worn out? News has it that the SZDSZ will nominate him as successor.

[Peto] We have not yet made an official decision on this. However, it is true that whoever is the successor, accepting the ministerial chair shows great personal courage. An extremely difficult task is awaiting him.

[Zsoldos] When will you decide on the successor?

[Peto] We are not in a hurry because Fodor's resignation is only effective from 1 January. The executive committee has to make the decision, but it is not at all necessary for this body to deal with the issue now. If, for some reason, we nevertheless make a decision, we will certainly not make it public until it is discussed with the coalition partner.

[Zsoldos] We have heard that, before Fodor's resignation, you sent a letter to Prime Minister Horn and parliamentary group leader Imre Szekeres in which you objected that a government party politician had organized a demonstration against a government member. Have you received an answer?

[Peto] I indeed sent a letter to Horn and Szekeres about a week ago in which I raised in connection with the so-called teachers' demonstration that, no matter how much the MSZP's stance differs from that of Mrs. Szollosi, she is after all a government party politician who attacked the government's policy through Fodor's person at a demonstration. I said in the letter that the same rules should apply to all deputies. It is only possible to ensure the coalition's cohesion if we do not allow certain deputies to do anything they wish just because we do not take them seriously. I did not wish to interfere in the MSZP's internal affairs with this letter but I feel that this is an important element of cooperation between the MSZP and the SZDSZ. I have not yet received a reply but this is not the type of letter which requires an immediate answer.

[Zsoldos] After the 27 November session of the SZDSZ's parliamentary group, you used very sharp words when you said that the submitted budget and personal taxation draft bills were the MSZP's ideas rather than those of the SZDSZ.

[Peto] This was indeed a pointed statement, but we had agreed with the MSZP's parliamentary group at the beginning of the debate that we would submit all significant amendment proposals together to parliament. The version on the basis of which parliament restarted the discussion of the budget and personal taxation bills is a proposal signed solely by MSZP deputies. It is not for technical reasons that SZDSZ deputies are not among the signatories. Our views differ on important points and this version is unacceptable for the SZDSZ. Within a few days, we will sit down with the MSZP parliamentary group's leadership and the finance minister to discuss, among other things, the issues of financing local governments and culture, the family supplement, and the new personal taxation table which we have not yet had time to thoroughly examine. We will try to draw up a proposal to which the SZDSZ can also agree.

[Zsoldos] Did the MSZP and the finance minister ignore your suggestions?

[Peto] This is one way to put it simply.

## Survey Indicates Popularity of Politicians

*AU2911142795 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Nov 95 p 5*

[Unattributed report: "Csurka and Thurmer Are Still Not Liked—Three Thousand Questioned—Mrs. Kosa, Maczo, Orban More Popular"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This is the first time since the May 1994 parliamentary elections that Istvan Csurka and Gyula Thurmer, leaders of two parties that did not make it into parliament, are part of our survey. Both are well-known politicians, but more people knew of Csurka, chairman of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] (90 percent), than Thurmer, chairman of the Workers' Party (71 percent). Of the two, Csurka was better known (with 82 percent) at the last assessment in April 1994, too, but Thurmer's recognition indicator has increased since then (it was 57 percent).

Their popularity indexes are practically the same and rather low: 26 and 27 percent. In October 1995, only one politician, Finance Minister Lajos Bokros, on our list was less popular. A year and a half ago, public approval of the leading personality of the extreme right [Csurka] was slightly higher (30 percent), while that of the leader of the extreme left was similar (25 percent) to the current rating. According to our latest survey, some 58 percent of the adult population find Csurka a disagreeable politician (within this, 37 percent find him very disagreeable) and 11 percent find him attractive (within this, 3 percent very attractive). In Thurmer's case, the proportion of rejection is 47 percent and acceptance 7 percent; within these, 27 percent and 2 percent are definitely negative and definitely positive opinions. Therefore, opinions on Csurka are more polarized than on Thurmer. [all figures as published]

As the sample of our latest public opinion survey was three times bigger than normally, we had the chance to examine the two small groups that sympathize with extremist politicians.

Although their political views are rather far from each other, the social structures of their supporting groups are similar in terms of major criteria: Extremist political trends mainly find support among the low social strata. People with low levels of education and income and those in villages form a significantly larger proportion of Csurka's and Thurmer's sympathizers than among other sections of the population. The average age of their supporters is the same, but Csurka is more attractive to younger and very old people than Thurmer.

Some 8 percent of Csurka's sympathizers said that they would vote for the MIEP if the parliamentary elections were to be held now, while 11 percent of Thurmer sympathizers said that they would vote for the Workers' Party. The former group would vote for the Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] in the greatest proportion (28 percent) and the latter for the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] (25 percent).

Mrs. Magda Kosa Kovacs, the resigned labor minister who is still in office, was not part of our surveys before, either. She now occupies second place. However, from our assessments of government members—these are published monthly in MAGYAR HIRLAP—we know that her ministerial suitability indicator jumped 19 percent following the conflict leading to her resignation.

Turning to the latest changes in the popularity list, we must first of all establish that the losses of the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] politicians among the counterinterested strata of society following the debate between the coalition partners have been evened up. [sentence as published] Apart from the MSZP's voters, an increase in support for Ivan Peto [SZDSZ chairman] and Gabor Kuncze [deputy prime minister] can be observed in all major voting groups. Peto's popularity has especially increased among supporters of his own party.

As we indicated in our previous report, Prime Minister Gyula Horn's index also deteriorated during the coalition dispute, especially among supporters of nonparliamentary parties and the SZDSZ. Since then, Horn's support has essentially returned to the level before the dispute.

The popularity of Agnes Maczo [FKGP], Sandor Nagy [MSZP], and Viktor Orban [Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party] has also increased by a statistically significant proportion since the previous survey. Maczo has become more popular mainly among supporters of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and the nonparliamentary parties, while Orban has become more popular among supporters of the governing parties and secondly among non parliamentary parties. On the other hand, former trade union leader Nagy was more favorably assessed by KDNP and Hungarian Democratic Forum sympathizers than before.

**Szonda-Ipsos Politicians' Popularity List 19 Oct-7 Nov 1995**

| Name | Popularity | Change | Recognition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arpad Goncz | 75 | 2 | 97 |
| Mrs. Kosa | 64 | — | 85 |

| Name | Popularity | Change | Recognition |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gyorgy Keleti | 62 | - 1 | 81 |
| Gabor Demszky | 62 | - 1 | 92 |
| Gabor Kuncze | 60 | 3 | 95 |
| Ivan Peto | 55 | 4 | 92 |
| Viktor Orban | 53 | 4 | 94 |
| Sandor Nagy | 53 | 3 | 87 |
| Tamas Deutsch | 53 | 0 | 83 |
| Zoltan Gal | 52 | 2 | 77 |
| Gyorgy Giczy | 49 | 1 | 57 |
| Tibor Fuzessy | 47 | 0 | 47 |
| Imre Szekeres | 46 | 0 | 67 |
| Gabor Foror | 46 | - 1 | 91 |
| Tamas Isepy | 46 | 1 | 34 |
| Jozsef Torgyan | 45 | 2 | 97 |
| Jozsef Szajer | 45 | - 1 | 52 |
| Agnes Maczo | 45 | 3 | 83 |
| Sandor Csintalan | 45 | 0 | 68 |
| Ivan Szabo | 45 | 1 | 86 |
| Lajos Fur | 42 | - 1 | 89 |
| Gyula Horn | 42 | 3 | 97 |
| Peter Boross | 35 | 0 | 93 |
| Gyula Thurmer | 27 | — | 71 |
| Istvan Csurk | 26 | — | 90 |
| Lajos Bokros | 21 | - 2 | 96 |

## Izetbegovic Briefs Assembly on Dayton Accord

*AU2911200095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1627 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Address by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, to the session of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly in Sarajevo on 29 November — live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mr. Speaker, ladies and gentlemen deputies, dear guests, and friends! Before I embark on this rather dull and a little boring expose, I would ask you to forgive me for being late. Thank you for not being angry with me.

A new page in Bosnian history was turned recently. It will be written by time; however, the most important things and pages will be written by us. This new page was turned in faraway Dayton on 21 November 1995, with the acceptance of the general framework agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina and its 11 annexes. Although you have, hopefully, received the integral text of the Dayton Accord in due time, allow me to summarize briefly this rather extensive document, spanning more than 100 densely typed pages.

The agreement, whose signatories are the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, envisages the end of the war. The three sides mutually recognized the sovereignty of the others. With Article 10 of this agreement, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY recognized each other as sovereign and independent countries within their internationally recognized borders. The 11 annexes that form an essential part of the general framework agreement regulate numerous issues, that is, domains that pertain to the end of the war and the internal changes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will briefly dwell on each of this annexes.

Annex 1, which consist of Part A and Part B, includes an agreement on the military aspects of the peace agreement — that is Part A — and the agreement on regional stabilization — Part B. The agreements contain three key elements. First, the separation of forces along the present lines of confrontation, and then the drawing of new lines between the entities in accordance with the Dayton Accord. Second, the relations between IFOR [Implementation Force] and the host country. Third, the lifting of the arms embargo and the requirements for the long-term security of Bosnia-Herzegovina, excluding regional disarmament and the strengthening of our defense capacities.

Speaking about the first element, 30 days after the accord becomes effective, all sides should withdraw to a distance of 2 km, and in some areas in towns to a distance of 1 km, from the present cease-fire lines. Within 45 days after this, wherever there is a discrepancy between the cease-fire lines and the new separation lines, one side or the other should pull back to these new lines. Looking at the situation on the ground, our army will not need to withdraw anywhere.

As for the second element, I must say that from the beginning of the withdrawal from the lines, IFOR, that is, the international forces for the realization of peace — international forces [pauses], implementation forces for peace [preceding six words in English], well something like this... [changes thought] These are practically NATO forces that will be deployed between the sides. Here, NATO will have full rights of movement and action in case of any possible provocations, be it an active attack or a serious military threat. It is also expected that the majority of the army will be demobilized or pulled back into the barracks.

Regarding the third element, it is known that the initiative for the lifting of the arms embargo on the basis of the Dayton Accord was raised on the very next day. Even though arms can be purchased immediately, there can be no import of arms into the country in the first 90 days, and only after 180 days can heavy arms, such as guns and tanks, be imported, according to this agreement.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] are envisaged as turning into the army of the federation. Any army on the territory of the republic must act in observation of the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A provision that all other military forces — this refers to the Republic of Croatia, that is, to the armed forces of Croatia, Serbia, the volunteers, and other military formations that are not Bosnian — must pull out from the Bosnia-Herzegovina territory within 30 days after the signing of the agreement is important. In accordance with the new situation, a new agreement on the military balance in the entire region is demanded. The balance will be established on the basis of the number of inhabitants, which, expressed in figures, means the ratio of five for Serbia and Montenegro versus two for Croatia and two for Bosnia-Herzegovina, therefore, the five-two-two ratio. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the ratio is two to one in favor of the federation. According to this, the armaments of Serbia and Montenegro will be reduced to a level that has not yet been agreed. Therefore, only the ratio was established. On the other hand, the Army of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation will be strengthened, mostly with heavy arms, to achieve the aforementioned radio at a level that still needs to be finally coordinated.

As President Clinton confirmed on Monday evening, the United States and other friendly countries will safeguard the capacities of the federation's armed forces through armament and training. This should be safeguarded by the end of the first year following the signing of the peace agreement, after the majority of the NATO troops have withdrawn.

Annex 2 contains the map of separation between the federation and the entity with the Serbian majority. Together with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Constitution, the map of the internal division was the subject of the most intense debates in Dayton from the very first day. The biggest debates evolved around Sarajevo, Gorazde, and the Posavina corridor. On the issue of Posavina, member of the delegation Kresimir Zubak [president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation] tendered his resignation, and, on the issue of Brcko, the conference interrupted its work at a certain moment. Because of the importance of these issues and the great interest of our public, allow me to present some details that will shed more light on the manner in which these issues were resolved and also on the work of our delegation.

Since the first day, the Serbs demanded Brcko for themselves and the widening of the corridor near this town from the present 5 km to 18 km. They persisted in this demand until the last day. Faced with a possible collapse of the talks on the 15th day of the negotiations, we proposed that the issue of Brcko should remain open and that it be resolved afterward by arbitration or in some other way. In the meantime, we proposed that Brcko and the semicircular territory with a radius of 10 to 15 km to the south should be placed under the control of the international forces, which would stay for the next five to 10 years. Milosevic rejected both proposals. Despite repeated debates, the issue remained unresolved until Sunday 19 November, which was the date that the U.S. side set as the extreme deadline for the completion of the talks. After this deadline passed, in an attempt to salvage the talks, U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher extended the talks for another 24 hours. The talks on this and some other unresolved issues lasted all through the day and night, however, a solution for Brcko and the corridor running next to it was not found. On 20 November, at about 2200, we received a demand to present our final stance by 2330 at the latest. When the hour struck, member of our delegation [Foreign Minister] Sacirbegovic visited Christopher and conveyed to him our stance that we remained steadfast on the decision that we could not cede Brcko or agree to the widening of the corridor. Some 30 minutes later, at midnight from the night of 20 to 21 November, we received written information that concluded that the talks had folded and that, with this, the U.S. mediation was considered terminated. However, a turnabout occurred in the course of the night. All the details are not known yet, however, it appears that, some time after midnight, Milosevic informed Christopher that he accepted the arbitration for Brcko and the corridor, and we were informed of this at around 0800 the following day. We accepted this compromise, which opened the way for the initialing of the Dayton Accord as a whole. As you know, this occurred on 21 November 1995, at 1500 U.S. time, that is, 2100 our time.

Speaking about the maps, we, naturally, have no reason to be satisfied. However, we decided that we would stick consistently to the rule that nowhere, at no point, would we agree to any withdrawal of our troops. [Words indistinct] to maintain this principle, we could not regain some of the territories that we wished to regain. We could only have done this by accepting the withdrawal from certain territories, especially in Krajina. Faced with two evils, we chose the lesser. I believe that the Serbian side did not succeed in accomplishing its goals, either. It did not manage to divide Sarajevo, to widen the corridor near Brcko, or gain access to the sea. The integral part of the agreement also contains a topographical map at 1:50,000 scale that shows a precise line of separation between the entities. After the agreement becomes effective, a joint commission will draft a technical document containing the exact physical description of the separation.

Here are some other observations about the remaining annexes:

Annex 3 concerns the agreement on elections. The elections should be held six months after this agreement becomes effective. However, if the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] — that is, its commission — assesses that as a result of the non-implementation of the constitution, a delay is required, then this deadline is extended to nine months. Therefore, the elections should be held within the minimum of six to the maximum of nine months after the signing of the agreement. As you know, the signing of the agreement is scheduled to take place in Paris sometime in mid-December. Speaking about the electoral procedure, that is, the electoral annex, our initial demands were reduced considerably. However, we consider it a great achievement that we managed to hold out for direct elections for the presidency and both parliaments — the republican and that of the entities. This gives the Serbian people a chance to remove criminals and bring more rational people into their leadership. The CSCE, that is the OSCE, as is written here — well we call it the CSCE, namely, the organization for cooperation and peace in Europe — will set up the electoral commission that will ascertain the electoral rules pertaining to the registration of the political parties, the suitability of candidates, and the role of the domestic and international observers. The mandate of this commission is the supervision of all aspects of the electoral process. Despite the resistance encountered in Dayton, as a matter of rule the census and the citizens' place of abode in 1991 are relevant for the gaining of the right to vote.

Annex 4 regards the Constitution. Bosnia-Herzegovina continues its legal continuity and maintains its international subject status within the existing internationally recognized borders. This Constitution merely realizes the internal constitutional and legal reconstruction, that is, it shapes Bosnia-Herzegovina as a complex country.

At the level of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state, there will be the Assembly, the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, as well as numerous other joint institutions envisaged by other annexes of the agreement. The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have full authority in the domain of foreign policy, foreign economic policy, customs regime, monetary policy, refugees, functioning of the joint international communications, and the air traffic control. A central monetary institution with one single currency is envisaged. The right of the entities to form special parallel relations with the neighboring countries is limited by the provision that these relations must honor the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as that any agreement on this must be approved by the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within the period of three months, the entities are obliged to harmonize their constitutions with the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is important to point out that the offices of authority, the institutions, and other Bosnia-Herzegovina offices will continue to function in harmony with the prevailing legislation until they are legally or consentaneously replaced.

Annex 5 concerns the agreement on arbitration. This agreement, which is rather short, stipulates the obligations of the entities to accept the arbitration in any mutual disputes. To avoid clashes it is, therefore, envisaged that this be resolved by arbitration, that is, by talks, negotiations, and mediation.

Annex 6 concerns the agreement on human rights. With this agreement, the sides pledge to safeguard the widest spectrum of human rights and liberties. A human rights commission consisting of two bodies — the first will be called the house of human rights and the other one the ombudsman's office — and the non-government and international organizations [words indistinct] rights represent the mechanism of the protection of human rights and liberties throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Five years after the agreement becomes effective, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina will take over these tasks from the commission.

Annex 7 regards the agreement on refugees and displaced persons. This agreement guarantees that the refugees and the displaced persons have the right to return to their homes, including the right to reclaim the assets seized from them, or in absence of these, the right to receive a fair compensation for the assets. The agreement defines the preconditions for the return, as well as the role and the assistance of the international organizations in the repatriation. The agreement envisages the leading role of the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] in the coordination of all actions aimed at helping the repatriation and providing assistance to the refugees and displaced persons, as well as the formation of a commission for the displaced persons and refugees, whose task will be the resolution of all issues, including the property issues, linked to the realization of the right to return home.

Annex 8 pertains to the agreement on the commission for preservation of national monuments. According to this agreement, a commission for the preservation of national monuments will be set up, the task of which will be to preserve the cultural identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The role and the task of this commission was defined on the basis of our suggestions. After five years, its responsibilities will be assumed by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government.

Annex 9 entails the agreement on the formation of the public corporations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With this agreement, a transport corporation is formed on the basis of the Geneva principles as well as the commission for public corporations, which will propose the formation of public corporations in the domain of public hygiene, energy supply, postal services, and other services.

Annex 10 refers to the civilian implementation. It concerns the civilian implementation of the Dayton Accord, which will be realized through a mechanism independent from the military implementation, that is, IFOR. Thus, everything that does not fall within the military implementation falls here. The civilian implementation will be headed by a senior representative and a deputy representative who will be accountable to the conference on the implementation of peace, which will be a body with its permanent headquarters in Brussels. The tasks of the conference on the implementation of peace and its representatives will entail nearly all duties, with the exception of military, and will also include the police and the government institutions as well as various activities in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Finally, Annex 11, the agreement on the international police force. To ensure the observation of the internationally recognized human rights and liberties, this agreement demands that the UN Security Council establishes an international police force. The activities of the international police force will be coordinated through a senior representative, as a part of the civilian implementation of the peace agreement.

This, in brief, would be the presentation of some important provisions contained in the general framework agreement on peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina with its annexes.

In the hall with us are also the members of the delegation and the members of the expert teams, Professors Trnka and Begic, who, if required, can provide more detailed explanations of the individual provisions of the agreement.

As for myself, I would only like to add three more points. First, I am constantly being asked whether there was any pressure.

I can say that there was no direct pressure, but there was indirect pressure. This pressure could be described as follows: If these negotiations collapse for whatever reason, the United States will definitely withdraw. You will have to solve your problem with Europe, and we know what that means.

The entire Europe was present there and it, through its representatives, kept saying: If the United States withdraws, we will withdraw too. I will leave it to you to judge whether there was any pressure or not and how such friendly warnings could be classified.

Second, Karadzic's Serbs around Sarajevo are staging a performance for the foreign public, especially the U.S. public. What we have is a so-called happening of the people, women, children, and the elderly. They are suggesting to the foreigners and the viewers that they are civilians. In fact, this represents an attempt to retain soldiers in the disputed area, or rather, to retain the murderers who have been cowardly killing the residents of Sarajevo for 44 months, targeting everything that makes the city a city, places of warship, schools, hospitals, and libraries. These people cannot be seen now. They are not hiding somewhere. They have now put women and children in front of the cameras.

I want to say very clearly. We guarantee the full safety of the civilians. We also guarantee the murderers that their punishment will reach them, sooner or later.

Here are some statistics for those who could fall for Karadzic's propaganda:

In the nine municipalities that used to make up the Sarajevo region, excluding Pale Municipality, according to the 1991 census, there was a total of 510,604 residents. Of these, 145,900 were Serbs. Of these Serbs, 73,086 lived in the free part of Sarajevo, and 72,815 Serbs lived in the occupied part, that is, the part controlled by Karadzic's army. The ratio is almost 1:1, half, half. There were even a few hundred more on our side, on the territory that we control.

We are informed that hardly one half of this number lives in this area today. In other words, something about 40,000 people. In their propaganda for those who they want to deceive and for those who agree to be deceived, they usually add another 100,000, and, instead of operating with the realistic figure of 40,000, they operate with a figure of 140,000 Serbs who would allegedly have to leave their homes. I have said that all those who are not guilty of anything should not leave their homes. The guilty ones must.

We have always distinguished between the Serbs and Chetniks, and we will continue to do so in the future. However, there is a condition for this. The Serbs must muster their strength to draw this distinction among themselves.

And finally, third, peace represents a chance for Bosnia. This is a peace without truth and justice, but instead of asking ourselves how such a peace is possible, instead of struggling to answer this question in vain, we should continue to work in the best possible way.

We have presented a miracle of Bosnian resistance to the world. Let us also present it with a miracle of Bosnian peace. The time of education and renewal is ahead of us. They had more guns and tanks. We had more spirit and courage. When the guns go silent, our advantage will be obvious.

And finally, let us now remember our fighters who lost their lives, the many known and unknown heroes, and those who are on the front lines today. What has been preserved and achieved has been preserved thanks to their devotion and courage.

Without them, the entire Bosnia would only be a big Srebrenica. Thank you. [applause]

### Sacirbegovic: U.S. Troops To Be 'Well Received'

*AU2911185095 Paris AFP in English*
*1828 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 29 (AFP) — US troops will get a warm welcome in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbegovic said Wednesday, stressing the key importance of US participation in peace enforcement.

"Without US participation in the implementation force there would not be an implementation force, and without an implementation force there would be no Dayton agreement," he said, referring to the peace deal signed in the United States on November 21.

"Without the Dayton agreement there would be no peace," Sacirbegovic concluded, addressing a press conference.

The foreign minister also promised that the US troops, expected to number some 20,000 in a peace implementation force totalling 60,000, would "not only be well received but will come here under the highest conditions of safety."

He added that he had telephoned both the White House and US Congressional leaders on Tuesday evening to campaign for approval of the troops package.

Sacirbegovic also expressed satisfaction at a commitment made by US President Bill Clinton to help upgrade the Bosnian government's armed forces.

We have had extensive discussions with United States about the equipping and training of our forces," he noted.

### Comments on U.S. Role, Interests

*AU2911220295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Report by Mladen Bosnjak on interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic on 29 November; place not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, correspondents from the local media had the opportunity to interview the foreign minister of our country, Muhamed Sacirbegovic. The meeting lasted over an hour. Our correspondent, Mladen Bosnjak, has selected the following details for this program:

[Bosnjak] Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic did not consider it necessary to make an introductory statement, but even without one, the numerous details regarding the implementation of the Dayton agreement were, of course, what the representatives of the Sarajevo media were interested in most.

Mr. Sacirbegovic had telephone conversations with several officials from Clinton's administration and the U.S. Congress until 0200 last night. In fact, the first question referred to these talks and the minister's impressions of the mood in the United States regarding sending 20,000 soldiers to Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his reply, our foreign minister said that the mood in the United States is positive and that it stems from the following perception in the United States.

[Begin Sacirbegovic recording] in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States is defending its strategic interests in the sense of NATO, in the sense of peace in Europe, in the sense of its relations with the Islamic world, and in the sense of its relations with the former communist world. On the other hand, they are certainly the principles of morality and legality. [end recording]

[Bosnjak] In reply to a question about who would play the main role in Paris at the ceremony of signing the Dayton peace agreement, Mr. Sacirbegovic said that the Dayton peace is a U.S. agreement, that the implementation of peace is a U.S. plan, that the bulk of the NATO forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina will come from the United States, and that it was quite understandable that the United States should have the leading place in the signing of the agreement. However, he said...

[Begin Sacirbegovic recording] In the last three of four days an EU delegation came here. Let us mention two delegations; one led by Mr. Bildt and one by Carlos Benavides [EU coordinator in Mostar], who is accountable to Mr. Van den Broek. They came here to see for themselves what the future relations between the EU and Bosnia-Herzegovina are going to be. The future of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the economic and politic sense, and the social integration in Europe, goes through the EU. [end recording]

[Bosnjak] Could the provisions of the Dayton agreement be disputed in any way in Paris? The Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister answered this question by saying that attempts will be made, primarily by those who have been indicted for war crimes — Karadzic and Mladic, and their servants, who will also be indicted for having committed crimes — to thwart the signing of the Dayton agreement, and that he, Sacirbegovic, is convinced that the peace agreement will be signed without delay and without any alternations.

From today's interview with Mr. Sacirbegovic, we will also single out his answer to the question on the possible topics of the talks in Bonn that are scheduled to take place soon.

[Begin Sacirbegovic recording] In Dayton, we were supposed to arrive at some kind of agreement on a new regional balance. Some concepts have been agreed on, as you could see. But these concepts have still not been explained in specific measures. Bonn should be the beginning of all that. [end recording]

[Bosnjak] It should, of course, be the beginning of establishing a military balance between Bosnia-Herzegovina, on one side, and Serbia and Montenegro, on the other.

NATO will not leave the territory of our country after one year and leave Bosnia-Herzegovina unable to defend itself adequately. Expressing the belief based on the facts that the United Nations is lifting the embargo on the import of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that the strengthening of the military power of the federation will also be helped by many other countries, Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic ended his meeting with the correspondents from the local media.

## Izetbegovic, UN Envoy Discuss UNPROFOR, IFOR

*AU2811204595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 28 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] President Alija Izetbegovic received Kofi Annan, assistant UN secretary general for peace operations and special envoy to the former Yugoslavia, today. The meeting was attended by General Clark, head of the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] civilian sector; Antonio Pedauye; and William Eagleton, special coordinator for the reconstruction of Sarajevo.

President Izetbegovic thanked Annan for the efforts that the United Nations troops have invested and continue to invest on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kofi Annan informed Izetbegovic about the procedure of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR troops which should, according to the Dayton Accord, be replaced by Implementation Force [IFOR] troops. The transitional period will last for two months, during which time the mandates of these two types of international troops will overlap to an extent. During this time UNPROFOR will ask for the extension of its present mandate.

Special attention at the meeting was devoted to the problems that concern the supply of natural gas to Bosnia-Herzegovina and especially the town of Sarajevo. It is not clear whether the financial, technical, or political reasons are hampering the normal supply of this energy source. Simultaneously, the road to Gorazde and the road via Kiseljak near Sarajevo are a far cry from the status that they should have had. The movement of convoys is hampered considerably and Bosnia-Herzegovina expects from the United Nations to fulfill its task and make these roads passable.

## Envoy Visits Serb-Held Sarajevo

*LD2811204595 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 28 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kofi Annan, the UN secretary general's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, was today one of the few world diplomats who have over these four years visited the Serb part of Sarajevo. The reasons behind his visit are evident, although Mr. Annan had no intention to encourage the citizens and leaders of this part of Sarajevo as he came to convey the messages of the world's diplomatic circles and their intentions — which, to say the least, have in recent days confused the Serbs in and around the city.

Having crossed the Serb Fighter's Bridge, the delegation headed, after a considerable period of hesitance, for the seat of the president of the municipality, Milorad Katic. There they stayed for about one hour. In his talks with the municipal leadership Annan stressed that the signatures of the three leaders in Dayton had their power and weight, and that no changes were envisaged in the agreement itself. [passage omitted]

## UN 'Logistical Support' for Rallies Protested

*AU2911193495 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic, minister in the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the State Committee for Cooperation With the United Nations, has sent the following letter to Antonio Pedauye, head of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mission, General Rupert Smith, commander of UNPROFOR for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Gen. [name indistinct], commander of the Sarajevo Sector:

We have the information that demonstrations against the Dayton Agreement will be held in Ilidza today. We have also been informed that the UN officials have promised to provide this rally with logistical support, fuel, and a special regime of traffic for the transportation of the demonstrators. My duty is to warn you that these demonstrations are directed against the peace agreement and in favor of segregation.

You know very well that Karadzic himself had been offering the resettlement of the Serbs from Sarajevo in Srebrenica and Zepa until his forces managed to carry out mass atrocities and expel the population of these two regions.

A request was made in Dayton to move the Serbs from Sarajevo to Gorazde, that is, that they do not stay in Sarajevo. The goal is, therefore, a total apartheid. We cannot allow the United Nations to support the resistance to the peace agreement in favor of apartheid. Are these UN officials ready to support the rally of the population of Srebrenica and Zepa, or the people from Posavina and Banja Luka?

I beg you to undertake immediate measures to prevent the United Nations from taking part in these activities directed against the Dayton agreement. Otherwise, we will be forced to demand the urgent departure of those who support such actions.

## Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Criticizes Accord

*LD2911184795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1702 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 29 Nov (SRNA) — The word "equality," which was envisaged in the basic principles agreed on in Geneva, was formally bannished from Dayton and the U.S. negotiators, led by Mr. Holbrooke, did not let it find its way into any subsequent documents, Dr. Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs of the Serb Republic, has stated.

Commenting for SRNA on the course of the peace negotiations, Buha said that "an erroneous theatrical act" was performed at Dayton, and explained:

"It was erroneous to the extent that this time the lies, the intention to cheat, the method of presenting a fait accompli and irrevocable deception, subterfuge, hypocrisy, double-dealing, and blackmail, in other words these traditionally hypocritical elements of policy making, were cast together under the guise of truth and justice, accompanied, at the same time and obviously, by the threat of brutal force.

"Worse than these threats was the intention of the intermediaries to fool us into believing their lies and deception. If I tell you that some members of the Yugoslav section of the joint delegation were deeply involved in this double-dealing, then I have intimated — I am speaking here exclusively on my own behalf — the extent of the moral, national, and human breakdown."

Buha said the documents, which in these circumstances had to be initialled, were the result to a large extent of such a state of mind, and he explained:

"If, of the total of 11 documents, we separate out three key ones — the documents on the constitution, the implementation of the peace agreement, and the maps of the territorial demarcation — one can immediately realize that they were drawn up in accordance with the logic of 50-50, i.e. they were designed to be the basis of a just solution and a guarantee of lasting peace, but also the basis and cause of possible future disputes.

"The envisaged constitutional solution could lead to the establishment of independent states, but also to the denial of the independence of the Serb Republic. The military part of the agreement, likewise, has a dual meaning: The authority of the multinational forces has been designed in such a way that it can easily be transformed from a peacekeeping force into a brutal force of occupation.

"There is hardly any resemblance between the definitive maps of demarcation and the promised criteria that were endorsed in writing in Dayton. There remains a number of flashpoints and uncomprehensible solutions for the Serb Republic."

The minister for foreign affairs of the Serb Republic notes that the Serb ethnic areas in Visoka Krajina have been given to the Muslims and Croats simply because they occupied the area.

"There is no comprehensible reason why the Serb Republic should not be given a wider territorial link between its west and east parts. Not a single municipality, out of the six municipalities planned under the transitional statute of Mostar, is earmarked for the 45,000 Serbs who have been driven out of Mostar.

"And finally, there is the scandal of all Dayton scandals — delivering Serb Sarajevo to the federation, i.e. placing 150,000 Serbs under Muslim domination. This is mind-boggling. What kind of reasoning can support the intention to destroy the second largest Serb town in one go," Buha asked and added:

"As early as August, the leadership of the Serb Republic lent support to the U.S. peace initiative as it heralded a positive outcome of the civil war and promised an end to it, equal treatment of the warring sides, and the kind of demarcation that would create compact state territories that would be capable of leading relatively independent lives."

Expressing a hope that the war would come to an end, Buha stressed that the Serb Republic was internationally endorsed and that it would abide by whatever was going to be accepted and signed.

Toward the end of his commentary on the Dayton negotiations, the minister for foreign affairs of the Serb Republic warned about the risks looming over their implementation.

"How can I be even remotely optimistic for the sake of this occasion when top U.S. voices have said that NATO will assist the implementation of the agreement and at the same time provide military training for Croats and Muslims?

"This was announced despite Article 3, Point 2, in the agreement on the military aspect of the peace plan which promulgates the obligation of withdrawing not only foreign troops, but foreign instructors, advisors, and other personnel," Buha stated.

### Bosnian Croats Protest Tudjman-Milosevic Deal

*AU2911211295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session held in Sarajevo on 28 November, the Croat National Council discussed the latest Dayton agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially its meaning for the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In connection with this, the Croat National Council expresses its bitterness and protests the acceptance of the politically and morally unacceptable deal between Milosevic and Tudjman on placing the Bosnian Posavina under the administration of the so-called Serb Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This has publicly legitimized violence over law, ethnic cleansing, the lack of protection for innocent victims, and the prevention of refugees from returning to their homes, as well as the violation of other human and democratic rights of the people in the middle of Europe.

Our bitterness is so much greater as we had constantly been warning our public between the start of the work and the completion of the Dayton peace agreement about the unacceptability of sacrificing the Croat people in Bosnia for some incomprehensible ideas of the Croatian leadership led by Franjo Tudjman. Everyone must understand this now.

Unfortunately, a section of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina has not taken seriously our warnings about the dangers of such a deal between two parties at the expense of the third, but followed blindly those who had constantly been indoctrinating them with Tudjman's ideas, those who took them away from their homes and native places and then prevented them from returning to them.

The Croat National Council takes this opportunity to appeal to all the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina to reexamine their position toward the political leadership that has led them to this situation and that is working against their vital interests. This is the only way to fight for the restoration of the right to return to one's own house and to protect other political interests.

If that happens, Bosnian Posavina will not be lost for the Croat people who live in it. If they do not do it, they should not hope for anything better. They will only experience more suffering. Accepting this solution for Bosnian Posavina seriously questions the clearly positive achievements of the Dayton agreement, namely the confirmation and preservation of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its internationally recognized borders, the Croat National Council stresses among other things.

### Karadzic Stresses Serbian State Unification

*LD3011130795 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1101 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 30 Nov (SRNA) — Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic and Vice President Biljana Plavsic received a delegation of the Association of Fallen Fighters from Romanija [east of Sarajevo] in Pale this morning. The delegation expressed support for their struggle for the rights of the Serbian people as a whole and Serb Sarajevo in particular.

President Karadzic thanked the delegation for its support, stressing that he "always feels at his most powerful in the company of the families of fallen fighters, as they are most determined in their struggle for the sacred Serbian aim."

Listing the pitfalls of the Dayton agreement in connection with territorial demarcation, Karadzic said:

"Despite all our dissatisfaction, a Serbian state has been created while this phase of our struggle has been successfully completed, although we have been hard done by at the green table."

The president of the Serb Republic stressed that "no one must ever give up Serbian state unification."

The representatives of the association told Karadzic that they "want unity among the Serbian people, stressing that the graves are sacred and that they must be defended throughout the Serb Republic."

Stevo Kapovic, one of the members of the delegation, emphasized that the people of Romanija feel solidarity with the Serb people in other parts of the country and hold the same views on how the Serb Republic ought to be defended, both in Krajina and Herzegovina, while everything should be done to change the status of Serb Sarajevo to the benefit of the Serbs.

### Commentary on Karadzic's Threats to NATO Forces

*AU3011124195 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 28 Nov 95 p 2*

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Fear of a 'Serb 'Arafat'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Karadzic's threat to turn Sarajevo into a "European Beirut" if the Serbs really have to surrender control over "their own town municipalities" to the "Muslims," has generally been regarded as a tempest in a teapot. It has, however, aroused many fears that international military and political circles hold secretly discussions in a much more serious and concerned way than is decent to admit publicly in these days of official peace-making enthusiasm. There is no doubt that Karadzic is "politically dead," but it is as if there were some kind of western fear in the air that Karadzic could nevertheless rise from the dead in a role of "some kind of Serb 'Arafat," who will chase the Americans away from Bosnia-Herzegovina, just as the Palestinian suicide-bombers once chased them away from Lebanon. Or at least humiliate them, just as the street crowd did in Somalia, when they dragged them bleeding through bloody dust.

True, there is no Syria, Libya, Iran, or the former Soviet Union, and even Lilic and Milutinovic have decisively concluded that there cannot and will not be any additional negotiations on the Dayton agreements. There is no doubt that Belgrade momentarily favors peace, but perhaps not some kind of undisturbed idyll in which the challenging Bosniak-Croatian Federation could assert itself without hindrance, while in this election year even the sick and impotent Yeltsin would not like it too much if NATO and Washington proved altogether and thoroughly that nothing can be done without the United States, while only with Washington does everything become possible. Nobody will support a major war any more, but at least a little terroristic mess could nevertheless fit neatly into some secret strategic calculations.

After all, as U.S. Defense Secretary Perry said, in all the preparations they have seriously taken account of militant individuals or groups "who could offer resistance," primarily from the ranks of the Bosnian Serbs, and then perhaps also some domestic, as well as imported, Muslim fundamentalists, who could similarly take their revenge on the Serbs or nevertheless aspire to some kind of "pure Muslim state" in which there would be no Catholics in the self-styled role of "strategic monitors." Possible Croatian resistance was mentioned least of all, since Tudjman "had not dismissed the Croats, as Milosevic had the Serbs," and he had been, from the very beginning, effectively creating "one party, one state, and one army," while it is generally believed that the "indecisive Izetbegovic" has already been "suffering from the weaknesses of age," so that, even sooner than is generally believed, there could come about "a power struggle within the Muslim ranks, in which foreign monitors could also get hurt." Of the possible violent malcontents, the Serbs are considered the most dangerous, the Muslims the most unpredictable, and the Croats the most obedient.

Thus Karadzic has found it particularly difficult — of all lunatics, the most dangerous are lunatic psychiatrists — to come up with something that will recall very bloody and bitter memories to the Americans and thus make thoroughly difficult Clinton's crucial speech last Tuesday, in which he tried to break the resistance of Congress and convince the nation that some 20,000 American boys were not going into a dead-end trap without any real need to and without good justification. Many have seen that speech of Clinton's as one on which his whole political future crucially depends, although the American public is in general prone to making too much fuss and then too quickly forgetting, so Clinton, too, has enough time for additional remedial tests. As matters stand now, Congress will nevertheless lean toward the view that without "the Americans there is no NATO, and without NATO there is no peace in the Balkans," so Washington also has to prove both its decisiveness and proverbial adherence to the highest ethical principles as the world's leader, although it also seems that the particularly inspired Clinton will not be able to hide that there is nevertheless some kind of squaring the circle here: The administration has incessantly claimed that this is just supervising an accepted peace, but at the same time it is sending in an armed force that is effectively ready for everything short of a nuclear show-down.

Therefore it was sad watching Madeleine Albright on CNN simultaneously trying to prove that one should nevertheless trust the word of the three "Balkan presidents," who have also in special letters had to promise both support and security for the international forces, and being unable to deny that inevitable casualties are also expected, at a time when everything that has happened in Bosnia proves "two basic things: The world needs the United States, but the average American does not give a damn about it" (TIME). Thus it was not at all difficult for Karadzic to rub new salt into an old wound, although his threats have primarily proven something else: Even though Milosevic — if he was sincere in getting into some kind of conflict with the Serbs across the Drina — had not removed him before, he should not have allowed him to return to Pale, if he had really wanted to prove that he deserved to have the sanctions lifted. In all this, some things still smell too much of some old games within games.

## Krajisnik Wants Separate Agreement on Sarajevo

*LD3011120895 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1101 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 29 Nov (SRNA) — At a joint session held tonight in Vogosca [Sarajevo area], Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, informed members of the government and the municipal wartime presidencies of Serb Sarajevo about a meeting of representatives of the Serb Republic and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and about details of today's meeting with EU mediator Carl Bildt and other representatives of the international community.

In Krajisnik's words, an agreement was reached at today's meeting on examining every possibility for resolving Sarajevo's status.

"We have told representatives of the international community that the Dayton agreement cannot be implemented without a solution for Sarajevo's status and that there must be a separate agreement on Sarajevo," speaker Krajisnik said, and added:

"The problem of Sarajevo cannot be resolved without us because the Serbs of Sarajevo are a factor to be reckoned with. I do not want to embellish the situation, but you have to know that the plan has not been signed yet and that some time will pass before the final signature takes place. The Serbs must not leave Sarajevo."

Following the joint session, a session was also held of the presidents of the wartime presidencies of the municipalities in Serb Sarajevo, during which members were elected of departmental headquarters in charge of implementing the Dayton agreement in individual areas of economic, cultural, and social life in Sarajevo.

Boro Bosic was elected president of the economic headquarters, Milada Cicovich will preside over the information and propaganda headquarters, Nedjo Sipovac is in charge of cultural and educational activities, Nemanja Rovic is in charge of communications and transport, and Tomo Kovac is in charge of security.

All the presidents of the municipalities and parties of Serb Sarajevo will be members of the political activity headquarters, which will be headed by its president, Trifko Radic.

The session under the chairmanship of the president of the People's Assembly was still in progress late last night.

## 'Grand Protest Meeting' Held in Serb Sarajevo

### Demand Correction of 'Injustice'

*LD2911220395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2040 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 29 Nov (SRNA) — Around 40,000 citizens of Serb Sarajevo, at a grand protest meeting called "For Freedom and Peace" held in Ilidza today, expressed the united standpoint that the Dayton agreement is "an act of betrayal and sets an official seal of approval on the intention to ethnically cleanse 120,000 Serbs." [passage omitted]

At the end of the two and one-half hour protest meeting a message was read out from Serb Sarajevo to the international community. It demands that the Dayton injustice be corrected. The following is the text of the message:

"We, the citizens of Serb Sarajevo, address the whole of the peace-loving world, and request that the international community support us in exercising our legitimate right to live as free people in the city of our birth.

"In four years of war, 120,000 Serbs from Serb Sarajevo have preserved their centuries-old living space. We have paid too high a price for this with over 12,500 casualties, while the number of displaced and deprived is enormous.

"Our forebears founded this city and we have no other home. It is inhuman to take our city away from us and impose an authority which has been killing us, driving us out, and depriving us of our right to freedom over the past four years.

"The initialling of the Dayton agreement strips us of everything, and the impossible is demanded of the 120,000 Sarajevo Serbs — that they move somewhere where there is no living to be made, and where the past and the future do not exist. We do not know what is wanted of us or what they want to do with us.

"We want peace, we want our Sarajevo, Serb Sarajevo, and Serb authorities. Correct the mistake in the name of peace, freedom, democracy, and human dignity, so that we can all look to the future, development, and prosperity. Correct the mistake in the name of your consciences, because you will be held responsible for a new war and the suffering of all the people in this area.

"We are not giving up our city, our hearths, the graves of our children and forebears, our cultural assets, and our churches. Do not take peace and freedom away from us; surely we are not asking too much?" [passage omitted]

### Demonstrators Accuse Milosevic

*AU2911183695 Paris AFP in English 1757 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[By Jean-Luc Porte]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ilidza, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nov 29 (AFP) — Thousands of demonstrators living in Serb-held areas of the Bosnian capital rallied in this Sarajevo suburb Wednesday in their biggest protest yet against the Bosnia peace agreement.

Brandishing banners and chanting slogans attacking Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic for his role in the peace deal, at least 4,000 Bosnian Serbs poured into Ilidza to protest the agreement, reached in Dayton, Ohio, last week.

Demonstrators, who came from several Sarajevo neighbourhoods, protested in particular a key clause in the accords providing for the handover of Serb-held Sarajevo suburbs to Bosnian government control.

"The Dayton accord, for the people of Serb Sarajevo, is nothing other than a pact with the devil," the western city suburb's mayor Nedeljko Prstojevic told the crowd during the peaceful protest.

"The Dayton agreement is Sodom and Gomorrha, the end of the world for the Serbs," warned Dragan Savic, a war invalid, to thunderous applause from a diverse crowd of soldiers, children and elderly, whose mood ranged from desperate defiance to quiet resignation.

Savic and Prstojevic were two of many speakers who filed past the microphone on a stage to recall the horrors of the war, their myriad losses and above all the "high treason" of the international community.

"America cannot steal the land of our ancestors like this," a young woman who identified herself only as Vanja shouted into the microphone, as in front of the stage, a group of youths struck up a chant accusing Milosevic of betraying the Serb cause.

"Slobo, you bastard, you have betrayed Sarajevo," the youths intoned.

The reintegration of Sarajevo's suburbs is one of the central planks of the November 21 accords, under which the currently divided Bosnian capital reverts to the unified control of the Bosnian government.

The accords, initialled by Milosevic, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic — and later by the Bosnian Serbs — are due to be signed in Paris by mid-December.

But Sarajevo's Serbs believe the Dayton deal victimizes them, and say they will refuse to live under the administration of the mainly-Moslem government.

It is impossible to live "under Moslem tutellage — Izetbegovic is the leader of a pack of wild animals," thundered Ilijas Radic, a municipal official.

Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbegovic stressed later Wednesday in Sarajevo that the Bosnian government would guarantee the safety of all citizens of the united city, echoing Izetbegovic's assertion that Serb civilians would have nothing to fear from living in a unified Sarajevo.

However, Serbs maintain that nearly all Serb males have taken part in the bitter fighting of the past three-and-a-half years and the peace deal would force families apart and create thousands more refugees.

"Everyone here knows they will soon be refugees," said a young woman who identified herself as Jordana. "But don't forget that before going we will burn our houses and the Moslems will find nothing but ruins."

The Bosnian Serb leadership claims 120,000 Serbs continue to live in Sarejevo, but the UN refugees office says the figure is closer to 40,000.

## Sarajevo Anti-Federation 'Rock Rally' Planned

*LD2911144695 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1151 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 29 Nov (SRNA) — This weekend a big rock rally will be organized in Grbavica, a Serb district in central Sarajevo. Sarajevo and Banja Luka rock groups will play their music to protest plans to incorporate Serb Sarajevo and its 120,000 citizens into the Croat-Muslim federation.

Sarajevo rock groups Arena, The Sarajevo Assassination, Profiteers, Sorab, Rikochet, and Trauma have said that they will perform, and Banja Luka will be represented by Honeymoon and The Dance of the Knights.

The rock stage in Grbavica will be open for guests from the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] who wish to help the people preserve their right to freedom, paid by thousands of lives of our best sons.

A general rally will be organized in Grbavica two days before the Paris summit. It will be attended by politicians, academicians, artists, and public figures from the FRY. Representatives of the military and political leadership of the Serb Republic are also expected to attend.

## Spanish Envoy Heads UNPROFOR Peace Mission

*BR2811145195 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1209 GMT 27 Nov 95*

[Unattributed report: "Bosnian War Is Paranoid Fight, Says Spanish Ambassador"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Medjugorje (B-H), 27 Nov (EFE) — During a visit to the Aragon Contingent, which consists of 1,200 Spanish troops stationed in Medjugorje (Herzegovina), Spanish Ambassador Antonio Pedauye told EFE today, Monday, that the war in Bosnia is a paranoid fight.

Pedauye leads the political part of an UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia which is trying to make Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and Croation Serbs guarantee the peace agreed to by their leaders in Dayton before the 50,000 NATO troops arrive around 15 December.

"Extremist nationalism is a form of paranoia which opens a chain of fears, which breeds enemies," said Pedauye, who will return to Sarajevo today.

The Serbs, who until September had military control over 70 percent of Bosnia, have been left with 49 percent following their consequent defeats and the Dayton agreements, and are afraid of being barred from Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

Momcilo Krajisnik, the president of the Bosnian Serb Republic's Assembly, expressed to Pedauye his fear that when Sarajevo becomes a city controlled by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovia, the Bosnian Serbs will be expelled from it.

The Bosnian Serbs deported the Muslims from their houses in the Sarajevo areas taken in 1992, and now fear retaliations from their former neighbors, with whom they used to live in peace.

"To start the whirlwind of paranoia is easy in a Balkan rural environment, where he who controls radio stations can convince peasants that 'the enemy' will come to cut people's throats, while the radio stations from the other side tell their people exactly the same," Pedauye said.

The diplomat said that, before the war, in Bosnian cities 35 percent of marriages were mixed and Muslims, Serbs, and Croats lived in peace in an area similar in size to Holland and with a population resembling that of Madrid.

Pedauye added that part of the 50,000 NATO troops which will arrive in Bosnia "already are" stationed in it. This is the case for the French, British, and Spanish troops, as well as those from other countries who will replace their mandate of watching over the current precarious peace with one of imposing the same peace by force if necessary.

Krajisnik has asked for guarantees from Pedauye that the — according to him — 200,000 Serbs living in Sarajevo [100,000 according to the United Nations] will not have to leave this city of 380,000 in a stampede.

Some 50,000 [Bosnian Serbs] live in a central, predominantly Muslim area and have undergone the siege and the air raids to which the Bosnian Serbs submitted the city for 43 months alongside their neighbors.

The rest can be found in the outlying areas which Radovan Karadzic's rebels have occupied since 6 April 1992, when Bosnia-Herzegovina's secession from Yugoslavia was recognized.

But perhaps the "alliance" between Muslims and Bosnian Croats, who might restart the battle among each other over central Bosnia and western Herzegovia — where the Spanish battalion continues its mediation and humanitarian tasks — raises more question marks.

"Nobody has been totally satisfied with the Dayton agreements, but the only alternative, a horrible one, would be to prolong the war until the final victory," according to Pedauye, who claimed that Europe wants 20th century and not 19th century principles to reign in it.

According to the ambassador, a great part of this conflict is caused by the institutional vacuum in Europe left after the Cold War divisions blew up, without the continent's being prepared for multi- party nationalist conflicts. [passage omitted]

### Troops Prepare for UN Mission

*BR2911145095 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish*
*28 Nov 95 p 8*

[Report by Ramon Lobo: "Spanish Troops in Mostar Prepare for NATO Mission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar — The headquarters of the Spanish blue helmets in Medjugorje is humming with activity. Some 2,000 tonnes of green camouflage paint, needed for repainting the Aragon Group's 265 vehicles, rest in a store in Divulje (near Split) awaiting NATO's final plans. "The change of beret (the UN blue beret for the NATO green beret) is very easy — a matter of seconds," explained Colonel Julio Lopez-Guasch, the unit's commander, who was assigned to UNPROFOR in Sarajevo back in 1993.

"We have a directive on the transition from UNPROFOR, which is preparing for the change, which will entail a deployment on the lines of confrontation; a deployment which we have already begun to make. The specific tasks will have to be given by the (French) division, under which we will come." Over 2,000 French troops from snowy Mount Igman, to the south of Sarajevo, are already settled 4 km to the north of Mostar, within what was an area under exclusive Spanish control. They are in a provisional situation, awaiting the arrival of the bulk of the contingent which France will contribute to the NATO force — around 8,000 more troops.

"There is no problem in getting along together with the French," said Major Gomez de Valenzuela, the liaison officer between what are still the Spanish blue helmets and the Rapid Reaction Force. "We have the same mentality, we have the same rules; we only need to become a little better acquainted." Everybody asserts that they do not feel offended or insulted by having to come under the future French division.

The French and Spanish are currently cleaning up the wrecked Mostar Airport, which is full of antipersonnel mines. Rebuilding just its shattered runway will cost over 1 million French francs (25 million pesetas). There is not a single Spanish enterprise involved in the titanic effort of reopening the airport. The initial French and Spanish plan is to set up there the multinational division's headquarters. So Spain would close down its base in western Mostar and reduce its logistic presence in Divulje to a minimum.

Col. Lopez-Guasch believes that Spain will maintain the current structure, without contributing new arms, although he does not rule out possible new developments. It will depend, he says, on the final mission which is given to us. Lopez-Guasch hopes that advantage will be taken of what he calls "the dividend of the affection" which exists toward the Spanish troops in this area, and that they will be allowed to continue to work in Mostar. "I believe that everything makes it advisable that we stay here," he asserted. "The command's intention is that it be from Mostar southward, including the Stolac corridor."

Some people, such as Captain Jose Maria Gonzalez or Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Pascal, assigned to western Mostar, do not conceal their enthusiasm about being able to take part in the first ground mission in NATO's history.

Col. Lopez-Guasch does not believe that the change of helmet will entail increased insecurity. "This was agreed in Dayton between the three sides. Peace is being forced to some extent, adopting coercive measures with a firmness which has not been exercised hitherto because there were no resources. There could be elements who disagree with the agreements, but the population is in favor; they are weary of the war."

### Bosnian Croat Prime Minister on Hague Indictments

*LD2911195195 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] We begin the news bulletin with a report on the visit of Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, to central Bosnia. Zvonimir Civic reports from Vitez:

[Civic] Jadranko Prlic, prime minister of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and deputy prime minister of the Federation, visited Vitez today, where he informed representatives of the political and economic life in the Lasva and Lepenica region about the agreement on the revival of the Federation and Dayton accord in general, as well as on forthcoming tasks of all political and economic structures in Herzeg-Bosnia. [passage omitted]

During the day Prlic also had talks with the Croat officials from Vitez who were indicted by the International Court in The Hague. Commenting on these talks, he said: I am convinced that the International Court in The Hague will be an independent judicial institution, and there is no reason to doubt that. Our position is — and this is how we must behave — that an indictment is not a guilty verdict. In all legal systems, a person is innocent until the contrary has been proved. As far as the indictment against the six representatives of the Croat people is concerned, I am convinced that the contrary will not be proved. Today I talked to those who have been indicted from Vitez, I heard their views, problems, and wishes, and we will take appropriate measures in the government of Herzeg-Bosnia. We will ensure adequate means for them and their families and the best possible defense lawyers. The indictments from The Hague are often manipulated, and claims are made that they are at the same time indictments against the Croat people of central Bosnia. Such manipulations should cease, because the Croat people of central Bosnia have waged an honorable struggle for their survival, and that is known to all international factors, Jadranko Prlic said.

### Commentary Examines Indictment of Croat Leader

*AU2511144195 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 p 4*

[Commentary by S. Luckin: "A Challenge for Tudjman and Sarajevo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] November 12 could represent a fatal milestone in the political career of the current leader of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dario Kordic. On this day four years ago, he politically founded Herzeg-Bosnia in Grude together with Mate Boban. Four years later, again on 12 November, the news leaked out about the intention of the The Hague Tribunal to indict Kordic for war crimes committed in central Bosnia. As for Kordic himself, the past four years have been a period of his meteoric rise and political downfall, which undoubtedly awaits him in The Hague. However, those years are at the same time a testimony to his consistent following of the political line that he set out together with Boban in Grude.

#### A Sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina "Non-Existent"

Six months before the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Boban, as chairman of the regional crisis staff of the HDZ of Herzegovina, and Kordic, as the chairman of the regional HDZ of Travnik, at a meeting in Grude outlined the policy of this party to be pursued in the months to follow. Time showed that they endeavored to implement those guidelines consistently, using any means available. Then they agreed that the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must finally take up a decisive, active policy to lead to the achievement of the centuries-long dream — a unified Croatian state.

The conclusions reached at the meeting in Grude also announced the removal of all forces within the HDZ that supported the "non-existent sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina," in which the Croatian people would be doomed to genocide and historical oblivion. Several months later, this trend was to remove the HDZ leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stjepan Kljuic, and thereafter Kljujic's successor, Miljenko Brkic. It is interesting that the conclusions of the Grude meeting made it clear that these were the fruits of an agreement with President Tudjman from 13 and 20 June 1991 in Zagreb, which illustrates that in Bosnia-Herzegovina nothing happened accidentally.

In the SDA, the partner party of the HDZ in the federal authorities, nobody was aware of all this. After all, this journalist obtained excerpts from the minutes of the meeting in Grude from a top SDA official several months ago, with the explanation that the document had been captured when Fojnica was liberated and it would not be advisable to bring it to light because of the current political situation. It is obvious that the SDA, because of the compromise about the Federation, has consciously suppressed knowledge of all Kordic's sins and even the fact that, after the massacre in the village of Ahmici, he was referred to in official investigations as one of its instigators. For the sake of peace between the Croats and Bosniaks, the legal authorities swallowed all that and Kordic has been moving quite freely throughout the regions under the control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Jablanica to Tuzla, and even visiting the capital.

### Did Tudjman Know About the Indictment?

However, what the legal authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have tried to forget has not been forgotten by Judge Goldstone. By issuing indictments against Kordic and Blaskic, chief of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] General Staff, the judge has made quite a delicate political move for Bosnia-Herzegovina. A particularly delicate issue will be the arrest warrants, which, according to the Hague Tribunal, will immediately be forwarded to the legal authorities in Sarajevo, Mostar, and Zagreb. Because, while Karadzic and Mladic are out of reach of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities, with Kordic and Blaskic that is not the case, particularly not for the federal authorities.

Therefore it is hard to predict how the judiciary and the police of Bosnia-Herzegovina will react, because the arrest of Kordic and Blaskic is chiefly their job. However, with regard to the real situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means in the two state mechanisms, it is hardly realistic to expect that politics will not influence the further course of events. In fact, all the dilemmas could be resolved by Croatian President Tudjman. If he denounces Kordic and Blaskic, Sarajevo will be able to do so as well without any consequences. There are already some indications that such a move could be possible, particularly since, according to a statement by the Hague Tribunal, Federation President Zubak agreed as early as in September to the indictments. And if Zubak knew about it, it is logical that Tudjman was informed and probably expected such a development as well.

### A Colonel Rather Than a Politician

The opposite development could totally freeze the further establishment of the federal authorities, which means the Dayton agreement as well. It would be extremely unwise for the legal authorities in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to insist with the international community that war criminals be punished, while at the same time accepting suspected war criminals as partners in the implementation of the project of internal transformation of the state. Any deviation from the general determination that all war criminals must be punished could open up the possibility of a political amnesty for Karadzic and Mladic as well. And that would be too much.

All these dilemmas were most easily resolved by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] from the very start. Just an hour after the announcement of indictments, UNPROFOR spokesman Aleksander Ivanko informed the public that, as far as UNPROFOR is concerned, Kordic and Blaskic continue to be valid negotiators, as long as they are the official leaders of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is nothing unusual, because UNPROFOR applies the same standards to Karadzic and Mladic, as well. But for the authorities in Sarajevo, such an interpretation is neither rational nor realistic.

In fact, the essence of the problem is that all the time Kordic has been viewed as a political leader. Yet, one should view the things the other way round and recall that, at the time when the atrocities were being committed, he was in uniform. He held the rank of colonel and was the second man in the HVO staff in central Bosnia. That he has meanwhile changed combat fatigues for the civilian clothes of a politician and has transformed from a colonel on active service into a reserve brigadier does not mean that at the same time he has disposed of the sins committed in the course of the war.

### Brigadier Placed on Trial in Croat-Held Bosnia

*LD2811194595 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 28 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Very great interest was provoked today by the resumption of the trial of Ivica Rajic, a brigadier in the [Bosnian] HVO [Croatian Defense Council] [Bosnian Croat forces], and of the soldiers Dominik Ilijasevic and Vlatko Trogrlic, who have been accused of physically ill-treating members of the HVO in Kiseljak [as heard].

Many people from Kiseljak and other places in Herceg-Bosnia gathered in front of the Mostar High Court and in the courtroom itself. They had come mainly to give their support to the accused.

The first day of the hearing, which is scheduled to last three days, was devoted to an interrogation of Brigadier Ivica Rajic. Here is a report by Anton Mrkonjic:

[Mrkonjic] Before the interrogation of Brig. Rajic, Josip Musulimovic, acting for the defense, requested that the hearing be postponed because during the investigation criminal proceedings had been infringed and it was necessary to collect fresh evidence. The defense lawyer, Musulimovic, explained that the accused Ivica Rajic was arrested without ever having been formally charged, and that he had been detained, or held in a dungeon as Musulimovic put it, for longer than he should have, because he ought to have been allowed out after three days to appear before the prosecuting lawyer. [passage omitted]

### Serb Paramilitary Leader Interviewed on Srebrenica

*AU2411193295 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 17 Nov 95 p 25*

[Interview with Branislav Vakic, Serbian Radical Party deputy in the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and commander of Serb paramilitaries in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; originally published in SVET: "How Frenki and I Took Srebrenica...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Vakic] ...I sent more than 6,000 volunteers from the south of Serbia. I have documents confirming that they had been trained in the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] camps of Bubanj Potok, 4 July, and others.

[SVET] Who did you cooperate with?

[Vakic] I cooperated with the current chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army [Momcilo Perisic] while he was still at the Mostar front and later, when he was the commander of the Nis army district in 1993. I got from him more than 70 uniforms, night-sight binoculars, ammunition, and weapons, which I got from Colonel Loncar of Bajina Basta through Generals Perisic and Ojdanic of the Uzice Corps. We signed a receipt for all those weapons, so we had to return them on our way back to Srebrenica. Here I have documents confirming that I took and returned 80 guns to a depot in Skelani (Vakic takes from his bag a disorderly bunch of papers and shows us originals and Xerox copies of documents confirming what he said). I also cooperated with Gen. Bozovic of Kumbor near Herceg-Novi, from whom I got a Pinzgauer pistol. Look at this rubber stamp: Army fieldpost, Split. Even though we were already at war at the time, in July 1992, they were still using the old rubber stamps. I obtained vehicles and gasoline from a colonel in Danilovgrad. With Col. Novica Glisic, who is a very good friend of Gen. Perisic, I fought together on the Herzegovina and the Dubrovnik fronts. I took part in crushing Muslim units at Nevesinje on 26 June 1992. On that occasion five of my fighters were killed, of whom two were from Niksic and three from Nis. I have a document signed personally by Col. Glisic. With the MUP [Interior Ministry] of Serbia we cooperated on the Skelani front. As a Chetnik major, representing my unit, I received a letter of thanks from the Unit for Special Assignments of the Serbian MUP. I also have a letter of thanks that refers to me as Duke [Chetnik military title] Branislav Vakic. I do not have that letter here, because I have given it to Seselj, just in case he is summoned to The Hague. I was under the direct command of Obrad Stefanovic, commander of the special units of the Serbian MUP and his deputy Frenki Stamatovic. There is documentation on all this and there are many witnesses who are able to confirm this.

[SVET] Will you need those documents to defend yourself in The Hague?

[Vakic] Certainly! I am not to blame for anything, save that I defended the Serbian people. And I shall do so in the future as well. After all, I would really like the Americans to come to Bosnia. Let them land there, so we can seen who are the better fighters at close quarters!

## Commentary Examines Muslim Ruling Party Unity

*AU2511155895 Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 14 Nov 95 pp 2-3*

[Nerzuk Curak commentary: "A Thousand Flowers Should (Not) Blossom"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The election campaign has started in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although there is a whole series of arguments in political and public life in Bosnia-Herzegovina to support this claim, it seems that its most radical expression is the open letter written by Enes Karic, the minister of culture, which he addressed to Mr. Ejup Ganic, the vice chairman of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In that public message Mr. Karic reproaches Mr. Ganic for criticizing the Ministry of Culture, but it can be claimed that this was not the primary aim of the letter, written in a very sharp tone.

The key word in Karic's pretentious condemnation of a Presidency member is "faction," so the young theologian [Karic] can be called its author, since he is the man who introduced that destructive word into the new Bosnian political language.

### The Unity of Diversification or Shooting at Attitudes

His intention is as clear as day: The public should be offered a precisely addressed thought — that there is at least one faction within the ruling party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of whose pillars is Mr. Ganic. Enes Karic has made a mistake, however: Regardless of how horrible his message is, he has not succeeded in stirring up Bosnian public opinion. On the contrary, the people have responded with indifference, which does not mean that this is good, since if a nation in a country is not upset by the possibility of a rift in the ruling party, this means that there must be something wrong, something that makes the people disinterested in political issues, even though they are as important as this one.

Without the wish to discuss the reasons of that national indifference, it is surprising that reporters, too, neglected the issue, since a single question addressed to Mr. Bicakcic in one of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] news conferences cannot be considered as bringing the most important internal political issue to the surface of public life. Bicakcic clearly said that there were no factions within the SDA, and this kind of answer could have been expected from one of the party leaders. The story cannot end with this answer, however — it has to be established whether there are factions within the SDA.

### A Group of People, Let Us Call Them a Faction

Anyone who actively follows political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina must have noticed a certain change in the behavior of Prime Minister Silajdzic. It seems that since the time he offered his resignation, which he then irrevocably withdrew, some of the old political lions have taught him how to engage in politics. It cannot be denied that his government has finally started to work on topics that are the main reason of its existence — the economy and all the problems in connection with the field trivially called the ordinary human life.

Even one of the high-ranking party officials told us that the prime minister has recently replaced his public shows by real work, which is, naturally, still a long way from the necessary efficiency, but much more valuable than platitudes about NATO strikes, genocide, Serbian terrorists etc.

It remains to be seen whether Karic, as Silajdzic's man, who knows that he will probably be withdrawn from the position of minister of culture, has been sacrificed in advance in order to strengthen Silajdzic's position by putting the word "faction" into circulation. It is, however, significant that this tumultuous political life is going on as long as the Bosnian prime minister is out of the country, so that this is either sophisticated shrewdness or a self-willed act from the minister of culture, whose vanity has been hurt because of his announced withdrawal.

It seems that the opposition has profited most from this, since this was a signal for it to free its capacity for association, which allows all imaginable alliances, although these cannot be considered realistic. All options are open, however.

The partitions in the political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the election period will certainly not be carried out beyond political parties, but through them. In other words, people will decide between party members and not between parties, so that no one should be surprised even at a coalition in the first election such as would include SDA, SDP [Party of Democratic Changes], Liberal Party members etc..

People will, in other words, go by personal values and not by parties, and this is the direct message of Karic's letter, from which the opposition has drawn certain conclusions and made calculations of the type whom it could win over from the SDA to its side, or whether a group of people (let us call them a faction) might possibly secede from the SDA and join various political parties or form a new party!

I do not think that the SDA is interested in pretending to be unitary if there is no unity, but it is, on the other hand, certainly not interested in losing people who have opinions somewhat different from the basic principles of the party. If we try to follow the thesis to its conclusion, it becomes clear that Karic has in fact called the whole party a faction, that is, those members who stubbornly, at least in public, insist on the uniqueness of the party. It is the classic substantiation of theses: Prospective faction members, regardless of whether they are in the party or close to it, call the whole party a faction! This could become a serious problem, but it seems that the ruling party will know how to solve it in these exceptionally responsible times, without pretending to be unique and without losing its strong people. Or perhaps at the price that it loses both its unity and its strong members, which is a sword that can turn either way.

Many people who hide behind Silajdzic or openly support him, since they consider him their political option, expect the prime minister to withdraw from the SDA. The author of this text is not convinced that this will not happen as long as Izetbegovic leads the party. First, Silajdzic sharply criticized the premises of the latest peace agreement but accepted them with enchantment later on, which is significant, since it seems that he gave up the radical Bosnian integration policy, joining the realistic political option. Seen in that light, it can rather be expected that he is rudely undisciplined toward the party, which is a form of factional behavior, than that he leaves the party. By definition, a faction means a disagreement with the party, but in spite of that, faction members remain party members. The SDA might have the wish, however, to thank the prime minister for his membership so far, which would mean that it has assessed that this would not be an irreplaceable loss for it.

### The Changes From Top to Bottom

Knowing that the opposition started examining the field in the "ruling party yard" everything points to the possibility that the SDA could soon make certain transformations within its party that would strengthen its position toward the opposition, which became furious because of the election results in Croatia.

Some sources have already pointed to the changes that could bring about significant shifts, in other words, they could make cuts in the party tissue from the top to the bottom. It is difficult to say whether the party will decide to take radical steps to dissociate itself from all those people and centers of power where there is fraud, but such a move would probably considerably strengthen the position of the party, knowing that the opposition will probably insist that every incorrectness related to either the party or the state that can be proven be admitted.

Starting from the fact that the SDA has doubtlessly more than any other party contributed to the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim population (despite all the failures it made during that historic period), it would be political illiteracy to lose the position it has. Therefore the stories might be true that the SDA will be revitalized by new members, who will come out of this war without any scandals behind them, and that it will be even more inclined to the political center, winning for its program also those people who distanced themselves from it, because of some of its stereotype attitudes about prerequisites "for entering its premises." It seems that this must inevitably happen if the SDA wants to remain in power.

If those people enter the SDA who have high intellectual and moral credibility, both in the urban and rural population, among soldiers and workers, this will enable it to avoid possible clashes within factions. It remains open whether the party will at the same time also be "cleansed" of political opponents and of those who violated legal and moral norms.

In any case, the ruling party is confronted with many challenges: An exceptionally aggressive media campaign has started against the SDA. It is less important whether the generator of the campaign is in the party or outside it, but everything speaks in favor of the possibility that there is at least one faction in the party. It seems that we shall not have to wait long to see whether it will remain within the party as a symbol of party liberalism or whether it will change to another party. The future of the largest party of the Muslim people considerably depends on this answer, however.

## Muslim Mojahedin Fighters Threaten UK Troops

*MS2811094095 London THE GUARDIAN in English 28 Nov 95 p 2*

[Report by Julian Borger: "Vengerful Islamic Guerrillas Threaten British Troops Bound For Bosnia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zenica — A vendetta against Britons pursued by Muslim mojahedin fighters in central Bosnia threatens to trigger an armed clash when Nato forces arrive to enforce the Balkan peace deal.

An estimated 1,000 mojahedin volunteers from Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa have become a law unto themselves across a large swath of highlands around the towns of Zenica, Tesanj and Zavidovici.

The region has become a no-go area for aid workers, particularly Britons, since a mojahedin-trained Bosnian fighter was shot dead by a British soldier last month. Islamic zealots have vowed to kill four Britons in revenge.

Aid agencies in the area have pulled out British staff after their houses and flats were daubed with death threats. Humanitarian convoys have been re-routed to avoid mojahedin areas.

Even Bosnian Muslims working for British organisations have been threatened.

British troops have also kept their heads below the parapet, but many local and foreign observers fear that once the British swap their blue United Nations helmets to Nato green, a settling of scores will become inevitable.

Under the terms of the peace agreement, due to be signed in Paris next month all foreign combatants have to leave the country within 30 days. There is uncertainty about whether the mojahedin will go quietly.

"We don't know who controls them and who can tell them to go," one aid official in Zenica said.

Many arrived posing as relief officials from the Middle East and hold UN identity cards. Others carry forged Western Passports. Some came for money, but many seek martyrdom and may savour a confrontation with Nato troops.

The mojahedin have trained and indoctrinated an estimated 1,000 local fighters in two extensive camps, and were described this month by a pro-government Bosnian newspaper, Ljiljan, as a "state within a state".

The bearded guerrillas can be seen patrolling around Zenica in US-made Cherokee Jeeps with no licence plates. In one incident, two Land Rovers full of British UN soldiers were surrounded by mojahedin in Zavidovici. According to a UN report, the guerrillas had the "clear intention of killing the British soldiers". Their lives were spared after the pleas of a Bosnian army commander.

Earlier this month, two New Zealand UN officers were detained by the mojahedin, who mistook their insignia for British markings. They were released after four hours, and were told the Muslim fighters were still looking for British blood.

The Bosnian government has an awkward relationship with the foreign volunteers. They arrived during the first two years of the war, when Muslim forces looked in danger of annihilation.

This autumn, they made territorial gains against the Bosnian Serbs around Mount Ozren, north of Zavidovici. But they have also been a source of friction. They first tried unsuccessfully to make local women wear the veil.

"If I go into a bar and there is a moji sitting there, I can't relax," one Zenica woman said. "People here are afraid but they are also fed up."

This month, the Zenica authorities issued a statement on the negative effect "certain foreigners" were having on "efforts to establish peace, security and equality for all the citizens of our town".

After stand-offs with Bosnian troops, the mojahedin have been pushed out of town. Yesterday the first British aid workers returned, but much surrounding countryside is out of bounds. "You definitely think long and hard before getting into your car and driving somewhere," one British aid official in the area said.

His staff have not forgotten Paul Goodall, a British aid worker shot dead by mojahedin renegades in January 1994. A memorial stone marked the spot south of Zenica where he died. A few days ago, the stone was smashed.

### Serb Units Neutralize Muslim 'Terrorist Group'

*AU2911195095 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 28 Nov 95*

[Report by Zeljko Stojanovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stojanovic] On the southern borders of Serb Sarajevo, special units of the Serb Republic army and police blocked and neutralized a fairly large enemy terrorist group of the so-called Muslim army 445th Light Infantry Brigade of Konjic. Muslim terrorists attempted an incursion into the Serb territory in the area of Mt. Igman. Anti-terrorist units of the Serb Republic Armed Forces thwarted the carefully planned enemy action, timed to coincide with the finale of the Dayton agreement and designed to destabilize Serb Sarajevo.

[Slavo Pavlovic, Serb officer] They passed through the UNPA [United Nations Protected Area], through all check points, and got onto our territory in an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] convoy. Our soldiers prevented that with a swift and responsible action.

[Stojanovic] Among the captured Muslim soldiers were also those whose criminal activities are very much linked to already registered crimes against the Serb nation.

[Jusif Balic, "captured Muslim"] Husein Balic, who is my distant relative, is from Orahovica. I come from the village of Bale. Husein Balic raped women in Selebici, Orahovica, Konjic, Gradina, [word indistinct], (?Poljani), (?Nezajici), Djordjici.

[Stojanovic] There is a growing list of charges against the infamous Jasmin Guska, Hazim Delic, a certain Zenga, Redzo Ballic called Trandzo, Fadil Ljevo, Fadil Rizdvanovic, Miralem Duracic, and a Muslim nicknamed Mitke Coro, who all committed crimes against the Serbs. Jusuf Balic, of the village of Bale, near Konjic, knows the following about those criminals:

[Balic] They raped Serb women who came to visit their relatives in the detention camp.

[Stojanovic] Which detention camp?

[Balic] Celebici. They took them to some rooms where they were on duty. I do not know where they took them from there.

[Stojanovic] What happened there?

[Balic] There was a prison in Celebici where they held some 500 Serbs.

[Stojanovic] Balic knows.

[Balic] Zenga beat, killed people down there.

[Stojanovic] Where?

[Balic] In Celebici, in prison, in detention camp.

[Stojanovic] How?

[Balic] By using anything from shovels to picks, whatever he had near him.

[Stojanovic] Balic also testifies that:

[Balic] About Redzo Balic called Trandzo, Fadil Rizdvanovic, and Ljevo Fadil, I know that they killed a woman, a man, his wife...

[Stojanovic] Whose?

[Balic] Jelenko Djodjic's.

[Stojanovic] Where?

[Balic] In the village of (?Zubici).

[Stojanovic] When?

[Balic] At the beginning of the war. Miralem Duracic, Mitke Coro — they now hold, they own three trucks, cars, two or three stores in Konjic in which they they sell Serb belongings. And now they are getting rich and nobody can harm them in Konjic.

[Stojanovic] Forces of the United Nations, i.e. NATO troops, removed all check points on Mt. Igman toward the Serb side, not to mention the fact that they no longer keep the warring sides separated.

[Balic] UNPROFOR did not check us except on Mt. Igman.

[Stojanovic] What did they say?

[Balic] Go on. Just drive on, they said.

[Stojanovic] Another Muslim terrorist act against Serb Sarajevo has been thwarted. With confidence and perseverance, all future attacks will also be repelled.

### Tudjman Asks Velayati for More Iranian Mediation

*LD2911194195 Tehran IRNA in English 1924 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 29 (IRNA)—Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati on Wednesday hand delivered a message to Croat President Franjo Tudjman from Iranian President Hojjat ol-Eslam Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

The Croat president told Velayati that he was interested in seeing Iran and Croatia broadening their relations as well as cooperating more closely with Bosnia-Herzegovina In the interest of regional peace and better collaboration between Muslims and Croats.

Tudjman said the Islamic Republic relying on its influence could help promote broader mutual understanding between Bosnians and Croats as well as promote the formation of a Bosnia-Croatia Confederation.

He said envoys of the two republics would shortly meet in Paris to discuss the topic of the formation of a Bosnia-Croat Confederation.

The Iranian foreign minister in response voiced the same feelings in relation to the cooperation between Iran, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, adding Iran was willing to play a role in reconstruction programs in Croatia relying on its own experience in that area during recent years.

The Iranian foreign minister is to leave Zagreb for Sarajevo Thursday where he is expected to meet with Bosnian officials for discussing the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### Bilateral Cooperation Discussed

*LD3011104295 Tehran IRNA in English 1018 GMT 30 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 30, IRNA—The latest politico-military developments in the Balkans were reviewed here Wednesday by Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati and the Croatian defense minister, Gojok Cucak.

Expansion of bilateral and trilateral cooperation after lifting embargo on Bosnia were also among topics discussed by the two sides.

Stressing consolidation of cooperation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, Cucak described the process as desirable. He further called for continuation of the ongoing cooperation between Iran and Croatia which led to further understanding between the latter and Bosnia. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Velayati announced Iran's readiness to participate in the regional reconstruction projects.

In another development, Velayati met with Croatian economic minister, Dador Cdern the same day in which the two officials reviewed expansion of bilateral economic ties. Broadening of Iran-Croatia-Bosnia economic ties were also reviewed in the meeting.

The two sides exchanged views on the progress made in agreements reached between the two countries on selling Iran's oil to Croatia and purchasing ships by Iran from Croatia. It was scheduled that the practical stages of the agreement be materialized through imminent trips of delegations from Iran's shipping organization and Oil Ministry to Zagreb. Providing consular facilities for tradsmen of the two countries was among other topics discussed in the meeting.

Expressing content over the outcome of the trilateral Iran-Croatia-Bosnia cooperation, the two ministers announced the joint cooperation commission would be set up in a near future in Sarajevo.

Velayati backed consolidation of economic cooperation saying that Iran's trade exhibition will be set up in Zagreb shortly to make Croatian traders and businessmen familiar with Iranian-made products and goods.

### Hungarian Peacekeeping Role in Bosnia Welcomed

*LD2911163295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] It is still debated in Hungary whether or not to take part in the Bosnian peacekeeping forces by sending technical squads. German political forces refer to the fact that this would not be welcomed by our Yugoslav neighbors. As far as Croatia's opinion is concerned, we would hardly have any problem with it. Monika Mester reports:

[Mester] Croatia would welcome Hungary participation in the Yugoslav peacekeeping operations by sending technical squads. Here is Croatia's ambassador to Budapest [Aleksandar Solc]:

[Begin Solc recording] We consider it proper that Hungary will help, on its own territory, the NATO troops which will fight for peace in the former Yugoslavia. We see no reason why they should not participate, particularly since it is technical help. [end recording]

[Mester] Aleksandar Solc, at the same time, stressed that the decision is Hungary's internal matter and that the concrete decision can only be taken by the Hungarian National Assembly.

We also wanted to ask the head of the Yugoslav Embassy about the possibility of Hungarian technical squads joining the NATO peacekeepers. However, we have not managed to contact either the ambassador or his first deputy.

### Commentary Views Dayton Talks as Premature

*AU2911152895 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 22 Nov 95 p 5*

[Commentary by Maja Freundlich: "Unprepared Ground"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the 21st day of considerable peace efforts in Ohio, ultimate deadlines, ultimate limits of possible expectations, and sudden twists are disclosing to us all sorts of things. They are providing us with various possibilities of division, but they are certainly not an indication of wisely pursued world politics. The Dayton talks are not the first such talks in the history of the world or of Europe, or in this century. Still, if we try to find the line that the talks are following, we shall not find it in similar examples of this century. However, it is apparent that the architects of the Dayton proposals have specifically tried to follow historic examples, and they have certainly found in history numerous explanations and justifications for their moves. Their justification will certainly be founded most on analogies drawn from the Versailles peace after World War I. Still, the red line that the Dayton talks are following is drawn from the experience Serbs and Russians gathered in this war. It is particular and different from all past world experiences. Right now the entire world has an opportunity to share with us the experience that we, Croats, have gained of Serbs in this war, about which we could teach many people, and particularly the Americans.

If we ask Clinton's advisors and experts for an opinion, they will certainly explain away their project by saying that the attacker must not be humiliated in his defeat, because eventually that humiliation brings forth a new Hitler, who was apparently a product of the Versailles peace. Clinton's team of experts is not only his, after all. The policies pursued by Clinton's staff is always one and the same policies of the United States, ardently and consistently followed for a long time, and most clearly demonstrated in the case of Russia, which was unnecessarily picked up from the dust by America, and in the case of Saddam Hussein, whose real defeat was unwisely evaded. That is America's consistent strategy of saving the enemy's face, even though defeat may be the only clear lesson to the resurrection of Nazism.

#### Historical Examples

Despite following historic examples, Clinton's advisors—for whatever reason—have forgotten about the fact that Dayton is not Versailles, and that Dayton cannot create a new Hitler. That new Hitler, Slobodan Milosevic, was created seven years ago, in the core of the Serbian communist party. For whatever reason, and I hope it is just because of political shortsightedness or inexperience, American political experts tend to turn a blind eye to the Serbian memorandum, being an imitation of "Mein Kampf," the obvious Serbian territorial aspirations, the Serbian concentration death camps, genocide and a civilization of devastation and destruction. Dayton has been envisaged since the very start as the place of a historic compromise, where everybody would lose and win, and where, because of the general compromise, peace would be achieved. Is it at all possible to expect this from Milosevic?

When the possible tripartite negotiations of southern European presidents were proposed for the first time in Moscow, Croatian President Tudjman elegantly discarded such a possibility, expressing quite clearly what he thought about Russian politicians' competence and their state policy. On that occasion he hardly referred to Russia's clear preference for Serbia, or even its direct involvement in conquests happening in the south of Europe. He just said that such a meeting would be possible, provided it was prepared well enough. That sentence referred primarily to the Russians, expressing doubt in the Russians' ability to secure accomplishment of a reliable peace agreement. However, it was obviously just a remark, that referred as well to many other political attempts outside Russia.

American politicians, and most of all U.S. President Clinton, have gotten involved in the south European crisis with a lot of passion and even more self-confidence. It is as if they suddenly said to all of us: "Halt! Do not move! Stop messing things up and let us do it, for we know best how to do it! We shall settle things once and for all, and you will see how easy it is to have peace there!" Of course, Clinton needs badly at least one high-sounding success, even if it were in foreign policy. However, overly self-confident, he has begun to grapple with the problem about which neither he nor his advisers know much. First and foremost, they have no idea who and what the Serbs are like. For that reason it is a problem that may give them broken teeth, rather than fame.

#### Final Attempt at Accomplishing Peace

The Americans have undertaken the organization of peace with such passion that many in the world have come to believe it is really the final attempt. Many believe that it is impossible for such an effort made by the greatest world power not to produce any result. Holbrooke traveled to and fro, talked, negotiated, and spent many nights sitting on Milosevic's sofa. This famous sofa, on which Owen foolishly laughed so many times and Stoltenberg subtly smiled, Holbrooke could not evade as well. For many days Christopher was also talking, persuading, negotiating, writing, and telephoning. Clinton focused his entire energy in foreign politics on one single region on Earth. It sounded almost impossible that such an endeavor would not produce a favorable outcome.

The Serbs seemingly began to yield. Rumors circulated that Milosevic broke up with Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs, and that it was a direct result of Holbrooke's efforts. It was said that Milosevic was about to collapse, that he agreed to recognize Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was said that Milosevic would do anything to have the economic sanctions against Serbia lifted. It was said that he was soft and nice. Milosevic was no longer seen as a war criminal. Holbrooke was getting more and more exhausted, which was supposed to reflect how difficult his job was, but also to corroborate his ever greater successes. Tired, yet radiant, Galbraith went to meet the remaining Serbian negotiators in eastern Herzegovina. There he was negotiating solutions, promising them all and sundry things, after which he came back and tried to convince Croatia of necessary compromises. Everybody was excited and increasingly self-confident.

Finally they declared that they got Milosevic's guarantees. They claimed they succeeded in breaking Milosevic on the most important issues, so that Croatia and the Muslims ought to give in as well on some remaining minor issues on which Serbia was insisting. Like obedient students, Americans were so self-confident that all the international observers began to think that, despite past experiences with the Serbs, this time something extraordinary happened.

### Milosevic's Sofa

Whereas in fact.... If Holbrooke confessed to the public what he and his colleague Milosevic talked about during those long nights, sitting on the sofa, we would be able to explain to him what really happened there, as a matter of fact, and what Milosevic meant when he said.... Which is to say, Holbrooke does not understand that Milosevic speaks Serbian even when he seemingly speaks English, so what happened there we, Croats, knew would happen and wrote about. Milosevic was playing games again. His games do not have any serious connection with real Serbian interests. Milosevic's tricks harm Serbia alone. Each time he played such tricks in the course of the negotiations, it cost the Serbs more than if they had accepted what was being offered to them. But the insanity characteristic of Hitler and his German contemporaries could not have passed over Milosevic and his Serbian Nazi contemporaries. They will keep on playing games, foolishly self-confident, without noticing that they are cutting the last twig they are sitting on. The Americans, however, will never understand how it is possible for someone to be so foolish and thoughtless to act at one's own disadvantage.

The circle eventually came full. After all the dramatic promises and expectations, Milosevic arrived in Dayton. For almost three weeks he behaved there like a tomcat, and then, in the daring manner of a blackmailer, cast completely new demands on the table. Assuming that Americans want success and signing of a peace agreement in front of CNN's cameras at any price, he decided to put the kids with whom he had talked nicely on the sofa up to now through a wringer. On Sunday the Americans told us that accord had been 99 percent accomplished and only 1 percent had remained questionable. "What is the 1 percent all about?" we asked. "Oh, it is nothing important," they said. "It is just about some territorial issues." Which means that they still have not understood that this entire war, and the chief motive of the Serbs, are precisely about some territorial issues. They still have not understood that Milosevic did not have any personal doubts or difficulties in signing all the agreements on the constitution, internal organization, military issues, government, parliament, protection of cultural monuments, or refugees. He does not care about that. He has already slaughtered refugees or will slaughter them, and he does not intend to abide by documents, so it is all the same to him what he signs. The only genuinely important thing to Milosevic is to seize territories, and perhaps, and just perhaps, to get the sanctions lifted.

He wanted to use the meeting in Dayton to accomplish two aims. First, to settle the territorial issue. Because he began to lose the war to the Croats, he wanted to halt their offensive and make use of American shortcomings to secure his remaining territories in Bosnia and eastern Croatia. Second, keeping a pen ready to sign the agreement, he wanted to blackmail the international community into immediate lifting of the sanctions. Yet, this is questionable, because the sanctions appear dreadful only to stupid Westerners. In Serbia, whose everyday needs are far from being excessive, the sanctions have proven to be an excellent impetus to the development of a black economy. Everybody is doing business on the black market, and Milosevic himself probably most of all, so why lift the sanctions, after all? How would they earn their living otherwise?

To sum up, the ground for the accomplishment of an accord in Dayton was not well prepared, as President Tudjman would put it. The organizers proved to be hasty and thoughtless. The time for such talks is not yet ripe, because Milosevic and his Nazi Serbia have remained militarily undefeated in this war. Therefore it is still too early for any kind of agreement. If, owing to the persistent pressure applied by the Americans, something happens to be signed, it will be an incomplete and immature piece of paper, void of continuity. Does this fact have to be explained to Clinton in a patronizing manner by somebody like Lawrence Eagleburger?

### Commentary on U.S. Pressure Over Erdut Accord

*AU3011100995 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 13 Nov 95 p 3*

[Commentary by Aleksandar Milosevic: "The End of the War or the Beginning of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith has described as historic the document signed by Hrvoje Sarinic and Milan Milanovic on Sunday afternoon [12 November], defining the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. In his opinion, it is a sign of the war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia really ending.

The optimism of the U.S. ambassador, as well as a certain amount of euphoria on his part, are understandable, when one considers that the United States has invested all the influence and political credibility of a world superpower in the signing of the document. However, a certain amount of restraint and caution would not hurt. True, the fact that the agreement was not signed at the same time and in the same place and the fact that the U.S. ambassador was travelling several hundred kilometers between Erdut and Zagreb like an errand boy are not crucial to the mere act of signing. It is much more important to see to what extent the Serb side will really abide by what it signed. Experience shows that the Serbs' political leaders in the occupied parts of Croatia have signed many documents, only to interpret them in their own way subsequently or not to abide by what they sign.

This is why it will be particularly important that the international community, primarily the United States, monitor the implementation of what was signed in Zagreb and Erdut by being present in the future. This may be not the end of the war, but the beginning of peace, since any deviation from the Zagreb-Erdut agreement makes the military option to integrate the remaining occupied territories inevitable.

It is clear that the document on the peaceful integration of eastern Slavonia, western Srijem, and Baranja has been achieved at the round table in Dayton. It was preceded by powerful political pressure from the United States on Serbian President Milosevic, who has been faced with the increasing isolation of the so-called FRY. At the same time, the International War Tribunal in The Hague hangs like the Sword of Damocles over some of his former followers. It is not entirely inconceivable that Milosevic himself was threatened with the same thing unless he managed to persuade his followers in Erdut to put their signatures to the agreement on peaceful integration.

And last but not least, this agreement shows that the Croatian delegation in Dayton did not abandon the position formulated in President Tudjman's statement that the issue of eastern Slavonia must be resolved at all costs. Emphasizing that Croatia would do this by military means if all the efforts for a peaceful resolution failed, President Tudjman was not bluffing. Both the United States and Slobodan Milosevic were obviously aware of that. Croatia's military power may be the crucial factor that will, with an international presence, guarantee the implementation of the agreement on eastern Slavonia. The confirmation of Croatia's credibility may be the most important result of what was signed on Sunday.

### Politicians' Reactions to Erdut Accord Viewed

*AU3011101095 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 15 Nov 95 p 2*

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov-Colic: "A Delayed Victory"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of all those in the very reserved Croatian public who have tried, in quite a nervous and tense way, to defend the "basic agreement" on the transitional years in the still occupied eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem, the most awkward has again been the main negotiator, Hrvoje Sarinic. Mario Nobilo [Croatian ambassador to the UN] was the most secretive, while Kofi Annan, who has been heading UN operations for years and whom Butrus-Ghali sent to replace Akashi in overseeing the diplomatic burial of UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] and UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], was the most convincing, which might have been least expected of him.

As Sarinic attempted to make awkward comparisons between Tresnjevka [in Zagreb] and Beli Manastir [in

Serb occupied Croatia], or Dubrava [in Zagreb] and Vukovar in avoiding something that, after all, smells of some future Serb political autonomy, Nobilo was mostly hiding behind secret guarantees from the most powerful, while only Kofi Annan openly and convincingly uttered things that set many suspicious people's minds at rest, even including analysts from some very "official" dailies, and even one Branimir Glavas [hard-line prefect of the Slavonia-Baranja County]: The Security Council has yet to make some of the most important practical decisions, but it is certain that "the UN will not be involved in the military aspects of the agreement," but only some "civilian" (police) and "political" (monitoring the elections?) affairs, in which it will be doing what it is best at, after all: humanitarian monitoring and general care for the return and welfare of refugees.

It turns out that the Croatian ambassador Mario Nobilo was not tailoring the truth when he said that this "agreement" would not be reduced to the restoration of the Vance Plan, freezing the entire "oblast" [Serbian word for municipal district] for centuries, as the UN did in Kashmir and nearly managed to do in the "Krajina," or a mere disguise by the peacemakers following the infamous Russian eastern Slavonian model [Russian UN troops have been stationed in eastern Slavonia]. Instead, Annan claims that the new international units would be organized according to the same principle as in Bosnia-Herzegovina (NATO, in which Americans will be in the majority, with just a symbolic presence of the Russians, who will listen to what Brussels has to say, even though their orders will be delivered by high Russian couriers), and if nothing comes out of it in the end, then the Security Council will organize (Nobilo uses the word "confirm," meaning that the Contact Group should make all the decisions, at least in principle) some new "special forces." The Croatian ambassador keeps calling these forces "regional forces," which need not mean that they will only consist of neighboring countries' forces, though it is difficult to assess at the moment which would be better for Croatia in the long run: some special forces that would confirm its sovereignty or the "Bosnian model," which would, owing to the role of NATO units, bring much firmer guarantees.

To all this Nobilo adds the promise that the issue will be the use of a "war" rather than a "peace" chapter from the UN Charter, adorning it with guarantees of the most powerful—which are still secret and unknown—in which he sounds most convincing when he claims something that can hardly be accepted as firm and final proof: That the international media have also interpreted this agreement as a Croatian victory and Belgrade's withdrawal. However, the "soft" language—some say "too soft"—that marks the whole agreement is quite unclear, the agreement being, as Nobilo himself has indirectly admitted, primarily a product of the international diplomatic need to have signed at least whatever is possible at the moment, within the general scramble to save face.

Croatia has managed in Dayton to anchor discussion on the last part of the occupied territory and thus set the (at least public) course of the first 10 days or so of the negotiations only on Croatian vices and virtues and advantages and drawbacks (the Bosnian Federation and Vukovar). But Washington could not accept this for ever, since the primary issue was the "Bosnian negotiations," in which difficult issues, such as the territorial division of Bosnia or the status of Sarajevo, had to be resolved. Zagreb had to be taken off the agenda and so it was better for it to accept a delayed victory than leave for home empty-handed. The real battles will take place on the Security Council, while a joyful Nobilo is already saying that "the war in Croatia has ended" with the above.

Not even the usually reliable official interpreters support such optimistic statements and it seems that in the general atmosphere this agreement is yet to start rising from its very pessimist basement: After "Operation Flash" and "Operation Storm," the Croatian public has become obsessed with the policy of a "steel broom" as the only certain solution and finds it difficult to accept the possibility of a peaceful agreement even in principle. In the messy acceptance of this diplomatic compromise, it was precisely Budisa [leader of the Croatian Social Liberal Party] and Djapic [president of the Croatian Party of Right]—who should not agree about war and peace to that extent—who rejected the agreement most firmly, while the Istrian Democratic Congress [IDS] even congratulated Sarinic, with Kajin [IDS member] again daring to voice the worst kind of criticism of the "original policy of war." The majority of the opposition is yet to get used to the idea that Croatia will have no real democratic, economic, and civilized future if it shows itself to be invincible only in using weapons.

### Air Force Commander Prefers Western Systems

*AU2911145295 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 27 Nov 95 p 5*

[Interview with General Imra Agotic, commander of the Croatian Air Force and the Antiaircraft Defense, by Snjezana Dukic at Zemunik Airport on 24 November: "Murderous Defense of Croatian Skies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The central celebration of the Croatian Air Force and the Antiaircraft Defense [HRZ and PZO]—which took place at Zemunik Airport on Friday [24 November]—showed, on one hand, the supreme qualification of our military pilots, and, on the other hand, an impressive picture of the aircraft equipment we possess. In a bit more than four years we have created a small but very respectable air force, which was, after all, proven by the recent Croatian Army operations in which the HRZ had one of the crucial roles. What is the bedrock of the Croatian Air Force and what will it look like in the future, we asked General Imra Agotic, commander of the HRZ and the PZO.

[Agotic] The time when the HRZ started on its war path can be approximately determined from the time of the National Guard and at the time of the first flights by cargo airplanes to deliver aid to besieged Vukovar. Then, a part of the combat activities were carried out by small planes on the southern battlefields, but especially in eastern and western Slavonia. However, the beginning of the serious creation and activity of the HRZ was at the time of capturing the first aircraft, first radar systems, and first antiaircraft artillery pieces to organize the system of the PZO. There were also the first flights of our pilots in exclusively combat planes. By then, in the period of the fiercest war, until the end of 1991, a large number of combat operations had been carried out by the non-combat planes. However, later on, by having captured a significant quantity of aircraft and equipment, first of all combat and cargo helicopters, and then by combat airplanes flying over the Croatian territory, and having obtained means otherwise, we have succeeded in providing a sufficient number of aircraft for real combat purpose.

### We Started With MiG-21

[Dukic] At the beginning of the liberation war people were saying that the HRZ had two or three MiG-21 aircraft, and then, after a very short time, that number almost quadrupled. How do you comment on that?

[Agotic] Yes, the HRZ was growing at a time of a very strict arms embargo. You cannot smuggle aircraft in your pocket, and it was necessary to be exceptionally skillful in order to provide for the equipment of the HRZ—combat-purpose aircraft like MiGs and aircraft equipment. In the recent Croatian Army operations the air force has marked those actions by setting the speed of the operations' development and inflicting main strikes on the resistance lines. So, it proved then that the HRZ has a sufficient number of combat airplanes, which made the realization of those tasks possible.

[Dukic] The HRZ has mainly Eastern-made helicopters and aircraft. Why is that so?

[Agotic] That was what we could have had at that moment. Besides, our people had been educated and trained for that Eastern equipment. Therefore we had to insist on it and that was the only possible solution. But our long-term orientation is not the equipment we have at our disposal now. We intend to create a relatively small but strong air force with contemporary forces, high-quality equipment and aircraft, high-quality ordnance... and that is Western equipment.

[Dukic] So, after the arms embargo is lifted, the Croatian Air Force will turn to Western technologies?

[Agotic] Of course. We expect that we will soon, through the Partnership for Peace program, become a full member of NATO, and we see our future in western European military integration. Thus the issue of Western equipment is automatically imposed. Because Eastern equipment, apart from not being so modern and compatible with the Western, demands a different doctrine and tactics of usage. Besides, Croatia is a state oriented to the West, which automatically dictates Croatian Army equipment on the model of Western armies.

[Dukic] Can you be more precise and tell us which types of aircraft and helicopters, and how many, would be appropriate for the Croatian Air Force in peacetime conditions, and which of them Croatia can obtain?

[Agotic] We have an idea which aircraft we need, but it would not be good to say now what those types are. We do not want to prejudice things. In any case, they have to be multipurpose airplanes equipped with supreme electronic equipment and highly sophisticated ordnance, airplanes which would be superior to the aircraft we would encounter as opponents in this area. First of all, those aircraft would have to be such as to have a psychological and deterrent effect on the enemy, so that they do not even have to be used. It is hard to say in advance what aircraft those will be. It is known, in general, that the military equipment is a political question, but also a question of economic capabilities of a country. Will that be one or two squadrons? It is a political decision whether those will be airplanes we will be given as military aid, or airplanes we will buy at the market, $30 to 50 million worth, which is the price of contemporary airplanes. In any case, we know what we need, and also those countries which are prepared to assist Croatia in obtaining military equipment know what we need. We gave them a clue already in 1991.

### My Wish Is an F-16

[Dukic] So, there are some agreements in principle already?

[Agotic] There are wishes expressed, but there are no agreements in that sense.

[Dukic] As the commander of the HRZ, which type of airplane would you like to have in the Croatian Air Force?

[Agotic] My wish is still an F-16, but an airplane itself does not represent any power at all. The system for its usage, trained pilots, high-quality crews, and purposeful usage—all this represents the power of an air force.

[Dukic] To use such airplanes, one must have highly trained pilots. What is the HRZ doing regarding that question, and will our pilots be trained abroad?

[Agotic] It is known that we have been training already the fourth generation of pilots. For the contemporary Western airplanes we need pilots who possibly have more flying experience, routine, capability to change types of airplanes. We do not fear that our pilots, who are flying MiGs now, will not be able to make themselves masters of more contemporary types of airplanes in a relatively short time. We will have more trouble with the training of technicians, with the training of accompanying infrastructure for the maintenance of airplanes, and that is the most complex and the most expensive part of the training. The classes of future pilots who are now being trained at the Air Force Military School and at the Faculty of Traffic Sciences are a pledge for the future and it is certain that those classes will start their flying careers on a Western type of airplane. It is usual in the world that the company which sells an airplane takes over the responsibility to retrain both pilots and technicians. There are training centers for that, with the military industries, while the retraining of the staff is included in the price of the aircraft. Since it takes six weeks to retrain a MiG-21 pilot to fly an F-16, there should be no problems with changing the types of airplanes.

[Dukic] You have mentioned that Croatia needs a small but strong air force in the future peacetime organization. How many people and what quantities of equipment would it consist of?

[Agotic] A bit more than 11 percent of the total number of the Croatian Army personnel falls to the Air Force. How much that will be in the future depends upon the decision of the president of the Republic. The number of personnel in the Air Force depends also on the type of aircraft we will buy, because we certainly calculate that we will not be producing aircraft. It neither pays to produce them, nor are we capable of doing so now. We need such an air force capable of defending the Croatian skies.

### Cooperation With NATO

[Dukic] What is your evaluation of the enemy's air force?

[Agotic] The enemy air force, we can nevertheless say, is respectable, and in any case we must consider it a serious opponent in Croatian skies if it comes to its usage. In relation to the Croatian Air Force it is more numerous, but it is less motivated, particularly after such experiences and such losses as they have had in Croatian skies. We know that they have some 350 combat aircraft, but they have problems with maintenance and insufficient quantities of fuel. So they have a relatively small number of flights which automatically speaks about a weaker training, and in itself about their preparedness for combat activity. However, regarding the number of pilots, as well as the support they have from the countries inclined to them, whose equipment they possess, in any case, the "SRJ" [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Air Force is a respectable enemy.

[Dukic] By the signing of the peace agreement, NATO forces will nevertheless come to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Will there be any kind of cooperation between the HRZ and the NATO air force?

[Agotic] It is hard to talk about what the obligation of the Croatian Air Force will be and what the needs of NATO will be regarding the Croatian air space. In any case Croatia will, regarding its expressed readiness to support NATO forces to the maximum, take over significant tasks. The HRZ is ready to cooperate with the NATO air force, particularly regarding the deployment and usage of the air space of the Republic of Croatia, and in that sense some talks have already taken place.

[Dukic] In what way has Croatia managed up to now to get the supplies of arms for aircraft and ordnance?

[Agotic] Well, the indicator of the supply level is the results of the recent Croatian Army operations. So, the results of Operations Flash, Summer, Storm, and Mistral have shown that we have managed well.

**[Box, p 5]**

### Rudolf Peresin

[Dukic] People have been saying that Rudolf Peresin is alive and that he has been held in a Serbian prison. What do you know about it?

[Agotic] Similar things. From the moment his airplane was shot down, we have thought so, and the information we have gathered has also told us that he was wounded upon ejection, but that he survived. Unfortunately, we have not succeeded in exchanging him. Special expert teams are working on that. We shall not be giving any other details for the time being.

[Box, p 5]

### Dalmatians Among Pilots

[Dukic] Who are better pilots? The Dalmatians, the Slavonians...

[Agotic] All of them are very good. We have not made an analysis based on that. There is a relatively small number of pilots among the Dalmatians, because the pilots were educated in the former army, and Dalmatians did not gladly join that army. In general, we are satisfied with the quality of our pilots, regardless of their regional affiliation. I am satisfied with a man who willingly does his job, which is a precondition for a job done successfully and expertly. And now, the Dalmatians have also proven to be good pilots.

### FRY Introduces 30 Percent Customs Duty

*AU2911180095 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Following the lifting of the sanctions against FR Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY], the frequency of cargo vehicles on the border crossing Tabanovce, especially for going out of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], has increased considerably these days. As the customs officials inform, some one hundred cargo vehicles heading toward FRY, cross here every day. Yesterday, the news came that the Yugoslav Government has increased the customs tax on goods coming into FR Yugoslavia, from 1 to 30 percent, depending on the type of goods going out of Macedonia. For those reasons, Macedonian trucks that could not pay the increased customs tax were sent back from the border crossing Tabanovce. The customs officials at this Macedonian border crossing have not been informed about this decision of the FR Yugoslav Customs Administration.

Otherwise, the customs officials are stating that the lines that are being created occasionally are a normal and common thing. The commander of the police station on the border crossing Tabanovce, Momchilo Jovanovski stated that "according to our realizations, over the last couple of days, Macedonian trucks are not being sent back from the Serbian side, except in one case when the drivers of eight 'Sileks' trucks could not pay the tax." The police officer could not say precisely what amount was in question, and the trucks were held in the border free zone for a while, and then continued their way.

### Increase Surprises Businessmen

*AU2911180195 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Macedonian businessmen received the news about the introduction of the customs regime by FR Yugoslavia toward Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] with great surprise. They claim that the increase in the customs rates, in average 25 percent for finished products coming from Macedonia, will have a negative effect on the cooperation between the two countries. The surprise from this new customs regime toward Macedonia is even more greater seeing it came only a couple of days following the meeting between businessmen from both countries in the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce. As it is known, at this meeting on Sunday [26 November], the businessmen even celebrated the advancement of the trade exchange between Serbia and Macedonia, according to the principles of free trade, and other more extensive forms of cooperation were announced as well. The president of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce stated that "it came as a great surprise to us on Monday [27 November] that a customs regime toward the Republic of Macedonia is introduced with the devaluation of the dinar and the new economic program adopted by the FRY Government. The surprise was even greater that the same day, the border was blocked, as concerns the flow of Macedonian products intended for the Yugoslav market. This goes to show that matters have taken on a different dimension, considering the fact that the sanctions have been lifted and that there is a possibility for the free exchange of goods and capital."

Petreski announced that the Serbian Chamber of Commerce has officially addressed the competent organs with a request to re-examine their decision, and to exclude Macedonia from this. "In the talks with my colleagues from the Serbian Chamber, I was told that they were not informed about this decision and that it came from the people from the bureaucratic mechanism, who have short-sighted views on the losses that will come as a result of this on both a short- term and long-term plan. I cannot say how sincere that is from their side, but it's a fact that the overall concept of the program was preceded by detailed preparations, and that it is not a decision made overnight. To be quite honest, these two days a lot of businessmen from FR Yugoslavia called to expressed regret for this decision and to forewarn the possible losses from the introduction of the customs system and the working costs."

The Macedonian Chamber of Commerce has analyzed the effects from the implementation of this decision, and if feels that Macedonia should introduce reciprocity for Yugoslav products. "On this note, it is important for the Government, beside the introduction of the new customs regime, to pay attention to the use of contingents (which is in force), and which have been expanded with the last decision. I fear that the present measures might bring about an expansion into other fields, especially transportation, for which there are no announcements at present. I must say that many things are not clear at the moment, because we are waiting to get the official text of the decision. According to our information, the overall customs taxes for the intermediate goods amount to 2 percent, and for the finished products, they are increased in average 25 percent."

"It is wrong to think that the same relations as before the sanctions will be reestablished with their lifting. It is also a misconception that such a decision will bring the other partner in a less enviable position. The example with Greece has proven that. In any event, this should not be seen as very tragic. Actually, it's good that it happened toward the end of the year, when our program is being prepared for next year. In its projection, we will be governed by the newly-developed relations with FRY."

### Reciprocal Measures Introduced

*AU2911192795 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In relation to the introduction of a customs regime on the Macedonian-Yugoslav border by Serbia, "Nova Makedonija" addressed the Customs Administration, which informed that the equalization of the regime toward Yugoslavia with that toward the other neighbors is a reciprocal measure to the measure for the introduction of customs towards Macedonia, which was implemented by FRY two days ago. This, according to the Assistant Director of the Administration Shaban Zendeli, means the abolishment of the to-date decision for preferential customs rates, according to which the goods crossing the Yugoslav-Macedonian border were not cleared through customs, but were only recorded.

According to Zendeli, yesterday (the new decision went into effect at 00 hours) it could not be assessed how this measure is being applied, since no larger quantities of goods crossed the border crossings with FR Yugoslavia [FRY], seeing a response to this customs measure by FR Yugoslavia was being anticipated.

### Official: Border Duty 'Standard'

*AU2911184095 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At yesterday's news conference, Government spokesman Gjuner Ismail announced that standard border regime has been introduced at the northern border from yesterday. Asked to clarify what that means, Ismail said that the regime on the border with FRY, following the suspension of the UN sanctions against this country, is now identical with that towards other three state borders with Bulgaria, Greece and Albania.

Asked whether the Government has asked for a changing of the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] mandate which expires after November 30, spokesman Ismail said that the last such Government request applied to the separation of the command of UNPREDEP from UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia], which has been done, and that the Government has still not built a new stand.

### Greece Denies Selective Border Crossing Activity

*AU2911184295 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Athens denied yesterday that the citizens born in Aegean Macedonia are asked to change their name and surname upon entering Greece.

"The Greek side is assuring that no one has ever asked anyone to change his name, seeing it does not have the right to do that, and something like that doesn't make any sense," the newspaper of the moderate left-wing "Elefterotipia" wrote yesterday, without revealing a source. The Greek Foreign Ministry, according to this newspaper, claims that "many citizens from Skopje, originating from Greece, are crossing the border after previously submitting a visa application, which is received in a period from three to four days." Contrary to this, as it is stated, there is a problem with the toponyms, since the new "Skopje passports" have the Greek names listed in the "Slav version," and Greece is not mentioned anywhere as the birth place.

The Greek side, "Elefterotipia" concludes, wanted that to be corrected. Skopje, as the newspaper says, said it would "find some kind of solution to this, however, nothing has been done as yet."

### Cargo Traffic With Greece 'Back to Normal'

*AU2911182395 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The cargo traffic with Greece is quite evidently coming back to normal, as can be seen at the three border points with this country. Eight compositions, of which four are with wagon cisterns carrying over 3,500 tones of crude oil, cross the point Idomeni-Gevgelija every day, in both directions. In addition, 20 auto-cisterns of Mlaz Bogdanci are transporting oil and crude oil from the Thessaloniki port, for Makpetrol.

The transportation of the wagons of materials for the Mines and Steel Works "Skopje" has also started. There are also wagons at the Thessaloniki port, waiting to be loaded with zinc concentrate for the needs of the Titov Veles smeltery, while the transportation of phosphates for the needs of the Veles chemical industry is also expected to start soon. Almost every day, "Fenimak" is sending out one train loaded with nickel towards the port Larisa, for third countries.

### Direct Railroad Traffic With Germany Resumes

*AU2911184395 Skopje MIC in English 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] railroads have announced that following the lifting of the sanctions against FRY, Germany has lifted the blockade on the railroads transiting through FRY. Thus, after a longer period, direct links between Macedonia and Germany are restored.

### Constitutional Court Rules on Parties' Law

*96BA0013B Skopje VECER in Macedonian 26 Oct 95 p 4*

[Article by B. Dj.: "Restrictions Within Constitutional Limits"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The legislator, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], has the constitutional right to stipulate the conditions and ways of registration of political parties, as part of exercising the freedom of political assembly. Accordingly, yesterday [25 October] the Macedonian Constitutional Court resolved to reject the initiative of evaluating the constitutionality of the Law on Political Parties, whose Articles 7 and 17 were disputed. The authors of the initiative consider constitutionally arguable the resolution stipulating that a party may be founded by no less than 500 adult Macedonian citizens, permanently settled in Macedonia; proof of the membership strength must be provided every year, for a drop in membership may block the party from registering. According to the Constitutional Court justices, such stipulations do not restrict the freedom of political assembly but are part of the stipulation on the registration of parties, which does not actually prevent the exercise of that freedom.

Another denied appeal dealt with the Law on Health Protection or, more specifically, the appealed stipulation which calls for making additional payments for health insurance by more than four family members. In this case as well, the legislator is constitutionally authorized to stipulate such requirements.

Also rejected was the appeal of the Komunalna Higiena JP [public enterprise] to the resolution of founding the Drisla Public Enterprise for Sanitation Warehousing, submitted by the Skopje Assembly, stipulating that the Skopje Assembly has the right to pass such resolutions.

The adoption of a resolution related to the Law on Identity Cards was postponed.

### Bar Requests Greater Protection of Lawyers' Rights

*96BA0013D Skopje VECER in Macedonian 19 Oct 95 p 3*

[Article by B. Tj.: "Lawyers Oppose New Defenders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Objections to stipulations in the Law on Industrial Property that, according to AKRM [Lawyers' Chamber of the Republic of Macedonia], call for a new category of individuals to provide legal assistance in the country.*

Are Macedonian lawyers being discriminated against if foreign physical and juridical persons are operating in our state? According to the Bar Association, this and all other stipulations of the Law on Industrial Property should be deleted from the Macedonian legal system. The final word in this case should be given by the Macedonian Constitutional Court, following the appeal initiated by the Bar Association, which also calls for resolving certain other disputed issues.

Actually, the lawyers are contesting two stipulations in this law. The first is that of Article 10, which stipulates that "in representation in administrative and judicial authorities foreign juridical and physical persons exercise their rights granted by this law through the services of a representative, who is a legitimate juridical person competent to represent in cases of industrial property, or a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], if his occupation is to arguing cases in the area of industrial property." Also arguable is the text of Article 120, which stipulates that the defenders may include "individuals who are graduates of a law school or one of the technical departments and has passed a test as a specialist in the area of industrial property or a special expertise examination in the areas governed by that law."

According to the Bar Association, these two stipulations violate the article of the Macedonian Constitution according to which the bar is defined as an "autonomous, independent, public service providing legal aid to the citizens," and exercising public rights based on that law. The contested articles introduced a new category of individuals who may provide legal assistance (who are not lawyers) in situations in which, according to the AKRM, no one other than a member of the bar could provide legal aid with or without remuneration.

According to our information, in order to resolve this issue, the Constitutional Court intends to hold a special preparatory meeting. The issues which must be resolved are related to whether the lawyers, according to the constitution, have the general right to represent parties in the courts and whether in defending the rights and freedoms of foreign juridical and physical persons lawyers could be denied the right to act as representatives. This also involves the issue of whether in acting in defense of certain rights the lawyers may make use of the special prerequisites stipulated in this law in order to be able to act as defenders, and whether this does not negate their general constitutional authority to provide legal aid in all areas.

## Seminar Focuses on Regional Security, NATO

*WS3011122695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 30 Nov 95 p 2*

[Article by Z.L.: "Cadres Believe in NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *As many as 86 percent of the professionally active cadres say that the only way to protect Poland from military threats is integration with NATO. In 1993, when research on the issue only just began, Poland's future membership in the alliance was supported by slightly more than 70 percent of professional soldiers.*

Yesterday was the second day of an international seminar devoted to civilian and democratic control over the Army, organized as part of the Partnership for Peace program. Colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk, commander of the Military Institute of Sociological Studies, presented the most recent data, which had not been published yet. Officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers assess that there is not enough stability in the East; they are rather skeptical about the efficiency of possible regional defense pacts. They believe that only expansion of the euro-atlantic security system may give Poland real guarantees and ensure political-military stabilization in Central and East Europe.

During the meeting on 29 November, the Polish participants exerted pressure on their Western partners to formulate the basic criteria of democratic civilian control over the Army. "There is no universal model. We have 16 perfect national methods of arranging the relations between the civilian staff and the military in the area of defense, and we are still working on them," responded the NATO guests. Marco Carnavale of NATO Headquarters admitted that, during the period of Cold War confrontation, when NATO was admitting new members, it shut its eyes to acts of violating the principles of democratic control over the Army in some states. At that time, NATO was guided by more important criteria, he said. "However, today, in the new reality, certain things are no longer acceptable."

General Stanislaw Koziej of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] spoke about difficulties in specifying the defense requirements of the country in a situation where there is no concrete enemy among the neighboring states. The director of the Defense System Department in MON confirmed that Poland is taking into consideration the possibility of dangerous crises breaking out in the immediate vicinity of the Polish Republic; it is also making preparations in case there is a local, limited-scope conflict. Moreover, it does not rule out a hypothetical threat to the country posed by a global war. "Today, we must rely on ourselves to defend the country because it is difficult to build anything on hopes," said Gen. Koziej. He emphasized our determination to integrate with NATO because "any expansion of the alliance enhances Poland's security," and an additional advantage of the collective defense system is the minimization of the costs borne by individual states. "Keep telling your taxpayers that NATO is an expensive club. Sometimes one has to bear the costs of defending another country, and the expenditures are more favorable only in the long run," warned one of the Western guests. According to Koziej, not much has been done so far to persuade citizens—and voters—to accept the necessity of spending money on defense. Justified postulates submitted by the elites, especially representatives of the military in public statements, are not effective and credible. In addition, the "presidential" minister [Okonski], who was perceived in the government as a rival to the coalition cabinet, did not have great chances to push through many well-justified ideas.

## Kwasniewski on Education, Policies, Church

*WS2911155895 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 2 Dec 95 pp 15-17*

[Interview with President-elect Aleksander Kwasniewski by Janina Paradowska and Wieslaw Wladyka; place and date not given: "Democracy Without Props"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [POLITYKA] We are conducting this interview a few days after the elections. The atmosphere has become very strained as a result of the protests sent to the Supreme Court. Many of these protests concern your education. It is difficult to understand why you did not tell the truth right at the beginning.

[Kwasniewski] I passed all of the examinations I was supposed to pass at the Foreign Trade Department of Gdansk University. I received very good grades; I was one of the best students. This is my answer to the formal questions. The protests themselves are a different story. I believe that they would have been filed anyway, for this or for some other reason. Perhaps I need not have used such a strong—though, in fact, true—comparison: that the Walesa-Kwasniewski fight is a heavyweight match. In this case, people chose between two well-known persons about whom they knew quite a lot. In the last stage of the campaign, they were practically stripped naked, and the public was informed about just about everything—bank accounts, size of apartments. Thus, it is difficult to state that a person who decided to back this or that candidate made a mistake or was misled. Emotions ran so high that I do not believe people checked the wrong name, the one they did not intend to check. The price that has to be paid for such a duel is strong emotions, and we must try to control them today. The ultimate decision will be made by the Supreme Court.

I believe that putting the election result in question today is tantamount to placing Poland in a state of real destabilization. This would mean that practically all elections can be questioned—in fact, under any pretext. It should be remembered that the turnout in these elections was the highest, which proved the great activeness of the people. Either candidate was supported by millions of people, and, if this duel were to be continued, things in Poland would go in a bad direction. The purpose of all of the proposals I have made over the past few days, proposals submitted to both Walesa and his voters, is the same: I believe that in Poland there is enough room for all, and it is time this fight was finished.

[POLITYKA] A person who decides to take part in a heavyweight fight should see to it that all of his documents are in order. He should be more careful when filling out forms, for instance.

[Kwasniewski] I believe that, because I passed all of the examinations, I completed my university education. However, I feel as if I committed a sin—I regret that I did not formally finish my studies by submitting a master's thesis. Why did that happen? Was it some kind of nonchalance, the feeling that this was not all that important? It happened probably because of all of these factors. Perhaps the fact that I do not have a diploma refutes opinions that I am a careerist who has planned everything in detail. Now you are asking me about a subject that is difficult for me; at the same time, it is part of my soul, which has not been exposed too much—for all my life I have felt a great desire for freedom, and that is partially why I did not write my thesis. Nonetheless, I do not have any complexes as far as my education is concerned; I believe it is very good, thanks to the efforts I made.

[POLITYKA] Was there a breakthrough moment in this campaign, a moment when you believed that you might win these elections?

[Kwasniewski] I have been in a few campaigns already; I could actually write a book as a veteran. Therefore, I know when one can expect a good result—it is when more people are beginning to come, when new people are showing up, when people are becoming more open. Thus, I expected a good result a long time ago, but I was not certain until the very end. I believed that I had won when the television reported three times in a row that Walesa had a 0.4-percent advantage over me.

[POLITYKA] The president's term lasts five years. However, we would like to ask you about your short-term policies, your plans for the next three months. These months may create the image of your presidency, an image that will last for a longer period of time. What economic initiatives can we expect?

[Kwasniewski] My first task is to help pass the budget, which will be a budget of economic growth. Therefore, I cannot allow anyone to use the atmosphere of the election victory to break this iron principle: maintenance of a narrow budget deficit. Such a temptation may appear. There may be opinions that, after all, Kwasniewski will sign the budget, so why should the deficit be only 3 percent? Why should it not be, for example, 4 percent? Well, I am saying "no" already. We must primarily guard economic growth. Another issue is the verdict of the Constitutional Tribunal, which is unfavorable to the Law on Commercialization and Privatization of Companies. I did not expect such a ruling. Therefore, an urgent and important problem is to prepare a new law that would speed up the privatization processes. The third big problem is the constitution. The National Assembly should conclude the work on it within three months; there arises a problem of how much agreement we can reach on the most fundamental issues. I believe that I should act very strongly in favor of such agreement. In addition, we must jointly try to find an answer to the following question: Do we want to hold a preconstitutional referendum? On 18 February a referendum on mass enfranchisement is to be held. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to add certain constitutional issues there, which, of course, would mean heating the political atmosphere.

[POLITYKA] We asked a question about political initiatives regarding the opposition. On 19 November voters split into two almost equal groups. You, as president, must take this split into account and try to lessen its effects. We can already hear opinions that perhaps Poland needs a new Roundtable, that it is necessary to seek new forms of cooperation between you and those who are in opposition to you today.

[Kwasniewski] Such openness is, of course, important and needed. I always thought very highly of the Roundtable, but I believed that this was a piece of political furniture that could be used only once. We should finally ask ourselves whether democracy should have such props at each stage. Millions of people voted in the democratic elections, engaged in them in a very mature way, which everyone admits. What are we going to say to these people now? We will say this to them: It is a good thing that you went to the polls, but now we are going to have another Roundtable and correct democracy. I believe that it is very important that broad agreements be made on specific issues, such as the constitution, [social] insurance reform, health service, foreign policy—that is, integration with NATO and EU. However, I reject all of the ideas that are coming from part of the opposition and that boil down to the following: your president, our prime minister. There is no social consent on this.

[POLITYKA] Social consent may be interpreted in two ways: Over 9 million people voted for Lech Walesa, therefore there is the real dilemma of whether the winner is to take all or, considering the result of the elections, to restrain himself. Self-restraint here pertains chiefly to the staffing of various state offices, because it is generally viewed through the personnel decisions that are made.

[Kwasniewski] I have always adopted the principle of self-restraint. Please remember who became prime minister after the 1993 parliamentary elections. For that very self-restraint I was awarded man of the year by the WPROST weekly, only to be discredited later on for handing power over to Pawlak. I therefore do not know whether self-restraint is a virtue or a vice. As you can see, everything is relative. I claim that it is a virtue, that it is indispensable in the Polish context, in particular for the president. Representatives of the opposition cannot sit in the cabinet, although I do believe that heads of the three vacant ministries referred to as "presidential" should not be appointed on the rule of sharing spoils with other parties. They should be administered by neutral politicians. The nature of the office of president, however, is different. I am thus making offers to people from beyond my party who are ready to act for the common good and who acknowledge the problems that concentrate in this office. It is, however, an offer targeted at individuals, not parties. It would be completely illogical if the presidential office turned into something of a small-scale parliament. It should be a team consisting of people with authority, with proven skills and a willingness to cooperate. I cannot even imagine what could be the basis for constructing such a multiparty office—the results of the first round of the presidential elections?

[POLITYKA] What type of response do you get to your offers?

[Kwasniewski] I will not drop any names at this point; they will be revealed only after I am sworn into office. Let me put it this way: I fully understand rational arguments, yet emotions arise in the parlors and the specific communities. This problem has to be overcome in Poland in some way if we want to really achieve anything. These elections have shown yet again that the parlors live a different life from society. If we want to take advantage of the five years to come, we should liberate ourselves from the constraints of parlor philosophy.

[POLITYKA] What do you think of the resignations handed in by heads of the so-called presidential ministries? Would you be willing to cooperate with them?

[Kwasniewski] I understand the dilemmas these people are facing. On the one hand, they are loyal to their bosses. I appreciate their gesture; equally loyal associates would do me proud. On the other hand, however, we have things to do. After all, the functioning of the state, foreign policy, and Poland's entry into NATO are at stake. I do respect the decisions that have been made to date, although I am sorry I will not cooperate with [Interior Minister] Andrzej Milczanowski, whom I greatly admire, or [Foreign Minister] Professor Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, who took up foreign politics so dynamically. I did not have many opportunities of cooperating with [Defense] Minister Okonski. Well, anyway, the decisions have been made and I recognize them.

[POLITYKA] Together with your rise to the presidency, there emerges the issue of cooperation between the presidential office and the government. Will we not be dealing with a specific theater of accord and discord in which the president and the prime minister will play their roles? First, in the privacy of their cabinets, they will make the necessary agreements, and then, to appear more credible to the public, pretend that they hold different opinions only to arrive at the prearranged compromise?

[Kwasniewski] First of all, do Poles really like these theatrics of political wrangling and stalking? It seems that the majority finally want to rest from politics and do their own thing. Their weariness is due to, among other things, the style of Lech Walesa's presidency. I would advise the chief editors of many papers, and several other people as well, to think about why their campaign propaganda did not hit home with the citizens and even brought reactions opposite to those intended. Poles deserve some peace and normalcy in 1996; the year 1997 will be very special.

Naturally, I will not argue with [Prime Minister] Jozef Oleksy in public. That would be simply absurd. We have known each other for 20 years. We can tell each other everything directly, and we have often talked like that. The general objectives are common; any arguments may pertain only to the details. We will definitely not bother the public with that. I consider Jozef Oleksy to be a very seasoned politician, who knows how to communicate with society. Besides, we should not forget that I am in a more advantageous position. My term lasts five years, therefore my perspective is different from that of the government. Tough parliamentary elections are scheduled for 1997. They might even be held in spring instead of fall so that the campaign frenzy will not have an impact on the budget law. The government has to have ready arguments because it will come under fierce attacks. This will be a very harsh trial for the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. The result of those elections will be compared with my results, which means that expectations will be high, but need not necessarily be met.

[POLITYKA] Can you imagine any conflict between the president and the SLD?

[Kwasniewski] For the time being, no—for the very simple reason that I have both influence and support in the SLD. I am a realist, however, and probably will not be so confident a year from now. The SLD will be under preelection stress, and I will be operating beyond its structures. I do not think there are any grounds to suspect that our ways could dramatically part.

[POLITYKA] We would like to ask you about relations between the state and the church. Is this not a gap that has to be bridged somehow?

[Kwasniewski] I have no intention of displaying my wounds and resentments. I think the time has finally come to end the campaign and solve the problems we are facing. The most difficult of them is defining relations between the state and the church in the constitution. I think it would help if the church lucidly declared that the suggestions made by Tadeusz Mazowiecki that have been provided for in the draft constitution are a foundation on which we can base everything else. We have, after all, provided for two basic principles: freedom of conscience and religion, and the neutrality of the state. If we agree that this is the foundation, we will find it far easier to talk about all of the remaining issues, including the Concordat. Besides, there is the practical aspect. It is not true that 52 percent of Poles voted for a neopagan candidate. To put it briefly, we have to stop speaking a certain language and avoid simplistic stereotypes. I believe the church is also interested in having normal and peaceful relations with the state.

[POLITYKA] The results of the elections are interpreted in various ways; your and Lech Walesa's electorates are classified according to different criteria. One thing, however, is beyond doubt—you were supported by a majority of the unemployed, inhabitants of rural areas, and young voters. Maybe you did not make too many campaign promises, but a new president carries a promise with him by definition. This is a challenge you are going to have to meet. How?

[Kwasniewski] You are right. All presidential elections carry a promise. I am aware of the expectations. This is not only the issue of how credible those groups consider me to be, but it is also a major Polish problem. Unless we reach those people, it will be very difficult to continue the reforms because that is where authentic protests may come from, in particular from the young people. I see only one route to follow—economic growth and decreasing the unemployment rate (which is already going down). There is one other big problem we are not yet fully aware of—differences between the particular regions. I have seen them in the course of my travels. We are slowly beginning to resemble Italy, where there is a huge gap between the wealthy north and the poor south. We do not know how to eliminate the disparity. Usually in such situations one group has to pay higher taxes for the benefit of the other. I see finding a solution to this problem as one of the chief objectives of my presidential term.

[POLITYKA] Thank you for the interview.

## UOP Head To Stay Until Interior Minister Named

*WS3011115995 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 Nov 95 p 3*

[Report by "SAR": "Czempinski at the Disposal of the Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy met yesterday at the Sejm with head of the Office of State Protection [UOP] Gromoslaw Czempinski and Union of Labor Deputy Ryszard Bugaj (member of the Sejm Secret Services Commission). Czempinski said he has "placed himself at the disposal of the prime minister" because UOP has been frequently charged with involvement in the presidential campaign. He did stress, however, that this should not be interpreted as an intention to resign. "A resignation would imply that my office is political, and it is not," the UOP head explained. Oleksy stated that he will decide whether Czempinski is to be dismissed after a new interior minister is appointed. Until that time, Czempinski will continue to fulfill his regular duties.

## Daily on Seminar on Civilian Control Over Army

*WS2911152695 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Nov 95 p 2*

[Article by Z.L.: "Politics and the Army; It Is Not Difficult To Become Convinced Something Is Wrong"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"Description of civilian control over the Armed Forces is like the definition of pornography—the term is not easy to specify very precisely, but there is a moment when everyone can feel* *that something is wrong," a guest from Great Britain explained yesterday on the first day of the international seminar on civilian control over the Armed Forces, organized as part of the Partnership for Peace program.*

The problem, in fact, is only seemingly uncomplicated: The thing is that the institutionalized, powerful, and armed force, which an army always is, should not serve within a given country for the purpose of imposing decisions that are not in line with the public interest. Hence the necessity of subordinating the military entirely to democratically elected, constitutional, political authorities. "No one finds it easy to part with power, especially power that involves giving orders. Hence the key to the efficiency of civilian 'authority and command' is as follows: The Armed Forces must unconditionally respect the mechanism of democratic replacement of authorities."

"Over the five years since the reforms started, we have made quite a lot of progress in the process of democratizing political control. Important decisions in the Armed Forces are made in accordance with political directives and on the basis of appropriate ministerial delegations. In the press there is always an open debate, even if some weak spots appear in the system of controlling the Army. Step by step, the law is being adjusted to the new conditions, but in the ranks some people still have trouble understanding the substance of the mechanism itself," Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka conceded on Tuesday.

John Borawski of the North Atlantic Assembly recalled the critical conclusions of the Poland-NATO report, drawn up this year, which drew our attention to the necessity of extending the powers of the Sejm in the area of controlling the Army (especially where the budget its concerned); the authors of the report also pointed out that the chief of the General Staff should be effectively subordinated to the defense minister and that the military should be banned from engaging in politics.

The statements made by Deputy Minister Karkoszka and his subordinates indicated that the National Defense Ministry [MON] is on the eve of serious changes. "We are ready to put our affairs in order in the coming months. We are coming back to the model that is in line with trends that are accepted in the civilized world," said General Stanislaw Koziej, head of the Defense System Department in MON.

The leadership of the ministry is convinced that the next weeks may prove crucial in the process of regaining the ground the civilian MON structures lost in recent years to the General Staff.

### Commission Recommends Purchase of French Aircraft

*LD2911162395 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm National Defense Commission has come out in favor of the purchase of the Alpha Jet [Dassault/Dornier] French military planes. Today, the commission discussed this issue at a closed meeting attended by representatives of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], the General Staff, and the WSK Mielec [transportation equipment] plant.

According to Eugeniusz Janula, the plans involving the purchase of either the French-made Alpha Jet or the Polish-made Iryda planes have aroused a dispute. The Alpha Jet planes have so far been part of the equipment of the German Luftwaffe:

[Begin Janula recording] The commission's position is that our own industry should be supported, but all of the indicators are that a possible purchase of the Alpha Jet aircraft could be beneficial both from the economic and military points of view.

The manufacturing pace of the Iryda planes is very slow. The capacity of Mielec is about six Iryda planes a year. In addition, the issue of engines has not been finalized. Only now, the Iryda planes are being equipped with the more modern engines. The ones manufactured earlier were equipped with the Iskra engines, which are not powerful enough. It is simply a matter that gives you a hangover—not the first and not the last time.

Perhaps we could have a compromise here? For example, the Mielec plant could provide the maintenance or the rearmament of the Alpha Jet planes. [end recording]

### Cabinet Accepts Strategy for Merging Banks

*WS3011131695 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Nov 95 p 8*

[Report by "MF, KAK": "A Strategy for Bank Mergers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday the government decided to merge state-owned banks and set up two strong capital groups headed by Bank Handlowy and Pekao SA.*

Bank Handlowy in Warsaw will take over the shares of the Pomorski Bank Kredytowy and a few other banks. Pekao SA will control 100 percent of the Lublin-based Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy shares and the shares of the Lodz-based Powszechny Bank Gospodarczy; it will also take over 63 percent of the shares of Polski Bank Rozwoju in Warsaw. Two banks, PKO BP and Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej [BGZ], will not be included in these two groups. A draft law on consolidation of banks will soon be prepared.

The program of bank privatization will be continued. The government will consider the possibility of selling 20 percent of Bank Handlowy on the stock market after 1997. After 1997, preparations will begin for the privatization of Pekao SA. Foreign experts (including specialists of the World Bank) will propose a strategy that should be used in the case of PKO BP.

**Why?**

Domestic banks must quickly and efficiently get ready for the inevitable confrontation with foreign financial establishments. They have only four years to go—until the end of 1999. After this period, Western banks will be allowed to carry out unlimited financial activity. (Now they must first obtain a license from the National Bank of Poland [NBP], but the central bank grants licenses only reluctantly.) Our fledgling banking sector may not lose in the confrontation with competitors. The government wants to help it; therefore, yesterday it approved the "Draft Strategy of Consolidating the Banking System in Poland."

The government is supposed to agree with the NBP on the policy of granting licenses to foreign banks, as well as admitting foreign capital into Polish banks. This policy is to make it easier for banks to gain capital. Th NBP is already trying to persuade large Western banks to enter our market by buying out the shares of banks that are on the verge of bankruptcy.

**How?**

State-owned banks may count on preferential treatment as far as accumulation of capital is concerned; for example, the government may reduce the dividend that those banks are paying it. Even though the state budget will have smaller revenues, it will earmark less money for the banking system. Over the past five years, it has paid 4.2 billion zlotys.

The government intends to finally resolve the problem of the debts that the Agency for Farm Property of the State Treasury has to pay off to BGZ SA (e.g., the debt left over by state farms). The NBP, in turn, will take care of the rescheduling of the BGZ SA debts to the central bank.

Banks that are entering international capital markets will be supported. The government will allocate money received as aid from the West to help banks and insurance companies set up a domestic mutual insurance firm. It is also planned to create a legal framework for the activity of investment banks and to separate the function of banking supervision from the NBP. (However, the NBP is against this initiative.)

## Next Ambassador To U.S. on Plans for Cooperation

*AU2911214595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] My colleague, Iulia Gherman, interviewed Mr. Mircea Geoana, the current spokesman of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the future ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Romania to Washington.

[Begin recording] [Gherman] The relations between Bucharest and Washington have registered an upward course, something that has also been proved by the response to President Ion Iliescu's recent visits to the United States. In this respect, I would say that you have a rather difficult diplomatic task, Mr. Ambassador Mircea Geoana; namely, to maintain and obviously to intensify these relations. What are your priorities in this respect?

[Geoana] I would not call it a difficult task, but rather a complex one. It is an honor and a challenge to any diplomat, particularly to someone like me, with a relatively short career behind me, compared to other, more experienced colleagues in the ministry.

The Romanian president's visits to the United States this autumn are outstanding assets and points of support for the activity of the new ambassador to Washington. I say that because—both in the dimension of political dialogue and in the dimensions of opportunities for business, investments, and the transfer of technology; of Romanian-U.S. cooperation in all important fields and spheres of economic activity; of bilateral cooperation in the military, security, and cultural-scientific fields; in the sphere of the relations with the diaspora; and in the sphere of the relations with the U.S. mass media, which are so important and influential throughout the world—the Romanian president's two visits there were great stimuli and marked the start of the relationship between Romania and the United States in a new and more dynamic, pragmatic, cordial, and close phase.

Generally speaking, what we are trying to do—not only through our embassy in Washington, but also at the Foreign Ministry and through the Romanian authorities in general—is to consolidate this favorable course of bilateral relations. We are also trying to substantiate, enhance, and enrich the concept governing—from Bucharest's viewpoint—Romanian-U.S. relations, which we want to become special and of particular quality, namely, relations of strategic partnership and alliance, within a foreseeable span of time, including from the perspective of NATO's expansion. This is, so to say, the motto with which the new ambassador to the United States expects to begin his activity in Washington soon. I would also add that this is the priority of Romanian foreign policy at a bilateral and, generally speaking, at the international level. In concrete terms, we are going to target large U.S. companies of interest for key spheres of the Romanian economy, big banks and financial consortiums, investment funds, small and medium-sized firms, professional organizations, trade chambers, and academic media with an economic or security profile, and we will bombard them, so to say, with information about and for Romania in an attempt to draw them into generous and, we hope, substantial cooperation with Romania.

I may say that the current U.S. position among the foreign investors and even among Romania's trade partners cannot satisfy us. Therefore, regarding this economic-commercial aspect, I am leaving for Washington with the definite ambition of ensuring for the United States—in the economic, trade, and investment spheres and regarding its economic presence in our country—the same place that it occupies in the overall political sphere, namely, the number one place, without any countercandidate. [end recording]

## Army General Views NATO Expansion, Security

*AU3011084095 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 21 Nov 95 p 17*

[Interview with Army Corps General Mircea Agapie, commander of the Academy of Higher Military Studies, by Serban Dinu; place and date not given: "It is Difficult To Presume That Romania Can Ensure Its National Security on Its Own"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Dinu] General, first of all allow me to congratulate you on the occasion of your promotion to the rank of Army corps general. And now, a first basic question: what does the institution that you are heading, namely, the Academy of Higher Military Studies, represent for Romania's Army?

[Agapie] Indeed, the question has a special meaning. This institution, that is, the Academy of Higher Military Studies, has been since its establishment and continues to be and to remain for sure the only institution of higher military studies in Romania. This institution, within its organizational structure that has been reformed on the basis of the order by the General Staff and the leadership of National Defense Ministry, will train cadres—commanders, general staff officers, and officers in the area of military logistics—capable of leading large units and military units, both in times of peace as well as in times of war. Our institution is practicing a form of education that is compatible with those in West Europe as well as with those in the United States and Canada.

[Dinu] General, in your opinion as a professional officer with a developed and penetrating strategic thinking, when can Romania's association to NATO be predicted to take place?

[Agapie] My answer belongs mainly to an area of interpretations; thus, it does not pretend to be infallible. First of all, I would like to mention the fact that NATO expansion toward East Europe, that has been decided politically, is part of the efforts of building a new architecture of security in Europe. As NATO officials leave it to be understood, this cannot be achieved without Russia's participation, but this power is opposing the expansion. Thus, there is here a first element of uncertainty. Second, the association to NATO structures presupposes accord on both sides. NATO means 16 member states, and the acceptance of each candidate must be ratified by each of those countries. Third, the candidates for association with NATO must meet certain criteria, compatibility and interoperability of military structures are among the most important. And last, but not least, NATO launched the formula of Partnership for Peace, which is seen both as a factor of the new architecture of euro-atlantic security, as well as a preparatory "stage" for joining the alliance. Lately, the activities of perfecting the Partnership for Peace framework and the amplification of its activities in general can be perceived with increased intensity in the field of European security. [passage omitted]

[Dinu] Do you think that Romania's security might be threatened in the context of Russia's recent declaration that it will establish its own military block in case NATO is going to expand toward the East?

[Agapie] First of all, I would like to tell you that sometimes the road from declarations to concrete deeds is very long. Second, since we are talking about declarations, all the big powers, including Russia, affirm that Europe can no longer be divided by a "wall" and that the time of military blocs is over, etc. But the establishment of such a military bloc by Russia would be equal to a new division of the continent; it would virtually mean a new Cold War. And the question that arises in this case is whether today's Russia can support the burden of such a confrontation. As is known, concurrently with the process of NATO expansion toward the East with the declared purpose of eliminating the possible negative reactions of Moscow, the North Atlantic alliance proposed that Russia conclude a treaty, which no doubt will be one of the pillars of the future architecture of European security. Within this framework, Romania's security will be part of the security of the whole European continent and of the euro-atlantic space in a broader sense. Our association to the euro-atlantic structures and NATO will therefore be part of the construction of this architecture of security and in no way will it be an act of hostility toward Russia. Thus, Russia will have no reason to perceive Romania's gesture as harmful to its interests of security. The future security partnership in Europe must be understood not according to the old model of confrontation between blocs, specific to the bipolar world, but as a process of cooperation and collaboration in the act of ensuring international stability.

[Dinu] Could Romania become a Switzerland of the Balkans, could it become neutral?

[Agapie] Although there are still neutral states in Europe, the concept of neutrality is becoming less and less viable. I can only recall the cases of Austria, Sweden, and Finland, which have become members of the European Union and, ultimately, will have to assume duties and missions of security and common foreign policy with the other 12 partners. I could also add that, in the complex situation of today's world, in the formidable technological modifications that have taken place in producing various systems of arms, which are so expensive, it is difficult to conceive that a medium-size country like Romania could ensure its national security alone, especially when it is located in an extremely sensitive geopolitical area. As a matter of fact, the modern history of our state convincingly proves that Romania has never had and cannot have the vocation of neutrality. When it assumed neutrality (in 1914-16 or in 1939-40) it was in fact only a delay of the decisive option. And it had to pay for every delay.

[Dinu] Could Romania currently cope with a simultaneous attack from the West and South?

[Agapie] In the current situation the question is not justified. Romania is building its military security on the principle of "defense sufficiency" just like our neighbors. In reference to Romania, just like to its neighbors, this principle stipulates the strict application of the ceilings for reducing troops and weapons in accordance with the Treaty of Vienna signed in 1990 (as a matter of fact, as far as we are concerned, we have already finalized its provisions.) On the other hand, the current situation in Europe is unfolding both politically as well as from a military viewpoint towards optimization of the climate of trust and cooperation among neighboring countries. As is known, in the military field—to refer just to this aspect—we have very good relations with our neighbors to the south and west, just as with all the other neighbors. I do not have to mention that the doctrine of our Army is to defend the independence and integrity of our country from any attack, no matter where it would come from.

[Dinu] What is your opinion about the recent statements made by General Paul Cheler [recently retired].

[Agapie] The defense minister's response to this issue seems to me adequate and unambiguous. We should stop commenting on Gen. Cheler's remarks.

[Dinu] Is the extremist nationalism present among the corps of officers?

[Agapie] No. Definitely not.

[Dinu] Thank you for your kindness and I hope you give the country as many elite officers as possible.

### Nuclear Plant Delays Cause Huge Economic Losses

*AU2911201895 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 25-26 Nov 95 pp 1, 8*

[Report by Marius Nitu: "By Causing $600,000-Losses Per Day, Cernavoda Has Become the Black Hole of Romanian Energy Production"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One month ago, the leadership of RENEL [Romanian Electric Power Authority] announced that the last deadline for rendering Unit 1 of Cernavoda [nuclear electric plant] operational, that is, 31 December 1995, cannot be observed. According to the most optimistic forecasts, the delay will be at least three or four months. The losses occurring from this are practically identical with the value of the electricity that would have been produced if the plant were running, that is, $600,000 per each day of the delay. There is nothing unusual about this, as delays and losses have already become traditional at the nuclear power plant building site. In 1979, when they laid the first foundation, the first deadline was moved to the end of 1985. But Ceausescu's tactics (which were quite successful in the case of hydroelectric power plants) to concentrate large material forces and manpower at the building site, turned into a huge fiasco, because, in this case, quality was far more important than quantity. The building work advanced at a snail's pace until 1991. In that year two of the companies that had sold licenses to the Romanian side (AECL and ANSALDO) set up the AAC consortium, which took over the building of the plant from RENEL. The new contract set the deadline for the first unit to become operational on 31 December 1994. The observation of this deadline was preconditioned to the "ensuring of foreign financing" by Romania, by using a very clumsy method for transferring the money. The money was then transferred in spurts, allowing the Italo-Canadians to renounce the contract. In this way, after two new intermediary deadlines (April and then October 1995), everything was postponed until 1996. Also according to the contract, the penalties we can impose on the consortium for the delays in 1996 amount to $250,000 over three months (that is, $3,000 per day). Meanwhile the bill to be paid by RENEL to the consortium is increasing, including the fact that they have to pay the 150 foreign experts (whose salaries amount to $25,000 per month). The total amount of penalties cannot exceed $6 million, which is almost nothing compared to the hundreds of millions of dollars represented by the total value of the contract. Perhaps it is important to remind our readers that this contract, which has been guaranteed both by the government and Parliament, was signed on behalf of RENEL by Aureliu Leca, the former RENEL chairman, the same person who also concluded the ill-famed "Dubatti" crude oil importation, and who later stepped down due to "delays in the construction of Cernavoda, as well as in the reequipment of the Rovinari and Turceni [thermoelectric] plants." Later on, and also invoking the delay, they fired RENEL chairman Vaida, after which they set up a group of experts to speed up rendering the Cernavoda plant operational. Despite all this, the largest investment ever in Romania's history (worth over $2.2 billion) is still unfinished.

And speaking of investments, one should perhaps mention the two immense electricity generator sets, of 8.8 MW each, as large as two houses, manufactured in Romania, which failed during the tests. However, whenever it came to the components that could have been properly manufactured in Romania, things happened, which the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] report described as the "systematic damaging" of the interests of the Romanian side. For instance, the nuclear fuel imported in 1994 was actually needed as late as the end of May 1995, a time interval during which the Nuclear Fuel Factory in Pitesti could have produced the entire quantity that was needed. The situation is the same with the 335 metric tons of heavy water imported from Canada, which was only needed in July 1995, as well as the 60 metric tons of heavy water manufacture meanwhile by the ROMAG plant. What the SRI forgot to mention is the fact that the heavy water plant in Turnu Severin was practically on the brink of bankruptcy. To salvage it, they ordered it to turn out dozens of metric tons of heavy water, which was then put into the state reserves, together with the flour, edible oil, and other such products necessary for the population in case of natural catastrophes. This strange transfer to the state reserves must have been ordered by the same people in the Vacaroiu cabinet who also approved the import of heavy water from Canada. Besides all this, regarding the management of the funds, an investigation done by the Court of Accounts revealed that the consortium "embezzled 14 million Canadian dollars."

Currently the work on Unit 1 is about to be concluded and tests are being run. This, however, does not mean that all difficulties have been overcome. Due to these very long delays, the plant has become a bizarre hybrid of the types built in the eighties and those of 1995. Owing to the fact that over a very long time they did not receive any new orders, many Romanian equipment suppliers (the Timisoara Electric Appliance Factory, the Electroaparataj in Bucharest, and others) lost their quality authorization (AQ) giving them the right to manufacture equipment to be built into the nuclear plant. Those who have not lost it, are receiving meager and very demanding orders, while their payment is coming in spurts.

In conclusion, one can say that a lot of water and dollars has to flow under the bridge before we see bulbs lighting up with electricity from Cernavoda.

### PDSR's Nastase Describes Party Goals

*AU2911085095 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 24 Nov 95 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Adrian Nastase, executive president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, by Constantin Priescu; place and date not given: "A Young and Dynamic National Party, With a Sure Democratic Identity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Priescu] What is the organizational strength of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], at this important moment, in all respects? Does this strength give hope to the country?

[Nastase] A multiparty system began to take shape in our country in 1990, that is, a democratic system which allowed the functioning of several parties. Some 200 parties were set up at the time. However, many of them were rather friendly associations grouped around a certain leader or personality. The years that have elapsed since then were serious tests for all these parties. The result was that some remained alive, others disappeared.

As everybody knows, the PDSR was rather an opinion trend in 1992. It did not have well consolidated structures. Therefore, these years for us were mainly years of consolidation. [passage omitted] We set up more than 2,600 organizations throughout the country. This is an extraordinary force, at an institutional level. Now, we can truly say that we are a national party, both as a nationwide organizational force and from the viewpoint of our doctrine, since one of our goals is to consolidate our national identity. To me, this is a very important aspect, along with the numerical and qualitative increase in the party ranks. From several thousands or several tens of thousands, we have reached almost 200,000 members. This is an extraordinary dynamics which cannot be explained, as some are trying to do, only through opportunism. Of course, there is a certain percentage of opportunists, people who only joined the party out of various personal interests. However, there are very many people and social segments who joined us for other reasons, out of trust and sincerity. Our policy of open doors has shown results. However, we have recently embarked on a renewal course, a kind of refurbishment of our leading structures, which is proceeding concurrently with a change in the organizations proper and in the composition of various party structures. [passage omitted] Of course, these developments within the party have led to some discontent and tensions, some of which have become apparent of late. They are linked either to the party life per se or to the drafting of lists for the coming general elections.

[Priescu] A lot has been written recently in the press about certain resignations from the PDSR. The people who resigned claim that they are fighting the corruption. Is there some truth in their claims?

[Nastase] I believe that each resignation should be treated separately. There are people who resigned for specific reasons. It is very difficult to make generalizations. [passage omitted] I repeat, the resignations cannot be interpreted as a generalized phenomenon, which would give us a warning in a certain direction.

[Priescu] Mr. President, since the PDSR's creation, the public opinion polls have always put your party in first place. Do you think that this position—of a party recognized as the country's main political grouping—is an advantage or a disadvantage for the PDSR?

[Nastase] It is both an advantage and disadvantage. First of all, I would like to emphasize that we did not only remain in first place in this political competition, but we have also expanded in the meantime. In 1992 we obtained 28 percent of the vote. According to the last polls, we are now standing at about 30-35 percent, which proves the success of our recent policies in the territory. [passage omitted]

[Priescu] You are being faced with a paradox. While the government is constantly perceived as having a less favorable image, the polls claim that the PDSR's image has continuously grown. On the other hand, the PDSR is a party which supports the government. How do you explain such a paradox, to call it that?

[Nastase] Here things are quite simple. The government operates in a closed environment; it is constantly administrating the concrete resources, hence its freedom of movement is somewhat limited. The PDSR is perceived as an active force which is striving to push things onto a more dynamic course and also points out other spheres for the government to become more courageously involved in. Therefore, the PDSR is being perceived as a stronger engine, thus incurring the people's greater trust in the long run. Of course, the government is also feeling the shocks of the living standard situation and the changes in the people's life.

[Priescu] Mr. President, there is a kind of competition from other parties in declaring themselves more social-democratic than the PDSR. What is your reply to that?

[Nastase] Yes, this is a very interesting aspect. Maybe I am wrong, but sometimes I have the impression that this is more of a battle for one's image abroad and for the Socialist International. For instance, the Democratic Party [PD] is constantly trying to push us to the left, to the socialist zone, so to say, in order to preserve the social-democratic sphere for itself. If one reads their messages, articles, or analyses, one may say: Well, there is a need for a civilized left in Romania, too. Therefore, they try to introduce us into Mohora's [Tudor Mohora, president of the Socialist Party—PS] zone, or the zone of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], or I do not know what other zone. [passage omitted] Paradoxically, many of the PD's attitudes are more center-right rather than center-left. This is an issue we are very clear about, namely, that we are a center-left party, not a left party or some other kind of leftist trend, as others are trying to label us, by obliterating the line separating us from the parties to our left. As for the Social Democratic Party, I understand that it is slowly disappearing, so I am not sure whether we should still concern ourselves with this problem. [passage omitted]

Our social-democratic values, which we reiterate in the platform-program to be adopted by the National Conference, rely, to a large extent, both on the European and euro-atlantic integration of our country and on consolidating our national identity. Maybe there is a certain difference here between us and the PD, for instance.

[Priescu] Have you thought of the possibility that the PDSR may not win the next elections? If this happens, have you prepared a strategy as an opposition party?

[Nastase] Of course, one should always consider such a possibility. We may win very many votes, but still not have a partner to form a government with. Let us say that there is a 5 percent threshold for representation in Parliament and we obtain about 30-35 percent of the popular vote. We will then have some 40 percent of the seats in Parliament. If we cannot find an ally to form a cabinet with, we may become an opposition party, even though we are the largest party in the country. Therefore, this variant should be taken into consideration and it is important for us, in the time up to the elections, to see what allies we might have after the elections. To a large extent this will depend on the internal strategy of the opposition, on the one hand, and on the way in which the parties currently making up the governmental arch evolve, on the other hand.

[Priescu] What do the PDSR and you personally expect from the National Conference?

[Nastase] Our conference will be a show of political strength. This meeting is the most important one organized by our party in recent years. It will prove the party's territorial strength and its ability to mobilize itself and the country's forces. I believe that this conference will draw a balance sheet of the period which has elapsed since the last National Conference and it will also look at the future and adopt some very important documents, such as the platform-program, which is a document of great intellectual value. Likewise, we will think up a better internal organization of the party. The new statute will certainly provide a guarantee in this respect, through the setting up of mechanisms of internal control and analysis and for screening the new applicants for party membership, in order to limit the percentage of opportunists, which we sometime feel that it exists in our organization. I am convinced that all this will create an extremely favorable premise for our electoral action in the coming months.

[Priescu] We wish you much success.

[Nastase] Thank you!

### Kucan Discusses EU Membership in Brussels

*AU2911171095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels]

[FBIS Translated Text] During last night's private meeting with EU Commissioner Van den Broek, Slovene President Kucan reportedly received a hint that the Brussels European Commission could start an initiative for the resolution of the problem of former Yugoslavia's succession. The Commission, as the executive body of the European Union, can propose to the Ministerial Council, that is, to the ministers of the European 15, that they take a joint stance on this issue. This, of course, does not mean that the Commission's proposal would actually be accepted.

At the morning meeting of President Kucan with Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene, Slovenia supposedly received support regarding our integration into the European Union. According to Dehaene, Belgium will do everything it can within the European Union to overcome the Italian-Slovene dispute as quickly as possible and for Slovenia to sign the associate membership agreement as soon as possible. Of course, here we must add, realistically, that Belgium cannot perform miracles in overcoming a dispute that is bilateral.

The talks of President Kucan with the president of the European Parliament, Hensch, were, of course, inevitably in the spirit of the morning debate in the European Parliament and the resolution on Slovenia passed. In its resolution, the parliament emphasized the need for Slovenia to be admitted into the so-called pre-entry strategy of the European Union as soon as possible. This comprises the countries that have already signed the associate membership agreements and are included in a program of the accelerated adjustment of their legislation to the European. The parliament expresses the hope that Slovenia will fulfill the promises given to the European Commission and the Ministerial Council as soon as possible and harmonize its legislation with the European. Within this framework, the resolution concretely mentions allowing the purchase of real estate in Slovenia by foreigners. Simultaneously, the parliament is calling on the European Commission and the Ministerial Council, therefore, on the member states, to do everything that the Slovene associate membership agreement that was initialed earlier will be signed as soon as possible. Of course, we must also point out here that the resolution of the parliament is not binding either on the Commission or the member states. It is primarily a form of political pressure on all sides to try to reach an agreement as quickly as possible.

President Kucan will speak to the members of the parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission this afternoon. He will also answer the questions of the parliamentarians, which probably means not only on the Slovene-Italian dispute, but also the Slovene views on EU expansion and the peace process in former Yugoslavia.

### Kucan Interviewed on EU Integration Process

*AU2911201595 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 20 Nov 95 pp 1, 14*

[Interview with Slovene President Milan Kucan by Peter Kasalovsky and Julius Lorincz in Ljubljana; date not given: "How To Connect to a European Train That Has Already Reached a Certain Speed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A presentation of, first and foremost, the Slovene Republic's economic and trading potential will be held in Bratislava at the end of this month. This provided an incentive for Milan Kucan, the president of the country "on the sunny side of the Alps," as the Slovenes describe their homeland, to receive the chief editor of HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, Peter Kasalovsky, and the deputy chief editor of PRAVDA, Julius Lorincz, in Ljubljana and to answer their questions concerning mainly the European integrative currents.

[PRAVDA] What do you think is the motive behind the endeavor by the countries in the central and eastern part of our continent to join the EU? We are asking because, although there is a political will on the part of the EU to integrate these states, it seems that there is a lack of genuine economic interest in taking such a step.

[Kucan] The answer to your question has two perspectives. One of them proceeds from our point of view, that is, of the countries of East and Central Europe. We see prospects for ourselves in taking part in the dialogue on Europe's future. This dialogue does not exist outside the European institutions, regardless of whether it is a political, economic, or security dialogue. The question is whether we are capable of conducting it. Therefore, the ambition to join the EU is the strongest motive behind domestic developments. When we acquire the ability to really enter into the Union, it will then be merely a matter of making a political decision.

The question on the EU side is whether it will be expanded and what the quality of this process will be. I am convinced that expansion is also in its interest, but it will have to adapt its institutions to this. It has to bolster its internal integration and, from this point of view, the certain hesitancy in defining the strategy for expansion is understandable. The major differences in the level of development between the Union's members and the applicants for membership and the candidates' degree of ability to assume all of the responsibilities resulting from the integration of the Union are an important factor of this hesitancy.

In my opinion, however, the process of the Union's expansion is inevitable and irreversible and which other state becomes a member of the EU and when is just a matter of time.

[PRAVDA] According to a public opinion poll conducted on Wednesday 15 November, 64.2 percent of Slovene citizens polled expressed themselves in favor of your country joining the North Atlantic alliance. Do you think that the alliance's enlargement is part of this process or does this belong to another sphere, to a different set of issues?

[Kucan] The logic of my thinking is the same. When Europe becomes a common economic area, then it is understandable that it will also become a common political and security area. The issue in fact involves formulating a European security doctrine. I know that the following question will arise in connection with this: Against whom should Europe be incorporated as a whole into the NATO pact? The question symbolizes a certain legacy from the time of the bipolar world; however, today it is not a question of against whom but of Europe's defense. The situation in the world has changed and perhaps it is more a question of ensuring that Europe can defend itself against conflicts within it. I view this within the system for strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which means—among other things—greater emphasis on preventive diplomacy on the basis of the Helsinki principles, that is, the principle of the inviolability of borders, of freedom of movement across borders in the broadest sense, and of respect for human rights, including minority rights.

[PRAVDA] But, some countries that are in the EU—for example, Austria or Sweden—are not members of the North Atlantic alliance and are not even talking about the possible ambition of joining it.

[Kucan] I am talking about the future outlook, not about the status quo. When Europe becomes a common economic, political, and security area, then it will be up to the individual countries to decide absolutely voluntarily whether to take a certain risk and join, or not. It will be impossible to choose just the good aspects of such a step, but it will be necessary to take on the responsibilities that arise from this. Naturally, the issue also involves the mechanism for and quality of the internal relations within the framework of the integrative structures, which will—obviously—be a matter for further discussion.

[PRAVDA] The tension caused by the different level of economic development among the continent's countries—which, incidentally, you have already mentioned—is also a problem for the security system in Europe. For example, how can the states of the former East bloc compete with the average GDP of their Western partners? It is not insignificant that the rules of the game are determined by those who are economically most advanced...

[Kucan] Yes, this is a problem. The aim should be to balance the economic ability of the individual states, but not in a way that the developed states would come to a halt so that the others can catch up with them. This involves a very sensitive system of relations. These would help the less developed states to "qualify" for the level of the developed ones. I do not mean just investments or possible aid, but education in the entrepreneurial sense, that is, "boosting qualifications" so that these countries become capable internally of connecting themselves to a train that has already reached a certain speed. I think that Europe is interested in this type of cooperation and it is in fact also a condition for our states' incorporation into the EU.

[PRAVDA] So, for example, could the countries in the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] free trade zone or the Visegrad Four undertake something together in the interest of connecting themselves to the train you are talking about?

[Kucan] It is necessary, first and foremost, to make use of the opportunities that the agreed upon free trade zone affords us. There are conditions for this. Within the framework of the CEFTA zone, the individual economies are in fact helping one another. In my opinion, however, it would be necessary to rule out unhealthy rivalry with regard to the EU, that is, the constant emphasis on who is best. They will ascertain this within the EU and their interest will determine whom they will admit among them. We all have to adapt ourselves to being able to really become their partners. Let us not just wait for help from the EU; I think that we ourselves can help one another in many ways. This also applies specifically in relations between Slovenia and Slovakia.

[PRAVDA] We are talking about European security. However, as Europeans, we have long been incapable of rendering efficient assistance and of resolving thoroughly the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Do you see a real end to this confrontation in the near future?

[Kucan] I hope that Europe will learn something from the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general. It will not bury its head in the sand when it is confronted with something unpleasant and will intervene sooner with reference to the principles that we have agreed upon in Europe or will yet agree upon in the interest of universal peace. Peace in the Balkans is as far or near as the interest of the major powers, especially the United States. Its interest is great, but I do not think that Europe can pass all of the responsibility onto the United States. It will be necessary to keep the peace, and some of the responsibility lies on Europe's shoulders.

### Decries Unequal Treatment

*AU2911215395 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Brussels]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Kucan warned the members and the guests of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee that the unequal treatment in the integration with the European Union has hurt Slovenia. He said that there was no justification for such a treatment in the results that Slovenia has achieved on the demanding path of its political and economic transition.

According to Kucan, this is no longer a question of whether Europe will reintegrate but rather how it will accomplish this. Will it recognize the equality of the countries that are joining it or will it rank them by priority? The latter would, according to Kucan, mean the creation of the Europe of several circles.

The president was very explicit in saying that Slovenia would not agree to the policy of blackmail, unilateral advantages, and the revival of the historic tendencies under the pretext of compensation of historic injustices. He said that the problems with Italy do not constitute a bilateral problem or a lack of good will on behalf of Slovenia. According to Kucan, some of the statements made by influential individuals suggest that this really involves an attempt to revise the results of World War II.

After the introductory speech, President Kucan encountered many very serious questions about the Slovene-Italian dispute. Some members of the parliament merely requested more detailed information, however, it was more than evident from the questions of some present that there are numerous Italian representatives in Brussels whose attitudes toward Slovenia are considerably sharper than the views sported by the current Italian Government.

The parliament will pass a special resolution on Slovenia tomorrow. [passage omitted]

### Contact Group Meeting on Succession Proposed

*AU2911214495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Report by Ilinka Todorovski]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following the talks behind closed doors, Ministers Thaler and Granic [Slovene and Croatian foreign ministers] confirmed that they devoted particular attention to the division of the assets of the former Yugoslavia, as, since the Dayton peace talks, this issue has become particularly pressing. The ministers concurred that, in the negotiations on the succession, there should be no deviation from the conclusion of the Badinter Commission or from the position of the international organization that all new countries that have emerged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia are equal successors to the former joint assets of the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

Croatia and Slovenia will, therefore, propose that the representatives of all four interested countries—apart from Croatia and Slovenia, also Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]—meet with the Contact Group representatives and agree on a faster resolution of the issues linked to the succession, as any foot-dragging could be a source of new instability in the region. The meeting should be called prior to the signing of the Dayton peace accord in Paris, which has been announced for the first half of December.

Foreign Minister Granic assured that the Croatian stance on the succession is identical to the Slovene. However, he confirmed that Zagreb is willing to recognize that to Milosevic's Yugoslavia is the legal successor of the former SFRY in the international organizations. Croatia might reaffirm this position within the framework of the mutual recognition between Zagreb and Belgrade.

Ministers Thaler and Granic also discussed a deadlock in the resolution of relations with our joint neighbor Italy and the efforts to join the European Union. Regarding bilateral relations, the ministers reviewed some new initiatives for the resolution of the two most controversial issues—Piran Bay and Ljubljanska Banka—however, they declined to talk about any details. They announced, though, that at Presidents Kucan ad Tudjman, and also Prime Ministers Drnovsek and Matesa, will meet at the beginning of January next year.

## Thaler To Demand Explanation on Succession

*AU2911171595 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Report by Ilinka Todorovski report from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the two months since the last talks of [Foreign] Ministers Thaler and Granic, the circumstances that influence Slovene-Croatian relations have changed in many ways. For instance, during this time, the Dayton peace process started and ended, which opened many other issues, from borders to the legal succession of the former Yugoslavia. In Dayton, [Croatian President] Tudjman and [Serbian President] Milosevic, among other things, agreed on the mutual recognition of Zagreb and Belgrade. At the upcoming peace conference in Paris, they are also expected to sign an agreement to make this effective.

Today's issue of the Croatian weekly GLOBUS publishes a secret draft of the agreement in 12 points, where the fourth point is especially interesting, if not outright worrying, for the Slovene side. Namely, in it, Croatia recognizes the state continuity of the Serb-Montenegrin state, that is, the succession of the disintegrated SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. If this is the case, Slovenia's concern over the succession is justified as it could easily happen that Belgrade would try to seize the entire joint assets of the former Yugoslavia.

For that reason, Minister Thaler will definitely demand further explanations and assurances from his Croatian colleague Granic at today's meeting [in Bezanec castle in Croatia]. Another issue opened by the Dayton process is that of borders. We are, of course, talking about the Prevlaka peninsula, which, as the signals from Dayton suggest, Croatia is willing to cede to Serbia. However, in previous talks with Ljubljana, Zagreb has, on numerous occasions, argued that any yielding regarding Piran Bay would set a dangerous precedent for the drawing of the Croatia's southern border. Those who support the idea of ceding Prevlaka to the Serbs are now suddenly stating that these two cases cannot be compared, as in the case of Piran Bay, the ceding would not merely involve the bay but also several hundreds of square kilometers of Croatian territorial waters. Istrian Deputy Kajin argued against such a stance yesterday. He was the first to point out that the change of the land border on Prevlaka would doubtlessly be reflected in the sea border, too. Precisely for that reason, Minister Thaler will most probably demand to know Croatia's official stance on this question at the meeting today.

## Federal

### National Bank's Avramovic on New Economic Program

*AU3011095095 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Nov 95 p 11*

[Interview with National Bank President Dragoslav Avramovic by Jasna Kesic; place and date not given: "Beggars Cannot Be Choosers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If we can trust our politicians and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] businessmen, who claimed that the sanctions were the only impediment to the implementation of the second part of Avramovic's economic program, there are no longer any impediments. We shall soon see whether this is really so and what is happening with "Program 2." Therefore we started the interview with Professor Dragoslav Avramovic, National Bank president, with the following question:

[Kesic] Will the "program" begin and if so, when will this be?

[Avramovic] I do not know. I wrote to Mr. Kotic the day before yesterday. He has all our documentation about the four things that have to be done immediately. First of all, the exchange rate has to be fixed, and, secondly, their decision or recommendation about the future foreign trade policy has to be respected. I have stipulated that permits for imports and exports be abolished immediately. We cannot change the exchange rate—in the way I would like this to be—unless we have these reforms. If you apply the present customs and import duties parallel with the new exchange rate, everything will explode. Number three: the decision must be adopted immediately and firmly that the Payment Transactions Agency be put under National Bank control. Number four: I want to see how far we have come with the proposals and ideas for the reform of foreign investment legislation. It should be totally liberalized, and any discrimination of foreign capital should be excluded.

[Kesic] Negative experiences of eastern European countries with foreign investments are very often mentioned by the state leadership....

[Avramovic] I do not know. There is the English saying that beggars cannot be choosers. We do not have any savings, we depend on the reconstruction of our capital stock, not to mention new investments. We must do all we can to get foreign assets. Then we shall discuss what we shall do, since we live in a very competitive world, where there is no "beating around the bush." If we, apart from that, live in the illusion that we have negotiating power, this is zero.

[Kesic] Who do you expect will show the biggest resistance to the implementation of the program?

[Avramovic] The first problem is foreign trade, whether import and export permits and contingents are abolished or not. This is the most important thing. Managers of large companies claim in the Chamber of Commerce: "We support it, but we have to be careful." I do not know what one has to be careful about here. If we cannot be competitive with an exchange rate of 3.3 dinars [to the German mark]—if we assume that this will be the new exchange-rate—and if we add 30 percent stimulation to it, we shall have the exchange-rate of 4.5 dinars, there is no help. In that case you would burden the domestic production with costs it could not endure. What kind of domestic industry can you have if this industry has to pay three times more for steel at home than abroad? This is what the whole thing boils down to. One of the reasons why our [first] program was broken was an increase in the prices of these goods: Raw materials and semi-processed goods, steel, aluminum, dyes, chemicals, polypropylene etc. The prices were increased by 100 or 200 percent, which, consequently, affected all other prices.

[Kesic] Will the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank start soon?

[Avramovic] The first hurdle is on 14 December [1995]. This is the deadline for our temporary status in these organizations. If we fail to make use of that deadline, we shall have to wait for another six months. We have constituted the commission for negotiations, the members of which are Kontic, me, and some other people. We first considered postponing these talks to some later time, but I think that we should try now so as to accelerate the whole thing, to do something before 14 December, if this is somehow possible. We shall see. Everything partially depends on whether this topic was discussed in Ohio. It is questionable whether they would receive us, had this not been previously discussed, but we do not know this. We shall prepare everything, so that everything can go at maximum speed.

[Kesic] Now, after the suspension of the sanctions, our Yugoslav deposits abroad are no longer frozen—they amount to 1.5 billion German marks. Will it be possible to use a part of this money as support for "Program 2"?

[Avramovic] According to the resolution—at least how I understand it, and how it was interpreted for me, though this is not certain, since one must be an excellent lawyer to understand it completely—we should be able to dispose of all the money. If there are claims, however, the matter will be brought to court, and as long as there is no court decision, you cannot get anything. This is number one. Number two is that the states of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia are explicitly mentioned in a resolution paragraph, which means that they have certain claims. The countries that consider that they have been damaged can say that they are damaged, and then everything depends on the country where the money is. The whole matter has to be brought to court then. There will be countries that will say that it does not matter, but there are certainly some that will consider the whole thing problematic. That is why we cannot take the money. In any case, a big step forward has been made compared to the earlier situation. Not only have personal accounts and bank assets been unblocked, but also official assets have been unblocked too.

[Kesic] Has the misunderstanding between you and the Serbian government, that is the SPS, mainly arisen about when the program should be adopted, or are there differences in your concepts too?

[Avramovic] You can judge on it much better than I can. Do not force me to go too far. I believed that we had to change the exchange rate a year ago and that we would have solved many problems had we done that. I have been formally arguing with the authorities because of that for the last three or four months, since June. This means that there are differences. This problem has more or less been solved, but others arise now—to what extent will foreign trade be liberalized. I claim that this must be done in order to retain price stability. There are voices that claim this is not necessary, but if we do not have it, we shall end up as expensive manufacturers of everything. That is the problem. Nobody supports the idea of giving away the market you have, but there is a problem if you are inefficient manufacturers.

[Kesic] Tell us, finally, what you will do if your program does not materialize?

[Avramovic] This is a hypothetical question, and I do not want to answer hypothetical questions.

**[Box, p 11]**

**Do Not Rush to Shops**

[Kesic] The sanctions have been suspended, what should, in your opinion, be done right away?

[Avramovic] Let me first tell you what should not be done. It is not necessary to run to the shops to buy things. And I do not know what is necessary. We can sell commodities now, which means that we should manufacture cheap commodities of good quality. This is the most important thing. It is also necessary to establish direct contacts, so that we do not need any mediators in our contacts with the world. All this will be done, regardless of whether I do it, or those I have in mind.

**[Box, p 11]**

**Temporary Silence**

[Kesic] Do you sincerely believe that "Program 2" will be implemented?

[Avramovic] I would not argue so much if I thought that it would not. I would not. In my opinion, there is absolutely no other solution. We have to interrupt the chain of price increases, since the present "silence" is temporary. We can already feel the shortage of medicines, milk, oil, meat, etc. Only threats with imports and competitive domestic production can be of help.

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### 'Evolution' of Montenegrin Foreign Policy Viewed

*AU2911171995 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25-26 Nov 95 (Supplement) p 4*

[Commentary by Radivoj Cveticanin: "World's Choice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kontic [FRY prime minister] has not travelled anywhere for a long time, and we seem to remember that, even when he did, it was only to Sofia. In any case, it was to the present and former East and a long time ago.

Milo Djukanovic [Montenegrin prime minister] has just returned from the United States and is now visiting England. Russia is expecting him.

Therefore, these are our prime ministers' travels. Each of them is taking his own road, and a deep difference is visible even to the naked eye. One of them—who makes less of an exhibition, apart from personal ones—has visited the biggest and most powerful countries. It is conceivable that both Kontic and Marjanovic would rather travel to Washington and London than stay at home. It is Djukanovic, however, who received the invitations. Why Djukanovic?

The easiest and most precize answer to this question can, of course, be provided by those who sent the invitations. For the time being, however, they are not showing any will to do so. They reckon that they have done enough.

Let us start at the end. According to reliable sources, Djukanovic had some fine moments in the States. In a way, they liked him. Clinton did not receive him, although he asked certain people who this young man was and where he came from. Gore did not receive him either, although there were some plans for that. They say that Holbrooke interfered because Milosevic demanded it, and everything ended with a visit to the Pentagon. It was there that Djukanovic presented the idea of sending NATO forces to Bosnia via the port of Bar—certainly the most spectacular idea expressed by our foreign politics of late. However, what interested Djukanovic most in the States was business, and Djukanovic himself was most interesting for businessmen. Anyway, the idea about NATO and Bar is in fact commercial and not political.

All this, however, is a little poignant story that still fails to answer the question: Why Djukanovic?

The answer is not in the United States but at home. And there, in Podgorica, it is shown increasingly clearly that the young men from the so-called January anti-bureaucratic revolution are, in many aspects, no longer the "young, smart, and handsome," as they carelessly used to think and say about themselves. In other words, they are no longer so rigid and wild. They, themselves, are aware of the changes in their policy. They have restrained themselves, however, by just saying that the policy is "recognizable." In any case, invitations for visit were not sent to the young, smart, and handsome Djukanovic, but the Djukanovic who, with conviction and sweet words, speaks about an open society; above all, a society with an open economy.

One thing is certain—the January movement that Djukanovic also belonged to went through a visible evolution. So much so that this group has little in common with the original apart from the personalities involved. Their mentor, Milosevic, also underwent evolution, but it seems his was upon a much narrower platform. What could be called his evolutionary capacity has, so far, showed itself to be very limited. The Montenegrins are simply demonstrating fewer prejudices than their teacher. This is why Djukanovic and his party bunch always appear much better compared with Serbia and Yugoslavia than with their own people in Montenegro.

This is perhaps where the essence of the answer to the question "why Djukanovic?" lies. The invitations that were sent to the Montenegrins from the big world are only a signal or, as that world likes to cynically put, encouragement. Yugoslavia, however, does not see that as an asset but as rivalry, and, instead of support, there is obstruction and the preparation of a silk cord. The issue of NATO troops and Bar seemed terrible to some circles here. In fact, it seemed handy to present it as such. The heaviest artillery was being prepared for Djukanovic, but then later it was reported that NATO troops are to reach Bosnia via Hungary. What could happen now that the idea was confirmed during the London visit? The odium has certainly not been removed for good. Official Belgrade ignores Montenegrin visits and initiatives. Our diplomacy also shows restraint. What else would that be but a bout of obvious political jealousy? Perhaps the question should be cleared up and formulated like this: Who is it on this territory who would like to remain the exclusive U.S. favorite? Judging from everything, this also seems to be at stake. The side of Montenegrin policy representing itself as completely unxenophobic has become disputable for Yugoslavia instead of becoming, in a way, an example to be followed. Is this a syndrome of a master or political egoism? Or is it rivalry in the struggle for the love of the big world?

If nothing else, Djukanovic certainly wants to show that it is not only geography but also politics that determines whether a country is big or small.

## Serbia

### Solution for Serb Republic Viewed as Not 'Final'

*AU3011090395 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 29 Nov 95*

[Commentary by Sonja Djuric]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Since both the American and Yugoslav sides have stated that the provisions of the agreement committed to paper in Ohio would not be changed in any way at the Paris meeting, we can speak about the Dayton Accord being the final document creating a new country in southeast Europe, which apart from everything else will sport one unusual dimension. It is supposed to demonstrate and perhaps even to become a blueprint for joint life on a territory once torn asunder by civil war.

A great deal of the Dayton Accord concentrates on the removal of the causes of possible conflict, such as the out-voting, the domination of a majority, discrimination, and conspiracy. Once all the documents are published it will transpire that in order to pass the most important decisions such extensive verification, arbitration, and consensus of the representatives bodies of the three constituent peoples and the two entities, which have numerous elements of sovereign countries—the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croatian Federation—will be required that it would be difficult to change anything in the absence of mutual goodwill.

In the commentaries by a segment of the Yugoslav political public, however, this important portion of the agreement, the constitutional principles and the agreements whose aim is military stabilization in the entire region, have been overshadowed by the territorial division. Probably, because some believe that in this part of the agreement, the details of which are still being worked out, some essential changes could be accomplished. Such reactions come from all sides, not just the Serbian, as after three and a half years of merciless war the value of these places has become more metaphorical than of any actual value. [passage omitted]

The final map that will form an integral part of the Paris document that will bring the Dayton Accord into life will be the last page in a thick atlas that one could make of all the maps of divisions proposed over the past few years and in past negotiations. It would, doubtlessly, have been better had the peace negotiations been embraced earlier, because, as we have learned from our participants, at the beginning of the talks in Dayton it was proposed that a considerably smaller chunk of territory be allocated for the Serb Republic from the territory that the Yugoslav side, with great efforts, ultimately managed to secure. According to this proposal, the Serb Republic would get only 33 percent of the overall Bosnia-Herzegovina territory. The reason for such a low starting bid was the drastically altered situation in the Serb Republic—it has lost a lot of territory, it was weakened militarily, and it bore the stigma of not having honored a single agreement.

Although it is not specified explicitly anywhere in its 150 pages, the Dayton Accord set direct conditions for lifting the sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia and has improved its security position. The Serb Republic has become its western neighbor, with whom it will maintain versatile links.

While it also does not say so anywhere on the pages of this agreement, the following is clear to all: For the first time since World War II there has been created in Europe a country that had had on its territory no state, nor historical or geographical tradition. Bosnia-Herzegovina was always referred to as a mixture of peoples. Therefore, a new Serbian state has been formed which for the time being is constitutionally linked to another country. This situation should not be viewed as final, however, but rather as a stage in the process, in the chain that it is hoped will lead to positive possibilities in the future.

## Kosovo

### LDK Leader Agani Insists on Independence

*AU2911200195 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 24 Nov 95 pp 19-20*

[Interview with Fehmi Agani, vice chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo, by Srboljub Bogdanovic in Pristina; date not given: "The Parallel Life Goes On"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It was not difficult to make an appointment with Mr. Fehmi Agani. The interview with the vice chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK] (and university professor) was organized in the modest rooms of the Association of Kosovo Writers in Pristina, which at the same time serve as the LDK "headquarters." It was our intention to talk with Mr. Agani about the chances for a change of the circumstances in Kosovo. It is only natural that all this is in the context of the present peace arrangements, which could somehow include Kosovo, too. Mr. Agani was glad to be able to fulfill our wish and answer our questions, but his condition was that the interview should not be published in the same NIN issue, in which interviews with some other Kosovo activists would be published. Therefore we left Mr. Agani the questions for the interview which he answered and sent to us several days later on.

[Bogdanovic] How would you assess the present (political) situation in Kosovo?

[Agani] The situation in Kosovo is difficult and increasingly unbearable. The all-inclusive and systematic discrimination of Albanians and repression as a kind of state terror—with which none of the paramilitary formations can be charged or blamed for—are very intensive and happen on a daily basis. The public life of Albanians is disturbed, blocked, we are persecuted. We have had imposed on us a national stratification, which has been encouraged by continuous repressive interventions by Serbia, so that there is the tendency that this might become a permanent, "normal" relationship. Still, the "parallel" life goes on. The national separation, however, is almost complete, which is interpreted in the wrong way by the Serbian president, who boasted on BBC that there were no conflicts and frictions in Kosovo! There have been no changes for the better, and this is the worst possible thing in Kosovo.

[Bogdanovic] What would in your opinion, or in the opinion of the LDK, be the solution to Kosovo acceptable for everybody?

[Agani] Our wish is an independent and sovereign Kosovo, based on the wish of the people expressed in the 1991 referendum as well as on the constitutional and legal position Kosovo had in the earlier constitutional structure, which entitles it to self-determination in the event of the collapse of Yugoslavia. Finally, our wish for an independent and sovereign Kosovo is also based on the policies of discrimination and persecution of Albanians, pursued by Serbia, which deprives Serbia of its right to have aspirations to Kosovo. It is not up to us to prognosticate a solution acceptable for everybody. A solution can only be reached through a dialogue among Kosovo, Serbia, and the international community.

[Bogdanovic] Has the LDK made something a condition for a dialogue?

[Agani] No, we only support serious talks, which should be to the point, and we have not set any conditions. In contrast to the opinion created by the powerful propaganda machinery, the Albanians have neither avoided nor conditioned a dialogue up to now—Serbia has done that. Serbia's condition was—this was confirmed by frequent statements made by officials and professors, Mihajlo and Ratko Markovic—that the annexation of Kosovo achieved by Serbia in 1989 and 1990 be accepted.

I would add that it is not a condition, but an assumed prerequisite for a successful dialogue that the cruel repression and attacks against the Albanian tradition, culture, and the public work in Kosovo come to a halt. Certain extremely senseless blockades have to be given up. The logic supported by a Belgrade official in a Radio Free Europe interview that the repression—if there is one, he made the restriction—need not necessarily precede a dialogue but be a result of it, cannot be accepted. If a dialogue without any conditions is acceptable for us, this does not mean that any initiative for talks has to be accepted. We have had many bad experiences in the small number of contacts we have had so far, so that we are not inclined to lead marginal talks, talks that are not promising and may be used to create the illusion that there are contacts and a dialogue.

[Bogdanovic] Would the LDK or other Albanian parties participate in the next election in Serbia, probably next year?

[Agani] No. Although this has not been discussed, it is almost certain that neither the LDK nor other Albanian parties will participate in any kind of elections in Serbia. This is incompatible with the determination for the independent Kosovo. Any kind of participation in the elections in Serbia would legalize in a way the situation imposed on Kosovo by Serbia. Our only political, representative, and legal body can only be the parliament of Kosovo, and not of Serbia. When Kosovo used to be an autonomous region "within Serbia," the function of the parliament was performed by the National Assembly of Kosovo, whereas the representation in Serbia was symbolic. Today, however, we have a legally elected parliament of Kosovo, whose public activity has been disabled by Serbia.

[Bogdanovic] What are relations within the LDK like?

[Agani] The LDK is a large and heterogeneous party, and there must be certain internal problems. Still, it has remained unique, and it seems to us that it functions successfully, without any problems. We have just completed the yearly meetings in around 30 branches and we are pleased with the result.

[Bogdanovic] What are the relations between the LDK and its former members like, and why are some of them allegedly acceptable for Serbia?

[Agani] The former political leaders of Kosovo, if we exclude those infiltrated by the counterintelligence service and the police and imposed as leaders, all support an independent Kosovo. Accordingly, we have good relations. It is another problem that we—perhaps because of our own inability or inexperience—do not have the cooperation we should have. Some of our former political leaders are not more desirable for Serbia [than us]. Serbia has difficulties in establishing contacts with legal institutions, the president, the government, the parliament, even with political parties, since they all symbolize the Republic of Kosovo. Therefore, but also to provoke conflicts between Albanians, these former officials are claimed to be "more desirable." This will not be successful, however, and Serbia will sooner or later be confronted with a new Kosovo.

[Bogdanovic] Do you consider it a big Kosovo problem that the opinion prevails that it can be ruled either by Serbs or by Albanians, who are always in opposition?

[Agani] This is a scheme that does not work. The problem of Kosovo is that it has always been an object of hegemonistic ambitions from outside. It is possible that Kosovo is equally shared by the two nations. As far as Serbia is concerned, it has always provoked international conflicts and manipulated the problem of the Serbs in Kosovo, not to solve them, but to use them for the achievement of greater-Serbian hegemonistic aims. The present regime stresses antagonisms because it is founded on them and they help it survive.

[Bogdanovic] The international political factors more and more openly claim that the Kosovo issue must be treated as an internal Serbian matter. Can this be considered a political failure of the LDK?

[Agani] No, the statement implied in your question is not true. On the contrary, I think that no international subject considers or claims that the Kosovo issue should be treated as an internal Serbian issue. Even those who think that a solution must be found without changing the present borders, do not think that this is an internal Serbian matter. After all, it would be senseless to treat the political destiny of a nation as "the internal issue" of another nation and its state. In other words, we cannot speak about the failure; on the contrary, the understanding and the support of the Kosovo issue at the international level can be considered one of the LDK successes.

[Bogdanovic] The LDK has chosen forms of peaceful resistance. Is this one of the reasons there are less national tensions in Pristina today?

[Agani] Yes, certainly. The determination of the LDK and other political parties for a peaceful resistance has had a significant positive influence on national tensions. The people, both Albanians and Serbs, feel better, although it has to be pointed out that the lack of tensions is partially also a result of drastically reduced relations.

[Bogdanovic] Can such a policy be called "pacifism?"

[Agani] Certainly not. The determination for a peaceful solution to Kosovo problems is connected to pacifism, but our struggle relies on the policy of resistance without weapons as well as on the development of our own forms of organization, relations, and activities.

[Bogdanovic] Is there a danger of relations among Albanians becoming more radical?

[Agani] Mr. Rugova's peaceful orientation still enjoys great support. Every orientation and support have their limits, however. If the solution is dismissed and the present situation continues for too long, radicalization is not only possible, but also inevitable.

[Bogdanovic] Do you believe that the Serbian president could in Ohio agree on an arrangement for Kosovo, avoiding the LDK?

[Agani] I do not think this is possible. The possibility is not excluded that the Serbian president could try to do this to profit at least here—since he has to give up his aims in Bosnia and Croatia. He could try to find support for his policy toward Kosovo. I doubt, however, that anybody would accept a discussion or a decision on Kosovo without Albanians. And, finally, I think that treacherous activities toward Kosovo have to be abandoned, since nobody can gain anything if a new framework is created for old and new conflicts, for permanent disputes and conflicts.

### Forum Faults 'One Party' Monopoly for Paralysis

*AU3011090695 Zurich BOTA SOT in Albanian 27 Nov 95 p 2*

[Report on statement issued by FIShK in Pristina; date not given: "The National Question—the Test of All Albanian Policies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Pristina, 26 November [QIK]—The Forum of Albanian Intellectuals of Kosova [FIShK] has issued a statement on the situation with suggestions on ways of finding a just solution to the Albanian national question.

The statement starts by pointing out that the Albanian issue is in a state of crisis. According to the FIShK, the Albanian question is to be found in the great historical crossroads in a "stowed parcel" and is being held hostage to developments in the Yugoslav crisis. [sentence as published] The Albanian issue has not managed to be internationalized beyond the sphere of human freedoms and minority rights and as a potential crisis of nerves in the regional conflict. International concern over the danger of conflict prevails over finding a just solution to the Albanian question.

The statement stresses that, while the federal units [of former Yugoslavia] have become free sovereign states, a situation of restoration and repartition under foreign rule is being offered to the Albanians. The statement also stresses that, even at the end of this century, there is a real danger of having the Albanian issue sacrificed for a democratic illusion and regional peace and stability.

The statement goes on to say that the current Albanian crisis is a crisis of conscience, agreement, and historical action. It is permeated by lethargy, lack of organization, bias, alienation from the homeland and national values, indifference toward the national question, marginal cosmopolitanism and snobbery, corruption, prostitution, and drugs. Meanwhile, the gravest consequence is the mass exodus from the entire Albanian ethnic territory.

The FIShK believes that the issue in question is currently being endangered not only by the vicious occupation, the ethnic cleansing, and the recolonization, but principally by the state of our nation itself, which is not reflecting the historical moment. The weakest link in the Albanian question lies with the Albanians themselves, as, according to the FIShK, the national movement has been paralyzed by the monopolization by one party during the occupation with no chance of pure pluralism.

We have only given form to, but have not vitally institutionalized the political and national will. Improvisations and political verbalizations cannot create independence and sovereignty. We have not yet managed to nationalize the Albanian question or set up a program and a national strategy, the statement reads. Albanian politics has not managed to present the issue in the proper way, even less to insist on a just solution to the Albanian question. Albanian politics has been entirely subject to international whims and expects a solution to come from a card table set up by others. Thus, the policy currently is neither self-supporting nor has any international guarantee of resolving the national question.

Assessing that it is crucial in the Albanian question to institutionalize the nation, the FIShK demands a national program to define: —the interest of national unity and integration into West European civilization;

—a policy of national consensus with a clear strategic platform to coordinate actions and obligations; —modern diplomacy that demands and insists on a just solution to the national issue; —a judicial state that creates a moral code of national stability, respects the democratic institutions and values of a civic society, and demands territorial and ethnic integrity in the national constitution and the obligation to protect national rights and interests and the Albanian diaspora organized on a national basis.

The statement concludes by recalling the historic responsibility that Albanian state institutions, parties, and intellectuals bear and stresses that the Albanian question is not and cannot be an issue of political ideology, of "democratic space" or of an "open society," but, above all, should be a question of national ideology and ethnic space, where a nation establishes its own existence and history, as well as creating a democratic and open society.

The national question today is a test of all Albanian policies, whose life depends on the resolution of this question, reads the FIShK statement signed by Academician Rexhep Qosja, chairman, and Abdyl Kadolli, secretary.

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